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1.1 CULTURE. PSYCHOLOGY AND CRITIQUE 
Towards the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, after drawing out some similarities between 
the ontogenetic process of the child's development of a superego function and the corresponding 
phylogenetic process in which the human 'species' develops a social order, Freud poses a question 
which, he says, he "can hardly ignore". He asks: 
"If the evolution of civilization has such far-reaching similarity with the 
development of an individual, and if the same methods are employed in both, 
would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization - or epochs 
of it - possibly even the whole of humanity - have become "neurotic" under the 
pressure of the civilizing trends? " (Freud, 1930, p. 103). 
These words of Freud seem to suggest that he believed modern society to have a greater tendency 
towards neurosis than previous epochs. However, Freud saw himself first and foremost, as a 
scientist and, because he could not envisage a scientific way of making a cultural diagnosis', he 
turned away from the problem. He reneged on giving a positive answer to the question he raised, 
citing the fact that when we make an individual diagnosis we are comparing the individual to a 
majority of people in the society, whom we regard as normal, whereas no such comparison is 
possible in the case of society as a whole. In this thesis one of my central arguments will be that 
post-traumatic anxiety is something which is particularly associated with the culture (or 
condition) of postmodernity. I shall argue that this association goes some way towards explaining 
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the spectacular growth of interest, both professional and lay, in the issue of trauma in the past 
twenty years. I am, inevitably, making a sort of 'cultural diagnosis' and indeed cultural criticism. 
Because of this I wish to begin this introduction with a discussion of the concept of cultural 
critique. 
For Freud, there was no detached objective position from which one could make a 'cultural 
diagnosis'. In avoiding the problem, however, Freud ended up endorsing a notion of 
psychological normality, which, being based on the prevailing cultural norm, was inherently 
conformist. Reuben Fine in his History of Psychoanalysis comments : 
"Thus, typically, in one breath Freud openly condemned the civilization in which 
he found himself and in the next breath almost withdrew his critique. This 
ambivalence lies at the root of many later conflicts in the history of 
psychoanalysis" (Fine, 1979, p. 369). 
Freud's ambivalence towards the issue of 'cultural diagnosis', and his reluctance to take a strong 
critical position in regard to his own society, have been condemned by a number of recent 
commentators (e. g. Jeffrey Masson, in his The Assault on Truth: Freud and Child Sexual Abuse, 
1984). However, others from within the psychoanalytic tradition have not shared this 
ambivalence. There has been a sustained engagement between psychoanalysis and Marxist 
thought running from the work of Wilheim Reich, in Freud's own time, up to Joel Kovel, in our 
own. Eric Fromm, in his work The Sane Society, developed a critique of modern capitalist society 
from a position of "humanistic psychoanalysis" (Fromm, 1963, p. vii). Fromm had no doubt that 
there could be a "pathology of normalcy" and argued that : 
"the criterion of mental health is not one of individual adjustment to a given social 
order, but a universal one, valid for all men, of giving a satisfactory answer to the 
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problem of human existence" (Fromm, 1963, p. 14). 
Implicit in the Freudo-Marxist position is a belief that there can be a universal "criterion of mental 
health"; in Fromm's words, a rationally conceived perspective on society which can be used to 
guide progressive social change. 
These debates in psychology, about the possibility, or otherwise, of a detached position from 
which one can mount a reason-based social critique, resonate with a number of other twentieth 
century debates in the social sciences. In the field of medical anthropology, for example, a similar 
theoretical debate has been going on for the past ten to twenty years between the defenders of 
a 'critical medical anthropology' and their opponents who adhere to a tradition of 'cultural 
constructivism'. The former defend the critical role of anthropological research in the area of 
illness and healing and argue that Western biomedicine involves theories and practices which work 
to support an oppressive social order. In other words, biomedicine is said to be 'ideological'. It 
serves: 
"... the ideological needs of the social orders to the detriment of healing and our 
understanding of the social causes of misfortune" (Taussig, 1980, p. 3). 
If biomedicine can be characterised in terms of ideology there is an assumption that a non- 
ideological position can be achieved and that this should be the goal of medical anthropology. 
On the other hand, those who argue from a constructivist position suggest that there is no neutral, 
objective, 'non-ideological' point from which the social scientist can adopt a 'critical' perspective. 
They point out that any 'critical' perspective can easily be shown to incorporate assumptions of 
one sort or another. The analytic terms used by 'critical' social scientists such as class, class 
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conflict, infrastructure, superstructure are, according to the constructivists, themselves cultural 
products and indicative of a certain (Marxist) view of reality. Most importantly, they argue that 
proponents of critical medical anthropology, although presenting biomedicine as being expressive 
of a bourgeois social order, nevertheless understand it to be a uniquely independent, sovereign 
institution set apart from, and oppressive of, society at large. On the other hand: 
"The constructivist approach allows for the understanding of medical knowledge 
as an expression of culture rather than as elite knowledge set apart and opposed 
to society in the form of some putative class (as in Marxist approaches) or 
"scientific" (as in medicine's view) ideology. While Marxism and medicine 
construe medical knowledge in their own way, both agree that it is an acultural 
ideology "(Gaines, 1992, a, p. 18). 
For the constructivists, all medical systems, including biomedicine, are cultural products. They 
also argue against the notion that Western biomedicine is a singular, oppressive, monolithic 
structure. Rather there are different biomedicines, reflecting different cultural emphases and 
traditions. They also oppose the critical tradition for its 'uncritical' position towards other non- 
biomedical medical systems. Cultural constructivism in medical anthropology involves the 
provision of'thick descriptions' (Geertz, 1973) of healing systems and their cultural contexts. It 
attempts to show how all medical knowledge is culturally produced and is the product (as is 
biomedicine) of conflict between different and opposing social groups. They deny any 'extra- 
cultural' position from which an objective critical account can be produced and instead produce 
'critiques', rather than 'criticisms' (Gaines, 1992, b, p. 6). 
In other words, it appears that we face a dilemma : if we accept the embedded, constructed 
nature of our knowledge, then the function of psychology and anthropology is limited to 
description, and description from a particular perspective only. On the other hand, if we accept 
9 
a strongly critical position with regard to medicine, or modern society in general, we appear to 
commit ourselves to the notion of a critical rationality which is universal and acultural. This 
position is increasingly difficult to sustain in the light of mounting evidence from anthropology 
(for example, see the essays in Overing, 1985) and the current popularity of post-structuralist 
arguments in many of the human sciences. As mentioned above, this thesis involves an element 
of critique in relation to psychology and psychiatry and makes the case that certain forms of 
distress are particularly associated with modern society. I shall discuss philosophical aspects of 
this debate in the next section and then introduce the thought of Martin Heidegger, which, I 
believe, allows us to avoid the extremes of the debate introduced above. I shall follow this with 
an introduction to the discourse on trauma. After this preamble I shall then be in a position to 
outline the structure of the thesis and introduce my central arguments. 
1.2 PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE 
The debate about critical positions in psychology and anthropology, introduced above, has also 
been reflected in philosophy. Indeed, in his book Life-world, Modernity and Critique Fred 
Dallmayr argues that concerns with the possibility of a 'critical reason' lie behind the central 
philosophical debates of our age. The challenge posed to 'traditional metaphysics' by 'post- 
metaphysical' and 'post-modern' philosophies involves a questioning of our ability to reflect upon 
ourselves and our social and cultural institutions from a detached and rational perspective. 
Through their emphasis on the contingency of human reason, its temporal and cultural 
embeddedness, such philosophies seem to dissolve the impact of any critical position and negate 
our ability to assess progress or decline. Dallmayr writes: 
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"By traditional metaphysics I mean here a philosophical outlook anchored in the 
primacy of the cogito or the accomplishments of critical rationality and 
consciousness - accomplishments which form the backbone of modernity and 
cultural modernization. In our century, metaphysics of this kind has been 
challenged or called into question by several developments - particularly by the 
turn to language seen as the matrix of human reason and, more broadly, by 
renewed concerns with the situatedness of thought or its embeddedness in the 
"life-world" " (Dallmayr, 1991, p. 1). 
Dallmayr sees this challenge exemplified in the work of Wittgenstein and some of his followers. 
However, his focus is upon debates in continental philosophy, in particular twentieth century 
German philosophy. He points to the famous exchange between Habermas and Gadamer about 
the issue of tradition, as a good example of these debates. In his major work Truth and Method 
Gadamer argued that all human understanding is historically and culturally located and that there 
can be no starting point for knowledge which is outside tradition. He positioned himself against 
the modern divorce of reason from tradition and against the Enlightenment 'prejudice against 
prejudice'. For Gadamer: 
"Understanding must be thought of not so much as an act of (transcendental) 
subjectivity, but rather as immersion and participation in the event of tradition 
where past and present are constantly mediated" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 282). 
In an extensive review of Truth and Method, published some years later, Habermas challenged 
Gadamer's 'rehabilitation of prejudice' and pointed to an inherent 'conservatism' in Gadamer's 
position. According to Habermas, this position denied a proper understanding of emancipation 
and progress. If we cannot stand outside tradition, and reflect critically on it from a non- 
prejudiced vantage point, we are doomed forever to live within ideology and oppression. He says: 
"Gadamer's prejudice for the role of prejudices certified by tradition denies the 
11 
potency of reflection, a potency which proves itself in its ability also to reject the 
claims of tradition' (Habermas, 1977, p. 358). 
In his analysis of this debate, which continued in a number of other publications, Dallmayr writes 
that there was a failure to "settle or even sharply pinpoint disputed issues". He criticizes Gadamer 
for holding onto a somewhat over-positive view of tradition. He says that in Gadamer's writing: 
" 
... the portrayal of 
historical tradition sometimes intimated a solid framework or 
else the unfolding of a steady teleology -a process privileging continuity of 
meaning over discontinuity and rupture" (Dallmayr, 1991, p. 25). 
While he does not endorse Habermas's overall frame of reference, Dallmayr does seem to agree 
with his argument that Gadamer's position denies the possibility of a proper grounding for 
critique. 
In more recent times Habermas has engaged with the work of Michel Foucault, who attempted 
to develop an overtly critical position with regard to the social sciences, but who also denied the 
possibility of a detached reason. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987), Habermas 
concurred with Foucault in recognizing reason as 'a thing of this world', and the 'immanence' of 
our standards of rationality. However, he argues that claims to truth and falsity reveal, by the very 
process of their articulation, a 'transcendent' element. It is in this distinction between the 
contingent and the transcendent aspects of communication that Habermas attempts to locate a 
new idea of universal reason. This reason is grounded in the fact that communication is a universal 
feature of human life and, according to Habermas, that at the heart of all communicative action 
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is an orientation towards validity claims'. While Habermas denies the possibility of a reason 
discovered or elaborated within the confines of individual consciousness (subject-centred reason), 
he asserts the reality of a reason which emerges in the social context of communication. 
Throughout all his work, Habermas sees it as essential that some conception of universal, non- 
ideological standards of rationality are maintained. If they are not, according to him, we have no 
vantage point from which to judge whether or not we are progressing. Challenging the current 
ideas of the social sciences only makes sense if we: 
"preserve at least one standard for (the) explanation of the corruption of all 
reasonable standards" (Habermas, 1982, p. 28). 
What is at stake, for Habermas, is the Enlightenment goal of being able to apply rational criticism 
to existing social institutions. If we have no universal standards of rationality then the possibility 
of this evaporates. Critique becomes ad hoc and liberation and progress are only illusions. 
For Foucault, however, the illusion resides in the belief that reason can be separated from 
ideology. His writing about reason emerges from his work on power and knowledge, in which he 
argues that traditional concepts of power as something essentially repressive cannot account for 
the many functions of power in modern society. In Discipline and Punish he argues that: 
"We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; 
it 'excludes, ' it 'represses, ' it 'censors, ' it 'abstracts, ' it 'masks, ' it 'conceals. ' In 
fact power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to 
'I shall present Derrida's critique of Habermas's approach to language and communication 
in chapter ten, below. 
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this production" (Foucault, 1977, a, p. 194) 
In this way he argues that knowledge is the concrete manifestation of the positive functioning of 
power. Knowledge is inextricably associated with networks of power: 
"power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it is 
useful); ... power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; ... there 
is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations" (Foucault, 1977, a, p. 27). 
Foucault holds that knowledge can never be separated from power and refutes the Marxist 
conception of 'ideology versus truth'. His approach to reason and rationality can be seen to follow 
from this. For him there is no such thing as an independent reason. Instead there are many 
different rationalities, all tied to various power formations for their meaning and validity. As Barry 
Smart notes: 
"whereas within the Marxist tradition and in the work of the critical theorists there 
is the clear implication of a higher rationality, a liberating reason, which is to be 
nurtured ... 
in Foucault's work there is no absolute "value-of-reason". The thrust 
of (this) work is not to subvert one notion of rationality, as capitalistic, 
instrumental, and technical, with another, "higher" form which is socialist, 
intrinsically emancipatory, and enlightening, but to analyse rationalities, in 
particular how relations of power are rationalised" (Smart, 1983, p. 137). 
For Foucault, being critical did not involve adopting a position of rational superiority over others. 
Rather it involved a demonstration of the contingent origins and contexts of all systems of 
knowledge. In doing this, and in showing how knowledge is always political and thus value-laden, 
Foucault worked to open up spaces where other, often marginalised and silenced, voices could 
be heard. The critical element in his work emerges from this. 
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"what reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different forms of 
rationality offer as their necessary being, can perfectly well be shown to have a 
history; and the network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced, 
which is not to say, however, that these forms of rationality were irrational. It 
means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that 
since these things were made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was 
that they were made (Foucault, 1983, p. 206). 
While there are strong resonances between the stance of constructivism within social science, as 
discussed above, Gadamerian hermeneutics and Foucault's position, there are also substantial 
differences. Before exploring these any further however, I would like to define the term 
hermeneutics and explain what I mean by the expression 'Foucault's position'. 
i) The term 'hermeneutics' will be used throughout this thesis. While difficult to define precisely 
the word hermeneutics is usually taken to mean something like : 'the art or theory of 
interpretation' (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995). As Phillips (1996) notes, the word 
is derived: 
"from the Greek verb hermeneuein, which means "to interpret, " and the noun 
hermeneia, "interpretation" (and both associated with the God Hermes)" (p. 61). 
In the thesis I shall use the term to refer to any approach to human reality which emphasises the 
meaningful nature of human life and which stresses the importance of interpreting human beings 
and their actions by way of reference to the contexts in which they live. Hermeneutic approaches 
stress the primacy of this meaningful level of human reality and deny that it can be reduced to 
explanation in terms of other elements. In the conclusion (chapter eleven) I shall outline some 
different approaches within the hermeneutic tradition. While hermeneutic philosophy has 
traditionally been seen as an element of 'continental philosophy', more recently a number of 
analytic philosophers have embraced the term, most famously Richard Rorty 
in his influential 
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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). 
ii) Foucault, himself, used a number of terms to characterise the nature of his work. Early on, he 
maintained that his 'historical' works were 'archaeological' in nature. Later, when emphasising the 
importance of power in shaping and changing discourses, he used the Nietzschean term 
'genealogy'. However, Foucault was always wary of proposing a 'new method'. While his 
approach had much in common with hermeneutics, there were also important differences. He was 
particularly suspicious of hermeneutic claims to 'uncover' meaning. According to Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1986) Foucault went 'beyond structuralism and hermeneutics'. They define his efforts 
in terms of 'interpretive analytics' : 
"Foucault says that he is writing the history of the present, and we call the method 
that enables him to do this interpretive analytics. This is to say that while the 
analysis of our present practices and their historical development is a disciplined, 
concrete demonstration which could serve as the basis of a research program, the 
diagnosis that the increasing organization of everything is the central issue of our 
time is not in any way empirically demonstrable, but rather emerges as an 
interpretation. This interpretation grows out of pragmatic concerns and has 
pragmatic intent, and for that reason can be contested by other interpretations 
growing out of other concerns" (p. xxii). 
While Gadamer, Foucault and the constructivists are all opposed to the notion of a critical theory 
which could stand outside tradition, they differ in relation to the question of how much a critical 
voice can be developed from within. As Dallmayr notes, there is a tendency for Gadamerian 
hermeneutics to adopt a position of some reverence towards tradition, and the cultural 
constructivists see their primary role as providing descriptions, not criticisms. 
On the other hand 
Foucault saw his work as being explicitly critical. His work has had a powerful effect in 
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stimulating alternative perspectives in many areas including psychiatry, sexuality, criminology, 
and anthropology. By undermining the self-assuredness of dominant discourses his writings have 
helped such alternative voices develop confidence and strength. 
I am attracted to Foucault's work because in it one finds a profound sensitivity to the dangers of 
knowledge and interpretation. Few philosophers share his concerns in this regard. As a practising 
psychiatrist, however, I frequently come face to face with the power of psychiatric theory and 
its interpretations of distress, and am made painfully aware of its often destructive effects on 
patients' lives. The thesis is, in essence, a philosophical discussion of the relationship between 
culture and trauma. My interest in this area emerged from my work as a psychiatrist, in the East 
African country of Uganda, during the years 1987-1991, and my continuing involvement as an 
occasional consultant for the organisation Save the Children Fund with regard to mental health 
projects in West Africa'. My work in Uganda was with the Medical Foundation for the Care of 
Victims of Torture and was funded by the International Secretariat of Amnesty International. The 
aim of the project was to provide medical and psychotherapeutic help to Ugandans who had 
suffered torture at the hands of the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. During my time in the 
country I became increasingly dissatisfied with Western psychiatric models of distress and 
suffering. They appeared inappropriate in many of the situations I encountered. They were too 
individualistic and 'mentalistic' and seemed to pay little attention to the importance of context and 
culture. Talking with villagers at medical clinics, traditional healing centres, political meetings and 
many other places in Uganda, convinced me that any understanding of how these people 
2Ts work has led to the recent publication of a book on the subject of war time violence 
and its psychological effects, see: Bracken, P. and Petty, C. (1998) Rethinking the Trauma of 
Thar. 
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experienced and reacted to the suffering of war had to involve a cultural perspective as a central 
dimension. 
After Uganda, I came to live and work in the U. K. My encounter with the cultural limitations of 
psychiatry in Africa led me to question further its conceptual and historical foundations. This 
questioning led me to philosophy and directly to this current work. This thesis is, therefore, the 
result of my practical involvement with victims of torture and war-time violence and my 
intellectual endeavour to develop an adequate conceptual framework for this work. This 
intellectual endeavour continues and thus the thesis is, in some ways at least, 'unfinished'. Perhaps 
it is the case that just as in clinical psychiatry we never really reach a complete understanding of 
the patient's world and the origins of his/her symptoms, so too a single conceptual framework will 
never be able to properly ground the enterprise of psychiatry. As the thesis springs from the 
'messy' world of clinical practice and is shaped by the dilemmas of this world, it has at its heart 
a certain dilemma : the tension between efforts after understanding victims of violence and their 
experiences and the fact that these efforts themselves can lead to a silencing of the victim's own 
voice. The reader will thus find a tension between interpretation and critique and between 
hermeneutics and deconstruction. Like hermeneutics, the term 'deconstruction' is difficult to 
define. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995) describes deconstruction as : 
"a demonstration of the incompleteness or incoherence of a philosophical position 
using concepts and principles of argument whose meaning and use is legitimated 
only by that philosophical position. A deconstruction is thus a kind of internal 
conceptual critique in which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the 
position criticized". 
The word 'deconstruction' is closely associated with the philosopher Jacques Derrida. However, 
many of Foucault's works could also be described as 'deconstructions'. Foucault shared with 
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Derrida a concern to demonstrate that certain ways in which the world appears to be structured 
according to necessity are in fact contingent and historically relative. These deconstructions work 
to undermine universalist understandings of human reality and the world in general. In some 
situations deconstruction represents a certain refusal to interpret, to explain, to grasp and to order 
'the other'. It thus involves a 'withholding' of knowledge in an attempt to allow the 'other' to 
emerge in its own idiom. In a dialogue with the philosopher Richard Kearney (1984) Derrida 
actually defined deconstruction as 'an openness towards the other' (p. 124). In this thesis I shall 
use the term with this connotation. 
I believe that a tension between hermeneutics and deconstruction is very much in evidence in the 
work of Heidegger and this is why I have put an engagement with his writing at the centre of the 
thesis. In addition, a major concern in the thesis is to provide a critique of the Cartesian 
assumptions which underscore current approaches to trauma. I believe that Heidegger's work 
provides us with the most powerful critique of these assumptions yet developed. I also find 
strong resonances between his account of anxiety in Being and Time and specific themes within 
the discourse on trauma. As mentioned above, I am also drawn towards the critical impulse of 
Foucault's work and I turn to him again towards the end of the thesis in an effort to draw out the 
deconstructive implications of Heidegger's later writing. 
1.3 THE PH[LO S OPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
The philosophy of German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976), though extremely 
complex, has had profound effects on European and North American thought in the twentieth 
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century. Charles Guignon writes: 
"As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is increasingly clear that Heidegger 
will stand out as one of the greatest philosophers of our times. His writings have 
had an immense impact not only in Europe and the English-speaking world, but 
in Asia as well. And his influence has been felt in areas as diverse as literary 
theory, psychoanalysis, rhetoric, ecology, and theology (Guignon, 1993, a, p. 1). 
Heidegger was a student of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and his 
philosophical enterprise was essentially an attempt to reorient phenomenology away from what 
Heidegger saw as a misguided focus on 'pure' internal consciousness towards understanding 
human 'being' as 'being-in-the-world', grounded always in a life-world shaped by culture and 
history. The concept of culture is notoriously difficult to define. In this thesis I will use the word 
in its anthropological sense i. e. referring to 'learned , accumulated experience' or 
'those socially 
transmitted patterns for behaviour characteristic of a particular social group' (Keesing, 1981, p. 
68). It should be noted that Heidegger himself sought to clearly distinguish his philosophical 
hermeneutics from the cultural anthropology of his time. As a rule he avoided the word culture 
altogether. The central philosophical question for Heidegger concerned the meaning of Being. 
How is it that anything at all shows up for us, and makes sense for us? Heidegger approaches this 
question by examining the creature for whom Being is an issue, the human'being'. What he called 
his'fundamental ontology', involved a penetrating existential examination of human experience 
in the context of its real everyday life. For Heidegger, unlike his predecessor Dilthey, 
hermeneutics was not simply an alternative methodological position within the social sciences. 
Verstehen (understanding) was not just an alternative to Erklären (explanation). In Heidegger's 
thought, understanding was not one possible mode of human engagement with the world. 
Instead, for him, the entire human world was constituted through interpretation. Hermeneutics 
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was not a methodological but an ontological discourse. It was not an approach within science, but 
stood outside science: 
"We want neither to replace the sciences nor to reform them. On the other hand, 
we want to participate in the preparation of a decision; the decision: Is science the 
measure of knowledge, or is there a knowledge in which the ground and limit of 
science and thus its genuine effectiveness are determined ... we stand outside the 
sciences, and the knowledge for which our question strives is neither better nor 
worse but totally different" (Heidegger, 1967, p. 10). 
This work was very much the inspiration for the sort of hermeneutics later developed by 
Gadamer. Through his influence on Gadamer's writing and also through his influence on the 
French hermeneuticist Paul Ricoeur, Heidegger has inspired a whole series of interpretive 
positions in the social sciences. His thought stands behind those approaches in philosophy and 
social science which emphasise the importance of life-world and the primacy of interpretation. For 
him no science or philosophy could mount a critique from a position outside the world of 
everyday life. 
However, there can be no doubt that Heidegger's work had critical intent. It stood in stark and 
critical opposition to the assumptions of traditional metaphysics. His greatest work Being and 
Time (1962, originally published in 1927) has become a classic text of modern philosophy. 
Heidegger intended to produce a much longer work but in the end only completed Divisions 1 and 
2 of Part 1. Neither Division 3 of Part 1 nor Part 2 of the book were ever published. In Division 
1, Heidegger works out his concept of being-in-the-world and uses this to ground a profound and 
penetrating critique of traditional Western ontology and epistemology. Recent readings of Being 
and Time have focused on Division 1, and the themes developed therein have influenced the 
development of contemporary hermeneutic and deconstructivist philosophies. 
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For some time these philosophies have been influential in disciplines such as sociology and social 
anthropology. However, it is only very recently that they have begun to impact on psychiatry. 
Thus the emergence of what has been called a "new cross-cultural psychiatryi' is largely due to 
the influence of interpretive social anthropology (Bracken, 1993). In turn, this has been inspired 
by the work of hermeneutic philosophers such as Ricoeur (Geertz, 1973). A radical 
deconstructivist critique of psychiatry has also emerged around the work of Foucault and Derrida 
(Bracken, 1995, Parker et al, 1995). Both Foucault and Derrida have acknowledged the crucial 
influence of Heidegger on their thought. However, in spite of these developments, there have been 
few recent attempts to bring Heideggarian concepts directly to bear on the key issues of 
contemporary psychiatry'. 
In many ways the Heidegger known to psychiatry is the existentialist Heidegger of Division 2 of 
Being and Time. In this section of the work he focused on the central existentialist themes of 
authenticity, death, guilt and resoluteness. This work had a particular impact on the Swiss 
physician and therapist Medard Boss who developed a school of psychotherapy, known as 
Daseinanalysis, which was directly based on the philosophy of Heideggers. These themes in 
Heidegger's philosophy were also taken up by French existentialism and thus had an impact on 
the many therapists who looked to the writings of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus for inspiration. 
However, the philosopher Charles Guignon (1993, b) argues that : 
3 see chapter five, below, for further exploration of this. 
4An important exception is the work of Louis Sass relating to certain symptoms of 
schizophrenia (Sass, 1990, Sass, 1992, a). 
5 see chapter seven below. 
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"In the mouth of this "existentialized" Heidegger, the ideal of authenticity is 
pictured as the stance of the rugged individualist who, upon experiencing anxiety 
in the face of the ultimate absurdity of life, lives intensely in the present and 
creates his or her own world through leaps of radical freedom" (p. 215) . 
I believe that this existentialist reading of Heidegger is extremely limited. Unfortunately, however, 
it is the only reading which is easily available to psychiatrists. It has led to a situation where it is 
extremely rare to find any discussion of Heideggarian themes outside the framework of individual 
case histories in the psychotherapy literature. In addition, as Guignon notes, as the enthusiasm 
for existentialism has waned during the past twenty years, so too has the idea that Heidegger has 
anything important to contribute directly to the field of psychiatry. 
Heidegger's work was on a vast scale and some of his papers are still appearing in the 
Gesamtausgabe, the collected edition of his writings. These have been published by Vittorio 
Klostermann of Frankfurt am Main since 1975. In addition, Heidegger remains a controversial 
figure. The fact that he became a member of the NAZI party in the 1930s, and his continued 
silence on the Holocaust after the war, point to a need for caution with regard to some of the 
answers he gave to the questions raised by his philosophy. I do not wish to enter the many 
disputes about the proper interpretation of Heidegger's work but I am aware that in this thesis 
I will be 'using' Heidegger in a particular way. Thus I will attempt to state from the outset my 
orientation towards his work and the way I intend to use this work in my thesis. As mentioned 
above, there is a central tension in this work. On the one hand I am seeking to provide a 
philosophical grounding for an interpretative (hermeneutic) approach to understanding the 
suffering of victims of violence. On the other hand I want to avoid any 'silencing' of the victim. 
This will involve a critical (deconstructive) element. I wish to critique current thinking about 
trauma and open a'space' in which other perspectives and voices can be heard. I will not attempt 
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to construct an alternative model but will argue that Heideggerian hermeneutics opens up an 
interesting dimension to the debate about anxiety and trauma. My reading of Heidegger will tend 
to emphasise these tensions'. 
In the first part of the work I will examine the philosophical assumptions which underscore the 
currently dominant positions in the field of trauma. I will attempt to show how Heidegger's 
writing in Being and Time engaged in a critical way with these assumptions. I will then discuss 
how a hermeneutic framework can be used to look at trauma and its sequelae from a different 
perspective. In the third part of the thesis I wish to show how Heidegger's critique of modernity, 
in some of his later works, can be related to the area of trauma. My overall aim will be to 
examine the cross-cultural validity of current conceptualisations of post traumatic anxiety from 
a critical philosophical perspective. 
There can be little doubt that, for Heidegger, ontology was not just a 'descriptive' enterprise. 
As Dallmayr remarks: 
"Given its basic anti-objectivism, fundamental ontology was not alien to, but 
rather a precondition of possible critique - though a critique cognizant of its 
underpinnings and limitations" (Dallmayr, 1991, p. 27). 
Before outlining in more detail the shape of the thesis I will first (in the next section) discuss the 
increasing importance of trauma and post-traumatic conditions within psychiatry. In the last 
6While Heidegger does not use the term 'deconstruction', early on in Being and Time he 
speaks about a'destruction (Destruktion) of the history of ontology'. He says : 'If the question of 
Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened 
up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved' 
(p. 44). For Heidegger 
'fundamental ontology' went hand -in-hand with the Destruktion of metaphysics. 
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section I will outline how I intend to engage Heidegger with this phenomenon. 
1.4 THE RISE OF POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association included the diagnosis, "Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder" in the third edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, the so-called DSM III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980)'. The inclusion of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) not only reflected an increasing interest in the area of trauma on the part of psychiatrists 
and psychologists, but in itself provided a spur to further research and the development of ideas 
in this area. Within the past fifteen years the concept has been taken up widely in North America, 
Europe and in many other parts of the world. Psychological trauma has become a central 
preoccupation of psychiatry during this period. Blake et al (1992) have documented the striking 
increase in published work on trauma in the years between 1970 and 1989. In this country a 
number of special clinics have opened for the treatment of post traumatic disorders; there are now 
several international journals dedicated to the subject and new books appear almost weekly, 
covering different aspects of trauma and its sequelae. The editors of a recent volume declared 
that PTSD is the "diagnosis of the 1990s" (Marsella et al, 1996, a). 
'The authors of the various versions of the DSM present their classifications as 'scientific' 
and maintain that their approach is 'atheoretical'. While they accept that changes in the DSM 
classification occur across time they argue that these changes are (as far as possible) based solely 
on the accumulation of new data, see for example statement in APA (1987, p. xxvii). Fulford 
(1989,1994) has put forward a strong case that such classifications are never just descriptive 
efforts, rather, they always contain a major evaluative element. As the reader will become aware, 
this thesis provides support for this view in relation to the concept of PTSD. Fulford's work is 
discussed at more length in the last chapter. 
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A number of writers have expressed opinions on possible reasons for this increasing focus on 
trauma. Alexander McFarlane (1990) points out that psychoanalytic theory was a major influence 
on earlier versions of the DSM. In the earlier frameworks it was assumed that post traumatic 
symptoms were time-limited unless some pre-existing personality pathology was present. 
McFarlane comments: 
"while the psycho analytic school saw both early traumas of a developmental 
origin and external stressors experienced in childhood as critical determinants of 
adult psychopathology, ironically it minimised the possibility that extreme stresses 
in adulthood could in their own right be equally destabilising to an individual's 
psychological functioning" (MacFarlane, 1990, p. 4) 
In the past twenty years there has been a decline in the influence of psychoanalysis, particularly 
within North American psychiatry. McFarlane suggests that this has decreased the emphasis on 
unconscious conflicts in the causation of psychiatric disorders and this in turn has led to an 
increasing focus upon life events, and in particular traumatic life events, as causative factors. 
However this theory fails to explain the way in which the discourse on trauma has been so 
enthusiastically taken up in parts of the world other than North America, where psychoanalysis 
has not had the same dominating influence. 
An alternative explanation comes from Judith Herman, a psychiatrist at the Harvard Medical 
School. Herman argues that there is, and always has been, a tendency to push traumatic events 
not only out of individual consciousness but out of social consciousness as well. To study the 
effects of traumatic events, particularly such acts as rape, torture and sexual abuse, is to come 
face to face with the capacity for evil in human nature, and also to confront human vulnerability 
in the natural world. The tendency is to avoid such confrontation. She argues that: 
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"to hold traumatic reality in consciousness requires a social context that affirms 
and protects the victim and joins victim and witness in a common alliance. For the 
individual victim, this social context is created by relationships with friends, lovers, 
and family. For the larger society, the social context is created by political 
movements that give voice to the disempowered" (Herman, 1992, p. 9). 
Herman argues that the discourse on trauma in the past twenty years has emerged because of a 
number of political developments, most importantly the rise of the women's movement in Europe 
and North America. The advent of feminism, she suggests, has made it possible for psychiatrists 
to examine the effects of trauma and to take the victims' accounts of their suffering seriously. She 
also suggests that the large scale social movements which opposed the war in Vietnam allowed 
for a critical examination of the effects of wartime experiences. Prior to this, government 
propaganda and recruiting campaigns had been effective in promoting the idea that the experience 
of battle and soldiering in general was somehow a positive maturing influence on the individual. 
The fact that there was a political campaign which looked upon the war in Vietnam as a negative 
phenomenon meant that there was again a political context in which psychiatry could take 
seriously the negative effects of wartime experiences. From Herman's point of view PTSD has 
always existed but has remained almost invisible to psychiatry until recently. Previous attempts 
to explore it, such as the early work of Freud, were abandoned on account of a lack of wider 
social support for such endeavours. 
More recently the medical anthropologist Allan Young has entered the debate about the 
emergence of PTSD as a diagnostic category and a focus of psychiatric interest. I shall return to 
his work at a number of points in the thesis. Young traces the origins of the trauma discourse back 
to the late nineteenth century when the word trauma, previously understood in terms of bodily 
damage, was extended to cover psychogenic sequelae of distressing experiences. From this 
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emerged the notion of the 'traumatic memory' as something locked in the mind and a continuing 
cause of distress. Young argues that recent accounts of psychological trauma have inherited this 
concept but have also been substantially shaped by a number of theoretical developments within 
American psychiatry, developments embodied in the publication of the DSM-111 in 1980: 
"The adoption of DSM-III was part of a sweeping transformation in psychiatric 
knowledge-making that had begun in the 1950s, These changes profoundly altered 
clinical practice in the United States and prepared the way for a new science of 
psychiatry, based on research technologies adopted from medicine 
(experimentation), epidemiology (bio statistics), and clinical psychology 
(psychometrics). In the course of these developments, the traumatic memory, up 
to this point a clinically marginal and heterogeneous phenomenon, was 
transformed into a standard and obligatory classification, post-traumatic stress 
disorder" (Young, 1995, p. 7). 
Young's point is that the concept of PTSD has been constructed over time; it has a history. Unlike 
Herman he does not believe that the disorder has always existed, waiting to be discovered by 
psychiatry at a time when society was ready for it. Rather : 
"The disorder is not timeless, nor does it possess an intrinsic unity. Rather, it is 
glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is 
diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented and by the various interests, 
institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources" 
(Young, 1995, p. 5). 
While Herman and Young disagree fundamentally as to how and why PTSD has emerged as an 
important concept, they both focus on the way in which this has happened within psychiatry as 
a professional discipline. Both seem content to view the current concern with psychological 
trauma as a product of particular developments happening within, or influencing from without, 
psychiatry itself I find both accounts persuasive but inadequate. 
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The discourse on trauma is something developed by professionals but it is also something which 
has been taken up by the general public in Western societies. Thus, whenever one hears news 
reports of natural or man-made disasters there is now always a discussion about the need for 
counselling and therapy for the survivors. The concept of the traumatised individual has become 
widespread and one hears lay people in many contexts discussing a perceived need for therapy for 
post traumatic conditions. The police, firefighters, ambulance workers and many other groups 
are now commonly understood to be at risk of developing post traumatic symptomatology. 
Lawyers have seen in PTSD the potential for a very rich crop of litigants. A recent editorial in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association pointed out that there are few psychiatric 
conditions which people 'like' to have. However the diagnosis of PTSD is proving to be an 
exception to this (JAMA, 1996). In other words the concern with psychological trauma is not 
simply a clinical issue, it would appear that it is also a cultural event. 
In this thesis I wish to deal with the issue on both these levels. Firstly I wish to examine the 
conceptual framework in which post-traumatic symptoms are understood and treated. I will argue 
that this framework involves assumptions and orientations, which are a direct product of 
Enlightenment thought, and thus are open to the philosophical objections which have emerged 
against this. Secondly I will attempt to link our current concern with trauma on a cultural level 
to aspects of life in modern and postmodern times. The issues are obviously linked. Western 
thought since the Enlightenment has focused strongly on the importance of disengaged rationality 
and individual autonomy. At the same time, culturally, Western societies have placed great faith 
in science and technology and promoted the value of the individual self The discourse on trauma 
which has developed over the past twenty years has emerged inside this cultural and philosophical 
framework. We can see reflected in this discourse the twin themes of individual orientation and 
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rational-technical models and interventions. 
For example, one of the most influential models of post traumatic stress disorder is the one 
developed by Mardi Horowitz in California in the late 1970s. We shall examine this in some detail 
in chapter four. This model combines both psychodynamic and cognitivist theories'. Horowitz 
proposed in his book, Stress Response Syndromes (1986), that traumatic experiences disrupt an 
individual's life by producing a block in cognitive and emotional processing. In his work, this 
process is conceptualised as an internal phenomenon located entirely within the confines of the 
individual self. It is a process that can be understood rationally and can be helped by a series of 
technical interventions which encourage the processing of the traumatic material. While Horowitz 
acknowledges that there are social, cultural and somatic aspects to the reaction to trauma, his 
approach is to separate out the cognitive - emotional phenomena and focus upon the latter. For 
Horowitz, the response to trauma is an intra-psychic individual occurrence. By separating the 
intra-psychic from other factors the importance of the social and cultural context in which the 
traumatic event is situated, is systematically underrated. This, in turn, leads to a reification of the 
postulated intra-psychic processes which are be accepted, in this analysis, as "givens" of human 
nature. Horowitz's model is very influential and stands behind the majority of current approaches 
to trauma. 
It is my contention that serious problems can arise if this type of model is uncritically exported 
to non-Western societies or is used with refugees from such societies. Within Western countries 
'In the last section of this chapter I distinguish between connectionist (neural network) 
models in neuroscience and more traditional computational approaches to mind. The later are the 
specific focus of my critique. When I use the term 'cognitivism', I am referring to such 
computational approaches. 
30 
there is a shared background set of beliefs and assumptions, amongst which this discourse at 
least makes some sense. In non-Western cultures, idioms of distress are likely to be quite different 
from those in the West. However, because psychiatry understands itself as scientific and thus sees 
itself as something which is culturally and morally neutral, it fails to grasp the cultural specificity 
of its concepts and interventions. Because, in general, psychiatry lacks a critical understanding 
of its own origins, it often fails to see that the realm of the psyche is a constructed realm and not 
simply "how the world is" in reality. Psychiatry can thus assume that the models it produces 
with regard to distress are universally applicable and valid. However, there is now a substantial 
literature which calls into question this assumption. What clearly emerges from work in a 
number of areas is the importance of contextual factors in shaping how any traumatic event is 
experienced and responded to. In this thesis I will argue that issues of context are not secondary 
factors which merely impinge on the progress of a universal psychological or biological process; 
rather issues of context in terms of social, political and cultural reality are of central importance. 
A critical examination of underlying philosophical assumptions in cross-cultural areas of medicine 
and psychiatry is needed now more than ever. On the one hand Western-based non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and multilateral organisations such as the UN agencies are increasingly 
involved in the provision of health care, including psychiatry, in war-torn countries of the 
developing world. On the other hand, as many Asian countries develop successful economies, 
they are attempting to expand their medical systems and are turning to Western medical schools 
for training and consultation. Unless there is an understanding of the cultural and philosophical 
grounding of Western psychiatry, and thus its cross-cultural limitations, as well as an 
understanding of the background ontological and metaphysical context of cognitions and 
emotional states, there is potential for much confusion and damage in these situations. 
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Higginbotham and Marsella, in an examination of the impact of Western psychiatry in Southeast 
Asia, point to the indirect, unanticipated and negative effects of the diffusion of psychiatric 
knowledge in the region. They point out how this diffusion has promoted professional elitism, 
institutionalised responses to distress, and undermined local indigenous healing systems and 
practices : 
"Modern psychiatry's purely secular discourse ... 
forces a kind of epistemological 
break with traditional formulations embodied in many non-Western cosmologies. 
Psychiatry's reasoning and classification is intended to replace indigenous 
conceptions of disorder" (Higginbotham and Marsella, 1988, p 557). 
1.5 SYNOPSIS OF THE THESIS AND A DISCUSSION OF ITS SPECIFIC FOCUS 
In the first section of the thesis I shall outline the current account of trauma and post-traumatic 
reactions as developed within psychiatry. I shall attempt to reveal the underlying philosophical 
assumptions in this approach. I shall also point to substantial difficulties within this discourse 
and point to the philosophical nature of these difficulties. In chapter 2: 1 shall begin by 
discussing some aspects of the Enlightenment legacy; in particular I shall discuss the emergence 
of'positivism' and show how this has come to be the dominant paradigm within psychology and 
psychiatry. I shall also discuss the philosophy of Descartes and outline the main elements of, what 
I shall call, a Cartesian orientation within the philosophy of mind. I make the point that the 
rejection of ontological dualism, which is accepted by cognitivism, does not help to solve the 
difficulties presented by Descartes' epistemological separation of the mind from 'its' world. In 
chapter three, I go on to discuss the discourse on trauma and the syndrome of PTSD. It will 
become clear that this discourse is currently dominated by a cognitivist orientation and, in chapter 
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four, I will outline the cognitivist paradigm and point to its Cartesian nature. In the last section 
of this chapter and in chapter five I develop a critical position vis-ä-vis Cartesianism and the 
PTSD framework from a cultural perspective. This section will draw on case material from my 
own work in Uganda. I shall demonstrate the importance of contextual issues in the area of 
trauma and argue that current models cannot adequately conceptualise these issues. I shall also 
give an account of Allan Young's critique of the PTSD framework. This is concerned with 
assumptions about time and causality. 
In the second part of the thesis I explore Heideggers hermeneutic approach to human reality 
and show how this has been applied in medicine and psychiatry through the work of the 
psychiatrist, Medard Boss. I also show how Heidegger's work can be related to the area of 
trauma. In chapter six I present the main features of Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian 
philosophical tradition and present his hermeneutic approach to human reality as an alternative. 
I focus, in particular, on his critique of individualism and reductionism and argue that this critique 
is effective in undermining the assumptions of cognitivism, including the 'sophisticated' 
cognitivism presented recently by Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill9. In chapter seven, I go on to 
discuss the application of Heideggerian insights in the fields of medicine and psychiatry and the 
form of psychotherapy known as Daseinanalysis which was developed by Medard Boss. In 
chapter eight I relate Heidegger's account of anxiety to the area of post-traumatic psychology. 
I argue that Heidegger's account of 'loss of meaning' in the state of anxiety is philosophically rich 
91n their book Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder. The Nature of Causal Explanation 
in Psychology and Psychiatry (1996) Bolton and Hill present a well argued defence of 
cognitivism. While not concerned centrally with the issue of trauma they do write about PTSD 
and offer support for other cognitive approaches to the syndrome. I encounter their work at a 
number of points in this thesis. 
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and clinically relevant. Heidegger locates our sense of meaning, not in individual minds, but in 
our practical engagement with the world in which we live. This has implications for how we 
conceptualise the 'loss of meaning' said to characterise post-traumatic conditions and which has 
been held accountable for the central symptoms of the PTSD syndrome. 
Having developed a critique of the universalist claims of the individual trauma model in parts 
one and two of the thesis, in the third part I move beyond the 'universalism' of Being and Time 
and show how the later philosophy of Heidegger is relevant to the debate about culture and 
trauma. In chapter nine, I present his critique of technology and modernity and show how a 
number of post-Heideggerian philosophers and sociologists have linked the sort of anxiety 
described in Being and Time specifically to contradictions and tensions within the culture of 
modernity. I argue that in postmodern culture, which has become characteristic of many 
contemporary societies, these contradictions have become even more acute. In other words I use 
Heidegger to open up the possibility that post-traumatic anxiety (characterised by a 'loss of 
meaning') may be something particularly associated with life in contemporary Western society. 
This may go some way towards explaining the recent dramatic increase in both professional and 
lay interest in the issue of trauma. This will raise questions about the relationship between trauma 
and culture which have not been raised previously. 
In chapter ten, I shall use the later philosophy of Heidegger in a more positive direction. I shall 
use his concept of Gelassenheit (releasement) to begin a discussion of how we can encounter 
other cultures in a more 'ethical' manner. This discussion also returns to the implications of 
deconstruction and the work of Foucault. I show how this debate is directly relevant to psychiatric 
work with victims of violence from non-Western societies. In the conclusion, chapter eleven, I 
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will summarise the arguments and point to some of the implications for philosophy and for 
psychiatric theory and practice. 
I would now like to briefly comment on how the thesis has a specific focus. My central aim is to 
develop a critique of certain positions in modern psychology and, in so doing, create a space for 
alternative perspectives. I have already discussed the debates about universalism and relativism 
which have been preoccupations of many disciplines in the past twenty years. I cannot hope to 
develop an answer to these debates in this thesis. My own feeling is that strong forms of 
universalism are gradually becoming more and more untenable and, whether we like it or not, we 
are faced with the inevitability of some form of relativism, particularly in the human sciences. The 
challenge we face today is to find ways of thinking about ourselves and our world which can cope 
with this inevitability without leading to a condition of paralysis. I believe that Heideggerian 
hermeneutics has potential in this regard, and I hope to demonstrate this in the course of the 
thesis. 
One of the central arguments developed in the thesis is the need for an approach to human reality 
which pays due regard to importance of context. In other words, I am attempting to approach the 
question of trauma from a perspective which avoids a commitment to a strong notion of 'interior' 
mind. I am aware that hermeneutics is only one of a number of approaches which share this 
concern. A number of Wittgenstein-inspired philosophers have developed externalist accounts of 
mind. For example this is the position put forward by Gregory McCulloch (1995) in his book 
The Mind and its World. Perhaps the most influential move in this direction is that developed in 
the most recent work of Hilary Putnam. In Representation and Reality (1988) Putnam argues 
against his original functionalist position (see chapter four, below) and what he calls 'mentalism'. 
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Button et al (1995) draw on the work of both Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle in their critique of 
cognitivism and functionalism. I will mention Wittgenstein in a numbers of places in the text but 
there is no systematic development of his ideas in this thesis. 
I have also avoided any real encounter with the world of 'connectionism'. When I write about 
cognitivism, I have in mind approaches in psychology which look to traditional computer-based 
models of information processing. I avoid connectionism because it has not, as yet, had any great 
influence on theoretical approaches to trauma and PTSD1°. Theories of PTSD are currently 
dominated by concerns with 'schemas', 'appraisal mechanisms', 'event cognitions' and other 
concepts which draw heavily on the assumptions of computational approaches to mind and 
thought. There is considerable debate at present about the implications of connectionist (or neural 
network) models for work in psychology and philosophy. Some commentators argue that these 
models do not substantially challenge the traditional cognitivist paradigm". However, others 
argue that connectionism involves a radical new paradigm which has major philosophical 
implications. The later view is developed by Paul Cilliers in his book Complexity and 
Postmodernism : Understanding Complex Systems. Cilliers suggests that connectionism moves 
us away from cognitivism's traditional philosophical dependence on analytical philosophy and 
points, instead, to its compatibility with post-structuralist philosophies. He remarks that it is 
strange that : 
"... when it comes to descriptions of the functioning of the brain, an obviously 
"In a 1994 paper in the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Dan Lloyd did 
make some tentative remarks about a connectionist approach to trauma in the context of an 
attempt to produce a network model of a Freudian case study. 
"see for example Dreyfus (1994) What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason. 
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relational structure, there is still such a strong adherence to atomic representation 
and deterministic algorithms. One of the reasons for this must surely be that 
cognitive science inherited its methodological framework from a deterministic, 
analytical tradition. Post-structural theory, I claim, assists us in revising this 
position" (Cilliers, 1998, p. 35). 
If Cilliers is correct, then it is possible that (in the future) connectionism will serve as a bridge 
between the sort of context-centred approach to psychology developed in this thesis and the 
world of neuroscience. 
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PART ONE 
THE CURRENT DISCOURSE ON TRAUMA 
In this part of the thesis I will discuss the concept of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
However, I will first outline, in chapter two, the way in which psychiatry is very much a product 
of the European Enlightenment. Chapter three is devoted to the discourse on trauma and in 
chapter four I discuss cognitivism. The importance of contextual and cultural issues are 
highlighted in chapter five and attention is drawn to the limitations of current models. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ENLIGHTENMENT, MODERNITY AND PSYCHIATRY' 
2.1 THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT 
We saw in the introduction how, from a philosophical point of view, much recent discussion about 
the possibility of cultural critique has centred on the nature of rationality. A central concern of 
the European Enlightenment was the importance of reason and its place in human affairs. Finding 
a path to true knowledge and certainty became the major issue for thinkers during the 
Enlightenment and epistemology became the central concern of philosophy. A guiding theme 
was the quest to replace religious revelation, and systems of knowledge from the past, with reason 
and science as the path to truth. As Norman Hampson argues: 
"The cultural horizon of most educated men in western Europe in the early 
seventeenth century was dominated by two almost unchallenged sources of 
authority : scripture and the classics. Each in its own way perpetuated the idea 
that civilization had degenerated from a former Golden age. The most rational 
preoccupation for contemporary man was, therefore, by the study of the more 
fortunate ancients to move back towards the kind of society which the latter had 
known. Recent European movements, the Renaissance and the Reformation, had 
reinforced this attitude and enhanced the authority of the sacred texts" (Hampson, 
1968, p. 16). 
'My discussion of the Enlightenment shall not be comprehensive. In this chapter I am 
seeking to identify the way in which psychiatry only became a possibility within a cultural context 
shaped by Enlightenment concerns with reason and interiority. However, I am aware that the 
positivism embraced by psychiatry reflected only one strand of Enlightenment thought. My 
account is therefore partial. For example, I do not discuss the importance attached to historical 
context in the thought of philosophers such as Montesquieu, Hume, Herder and Hegel. 
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The Enlightenment involved a dramatic reorientation of intellectual life, looking to the future 
rather than the past, and finding in reason itself, the path to this future. In this venture philosophy 
was to have a vital role, for it was through a critical philosophy that both the potential and the 
limits of reason could be defined. Enlightenment meant a move from "darkness" to "light" . 
To 
achieve this, reason would have boldly to give up its preoccupation with those things handed 
down in tradition. Kant expresses this forcefully in his declaration that : 
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity 
is the inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of another. This 
immaturity is called "self-incurred" if its cause is not lack of understanding but 
lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The 
motto of Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own 
understanding! " (Kant, 1970, p. 54). 
The other preoccupation of European thought emerging from the Enlightenment, particularly on 
the continent, was with the human self and its depths. European thinkers became concerned with 
the "inner voice" and the structures of subjectivity. Robert Solomon points out that in the work 
of Kant, in particular, this preoccupation attained its full force. In many ways, in Kant's philosophy 
the structures of subjectivity become the entire subject-matter of philosophy. For him: 
"The self is not just another entity in the world, but in an important sense it creates 
the world, and the reflecting self does not just know itself, but in knowing itself 
knows all selves, and the structures of any and every possible self " (Solomon, 
1988, p. 6) 
Solomon labels this strong form of universal subjectivity the "transcendental pretence": 
"... the unwarranted assumption that there is universality and necessity in the 
fundamental modes of human experience" (Solomon, 1988, p. 7). 
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Psychology and psychiatry only became possible in a cultural framework substantially influenced 
by these Enlightenment and post Enlightenment preoccupations. These disciplines represented 
a search for causal, scientific accounts of the mind and its disorders. They depended on theories 
of the self and behaviour, which would explain human actions and so allow for technical 
interventions to be made on a rational basis. As Jerome Levin writes: 
In premodern conceptualizations, the self had been seen as safely coherent and 
enduring, deriving its stability from its relationship with God, but now something 
else was required as a cement. The old verities were no longer certain, and the 
unity of the self, itself, was now problematical" (Levin, 1992, p. 16). 
As I pointed out in the introduction, a connecting theme throughout this thesis will be my concern 
with the export of the current discourse on trauma from Western centres to non-Western 
communities in different parts of the world. A first step in looking at this issue will be to examine 
the cultural background of Western psychiatry itself. This is my aim in the rest of this chapter. 
I will refer to the 'Cartesian tradition' at a number of points in the thesis. My use of this term is 
indebted to Hubert Dreyfus' discussion of 'Cartesianism' in his Being-in-the-World. A 
Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1(Dreyfus, 1993). 1 am aware that there 
are different interpretations of Descartes and my references to his work will not be extensive. 
However, many of the philosophers quoted in the thesis, including Heidegger, have seen their 
work as being in direct opposition to a Cartesian account of human reality. It is important 
therefore to say something about what this account entails. 
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2.2 THE CARTESIAN PROBLEMATIC 
The central philosophical problem for Descartes was the question of certainty : how can we be 
certain that our internal representations give us an accurate account of the external world? His 
answer was to propose a method of systematic reflection upon the contents of the mind and 
through this to separate what was clear and obviously accurate from what was uncertain and 
vague. By way of systematically doubting everything which was unclear, he argued that we could 
reflexively reach a situation of certainty, which for him was guaranteed by God. Descartes 
believed that his cogito set the foundations for indubitable truth. For him, certainty was reached 
by turning away from the world and examining his own thoughts in isolation, without reference 
to what they represented in the outside world. While a non-deceiving God was the ultimate 
guarantor of truth and certainty, his presence was not essential to Descartes's confidence in our 
ability to clarify our thought and to separate the clear and distinct thoughts from others. Even in 
the absence of a guarantor of truth, systematic reflexivity will render us better able to account for 
our thoughts. A central tenet of Cartesianism is therefore a belief in the importance of, and the 
possibility of, reflexive clarity and the importance of defining and mapping the ways in which 
internal representations are ordered and related. 
In addition, Cartesianism operates on a fundamental distinction between the "inner" world of the 
mind and the "outer" world with which it is in contact. This separation of the inner and the outer 
is predicated upon Descartes' ontological separation of the world into two kinds of substance. The 
term substance is the philosophical equivalent of the ordinary word "thing" (res). Descartes 
separated out the soul from the body in which it resided. The latter he characterised as follows: 
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"... by body, I understand all that can be terminated by some figure; that can be 
contained in some place and fill a space in such a way that any other body is 
excluded from it" ( Descartes, 1968, p. 104) 
In other words the body is characterised by the fact that it possesses "extension", it is thus res 
extensa. In contrast to this the soul is characterised by thought: 
"... I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thing which thinks, that is to say, a 
mind, understanding, or reason, terms whose significance was hitherto unknown 
to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existing; but what thing? I have 
already said it :a thing which thinks. " (Descartes, 1968, p. 105) 
The soul, or the self, is thus "a thing which thinks", a res cogitans. This application of the concept 
of thing or substance, to the self has had major implications. The term substance is usually applied 
to familiar objects such as trees or chairs. In scholastic philosophy a distinction was made 
between the attributes of a thing and that within which such attributes resided. The latter was 
called the substantia, that which "stands beneath" the attributes. The substance, as that in which 
the attributes or properties of a thing inhere, cannot be readily perceived or described. 
Nevertheless it is what gives the thing its existence as a singular entity. In the concept of 
substance used by Descartes, this contrast between the plurality of the attributes and the 
singleness of that in which they reside, is fundamental. When moved to the self, the res cogitans, 
this contrast is maintained, but operates in a somewhat different way. Frederick Olafson 
formulates this as follows: 
"To the attributes of the standard substance or thing, there now correspond the 
representations or ideas of the things that the self perceives or otherwise thinks 
about; and to the mysterious nucleus in which those properties were supposed to 
inhere, there corresponds that in which these representations are contained. It is 
as though substance in the picture we ordinarily form of it had been turned inside 
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out or, better still, outside in. Indeed, this is not a bad way of understanding the 
change that has taken place, since to the attribute that a thing like an apple 
displays to general view, there now corresponds a representation within the new 
kind of substance, but with this difference, that the representation is accessible 
only to the view from within and cannot be perceived from without at all" 
(Olafson, 1987, p. 7). 
Thus thoughts, perceptions, beliefs, desires and other mental phenomena are the attributes, or 
properties, which inhere within the mind. Thought becomes the inner functioning of a substance 
which we call a subject (subjectum). This subject is in contact with an outside world and has 
knowledge of it through sensation and through the representations it has of it. The mind stands 
outside the world and has a relation to it. Mind becomes something conceivable apart from and 
separate from this relation. 
It is this epistemological separation, based ultimately, as we have seen, on Descartes' ontological 
dualism, which gives sense and meaning to the representational theory of mind and thought, 
concerned as it with the relationship between inner states of mind and outer states of the world. 
As Dreyfus points out, modern information-processing models of mind and the functionalist 
philosophies of mind which go with them are, in essence, updated versions of this approach 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 115). Descartes' epistemological separation also provides the source for the 
project of phenomenology, at least as developed by Husserl and his followers'. 
Husserl's orientation towards the Cartesian project is overtly positive (the title of one of his major 
works is Cartesian Meditations). His fundamental method of enquiry, which he called 
21n turn, Karl Jaspers, in his General Psychopathology (Jaspers, 1963, p. 55), cites the 
direct influence of Husserl on his approach to the phenomenology of psychopathology. 
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"phenomenological reduction", involves setting aside, or " bracketing", the existence of an outside 
world in order to focus in a clear and unbiased way upon the phenomena of consciousness and 
experience. His aim was to reach what he called the "transcendental standpoint". This was to be 
achieved by a series of "reductions" which, in turn, were operations performed upon everyday 
experience with the purpose of isolating the "pure" consciousness which is obscured as long as 
it is not separated from the natural world. Like Descartes, Husserl was attempting to elaborate 
a method of investigation into the experiential world which was solid and foundational. Louis Sass 
says: 
"Like Descartes' method of doubt, Husserl's approach can be called a kind of 
"foundationalism" : an attempt to discover a realm of indubitable and transparent 
meanings or experiential entities that can provide a firm basis on which to build 
valid knowledge about human existence" (Sass, 1989, p. 443). 
Following Descartes, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology thus starts with a radical separation 
between the world of consciousness and the world "outside" it. However, in some ways Husserl 
goes a step further than Descartes. His "bracketing" of the natural world extends to the lived life 
of the person doing the bracketing. His/her body, history and personality are bracketed along with 
everything else and become the "empirical ego". This is in contrast to the "transcendental ego" 
of pure consciousness. In this strategy the empirical ego becomes ranked alongside the objects 
of the natural world and thus an appropriate domain of scientific enquiry. In this way the end 
result of Husserl's phenomenology is an endorsement of the project of scientific psychology. For 
him, transcendental phenomenology was concerned with the phenomena of pure consciousness, 
which he talked about as consisting of acts and meanings, or in his words, of noesis and noema. 
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Thus Cartesianism provides an account of the self and thought which has been articulated in 
different ways through different philosophies. It has, in many ways, come to be taken as "common 
sense" within Western cultures. In their book Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder: The Nature 
of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill argue that 
Cartesian dualism provided the 'thought space' in which behaviourist psychology emerged. 
However, they, like most other philosophers, wish to move us beyond both Descartes and 
behaviourism, and they suggest that cognitive psychology has effectively allowed us to do so. For 
them, the problem with Cartesian philosophy is its presentation of mental states as 'epistemically 
private, inaccessible to public observation and verification' (p. 4). Cognitivism, by making mental 
states the object of scientific enquiry, is thus seen as being opposed to the Cartesian framework. 
However, Bolton and Hill appear mainly concerned to surpass ontological dualism. They argue 
that we simply need to 'merge' Cartesian thought and matter and they suggest that cognitivism 
does this : 
"... a (or the) defining attribute of Cartesian mind was thinking, which is closely 
linked to representation, meaning, and intentionality, and these are none other than 
the characteristics of mental states which are essential for the purposes of 
cognitive explanations of behaviour.... what was essential to the Cartesian mind 
is essential also to mind as posited by cognitive-behavioural explanations. This 
means that the latter will not be satisfied with any definition of mental states that 
makes them 'material' as opposed to 'thoughtful'... if mind is going to be identified 
with the material brain, then the material brain will have to be - like Cartesian mind 
- a'thinking substance"' (Bolton and Hill, 1996, pgs 74-75). 
Bolton and Hill argue for an approach in which the brain is understood to 'encode' meaning. 
Because of this the activity of the brain cannot be grasped in terms of traditional notions of 
causality alone. They propose the existence of 'intentional causality' which comes into play when 
material systems are involved in 'meaningful' activity, involving the passage and storage of 
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information. Biological and psychological systems are said to exhibit 'intentional causality'. 
Because of this such systems lend themselves to scientific investigation with the generation of 
predictive theories. I shall return to the work of Bolton and Hill in chapter six, when I present a 
Heideggerian critique of scientific reductionism. Suffice it to say here that I am not convinced that 
they genuinely move us away from the Cartesian account of human reality presented above. I tend 
to agree with Dreyfus that information-processing accounts of mind are still firmly within a 
Cartesianism framework. While cognitivism does move us away from an ontological dualism, it 
continues to operate with a strong epistemological separation between the mind and the world 
outside. McCulloch makes this point in his book The Mind and its World (1995) in which he 
argues the case for an externalist account of mind. He argues that even if we move beyond the 
'immaterialism' involved in Cartesian ontology we are still left with Descartes' separation of the 
mind from °its° body and from the world around it. He says that " vanishingly little is settled when 
immaterialism is rejected" (p. xii). A similar argument is made by Button, Coulter, Lee and 
Sharrock in their book Computers, Minds and Conduct (1995). 
For the purposes of this thesis I will identify Cartesianism with a number of assumptions which 
continue to dominate thinking within psychology and psychiatry, These are : 
1) an endorsement of methodological individualism and a belief in the possibility 
of, and the importance of, detached reflection upon the contents of mind 
2) the epistemological acceptance of an apriori separation of mind from world, in 
which an interior mind relates through internal representations to an exterior 
world 
3) a belief in the causal nature of psychological events and a reliance on positivism 
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to guide research and theory formation' 
In the next section we shall look at point no. 3 and the way in which this reliance on positivism 
has developed in medicine and psychiatry. 
2.3 SCIENCE, POSITIVISM AND PSYCHIATRY 
The Enlightenment witnessed a new orientation within science: a rejection of the 'traditional' 
Aristotelian ordering of the world and its replacement by a method focused on human reason and 
observation. This 'inductive-experimental method' became the dominant paradigm in natural 
science. Subsequent to this, empiricism became the principal philosophy in science and when the 
systematic study of human phenomena began with Hobbes in the 17th century, it was generally 
accepted that here too an empiricist methodology would be appropriate. John Stuart Mill's 
System of Logic (published in 1843) provided the philosophical foundation for empiricism as the 
ground of all knowledge. Mill advocated the use of natural science methods in the study of human 
phenomena and said that: 
"the backward state of the moral sciences can only be remedied by applying to 
them the methods of the physical sciences duly extended and generalised" (Mill, 
1953). 
3Mary Hesse writes that the assumptions of Cartesianism : 
"constitute a picture of science and the world somewhat as follows: there is an 
external world which can in principle be exhaustively described in scientific 
language. The scientist, as both observer and language-user, can capture the 
external facts of the world in propositions that are true if they correspond to the 
facts and false if they do not" (Hesse, 1980, vii). 
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The word "positivism" comes originally from Auguste Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive'. 
Comte attempted to explore reality through the assessment of facts available to experience. He 
sought to establish the authority of observation and, like Mill, argued that the methods of the 
natural sciences were the only properly scientific methods available to researchers in the human 
or social sciences. For Comte, human activity should be included under the category of objective 
necessity. Furthermore science should be seen as a value-free enterprise dealing in objective 
facts generated by disinterested observation. Since the time of Comte the term "positivism" has 
been used to cover a range of philosophical positions. Polkinghorne characterizes its three central 
themes as: 
(1) metaphysics should be rejected and knowledge confined to what has been 
experienced or can be experienced. 
(2) The adequacy of knowledge increases as it approximates the forms of 
explanation which have been achieved by the most advanced sciences. 
(3) Scientific explanation is limited to only functional and directional laws 
(Polkinghorne, 1984, p. 18). 
During the course of the 19th century a combination of naturalism, empiricism and positivism 
became the basic philosophical credo for most areas of discourse which aspired to be scientific. 
Naturalism held that all phenomena could be adequately explained in terms of natural causes and 
laws without attributing supernatural, spiritual or moral significance to them. Empiricism held 
that the only source of knowledge was from the experience of the senses. This combination of 
naturalism, empiricism and positivism came to dominate the methodological framework for 
medicine and the behavioural sciences such as psychology, and has continued to do so up to the 
present time. Hilary Putnam termed it the "received view" (Putnam, 1962). This dominant system 
4This was published in six volumes between 1830 and 1842. It contains an encyclopedic 
account of the sciences. It expounds positivism and introduces the discipline of sociology. 
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provides epistemological support for experimental designs based upon empirical data. It 
constitutes the approved approach to science, and it is communicated within the social and 
behavioural sciences through the primary agencies of disciplinary orthodoxy. The standard 
textbooks on research, the editorial policies of disciplinary journals, and the guidelines for 
acceptable doctoral dissertations call for the use of a methodology based on this approach 
(Polkinghorne, 1984, p. 60). I shall use the term "positivism" to broadly denote this "received 
view". During the last hundred years much Anglo-American philosophy of science has been 
devoted to detailed development of the internal logic of natural science. It attained its clearest 
explanation in the work of the group of philosophers known as the "Vienna Circle". Science, they 
argued, explains events by way of a "deductive-nomological" method through which theories are 
accurately deduced from observational data. Theory is stated in the form of universal causal laws 
which can be used to predict, as well as explain, events. Through this prediction theories can, in 
turn, be tested. 
Positivist philosophy of science sought to replace any assumptions or inexplicit links in the 
process of knowing, with fully explicit observations and fully explicit deductions from these 
observations. However, as Hume argued in 1748, if all but sense impressions were excluded as 
sources of knowledge then "causation" as such does not show up. According to Hume "cause" 
is simply a habit of thought which people add to the sense data (Hume, 1972). Thus the most that 
we can truly know is that two events have been constantly conjoined in our sense experience. On 
the basis of our observations alone we cannot know that they will always be so conjoined and 
that one event causes the other. Philosophers of science committed to the deductive-nomological 
system had to approach this matter of causation in such a way that it could fit in with their system. 
To this end they replaced the notion of one event "resulting" from another with the notion that 
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a certain kind of relationship held between these events. They characterised the kinds of 
relationship as "necessary" or "sufficient". If a necessary relationship exists between events then 
the presence of one event is a necessary condition for the presence of a second event. A sufficient 
relationship can be characterised as follows: "if A, then B". B will always occur if A is present. 
B "might" occur if A is absent, but it "must" occur if A is present. In the deductive-nomological 
system, when a relationship exists between events of a sufficient condition, it is spoken of as a 
causal relationship or as a causal law, examples of which are abundant in medicine. For instance, 
if an insulin-dependent diabetic does not receive exogenous doses of insulin regularly then he or 
she will become comatose. For positivism, the ability of science to identify such causal 
relationships through the deductive-nomological type of methodology underlies its predictive 
force and its explanatory power. These factors in turn explain the success of the natural sciences. 
If the human sciences were to aspire to such success they too would have to produce 
deductive-nomological explanations. I will not discuss here the differences between logical 
positivism and logical empiricism, nor the differences between phenomenalism and physicalism. 
For the purposes of my explication of psychiatry's underlying philosophical systems the two 
central elements of the positivist framework are its prescriptions about the collection of data and 
about the construction of theories. 
Within the "received view" of science, two assumptions are made about the human sciences: first 
that observations can be made objectively and that measures can be defined objectively and 
applied in a precise, replicable fashion; secondly, that theories can be constructed on the same 
causal and deterministic basis as in the natural sciences. The ultimate goal of positivism is to 
provide an objective, empirical and systematic foundation for all knowledge. It is an inherent 
assumption of positivist philosophy that this is possible. Stemming from this is another basic 
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assumption: that science is progressive. The accumulation of facts about the world leads to an 
increasingly detailed and informative picture of reality, both natural and human. 
This concept of science and knowledge lies at the heart of Western medicine's understanding of 
itself In particular, medical research sees itself as attempting to provide a set of value-free 
techniques which will alleviate pain and suffering by successfully combating disease. It presents 
itself as disinterested and empirical in its description of the human organism and its diseases, and 
as steadily progressive in its understanding of the same. The anthropologist Deborah Gordon 
argues that the dominant philosophy underlying modern Western medicine (what is usually 
referred to as "biomedicine") is that of naturalism. This naturalist cosmology and ontology 
incorporates the main tenets of positivism: 
"Biomedical practitioners approach sickness as a natural phenomenon, legitimize 
and develop their knowledge using a naturalist method ( scientific rationality) and 
see themselves as practising on nature's human representative- the human body 
(Gordon, 1988, p. 24). 
Biomedicine also assumes a naturalist epistemology: 
"Naturalist truth is not supernatural or spiritual knowledge but the truth of matter, 
of mechanism. "Truth" is in the accurate explanation of material reality, not in the 
good, or the beautiful, or the spiritual. Naturalist knowledge should maintain the 
separation between culture and reality. Culture - symbols and language - are 
vehicles for knowing; they connect the outside reality with the internal knower. 
They should leave no trace on the knowledge, that is, they should depict rather 
than constitute... Rationality is also separate from morality. In fact it is supposed 
to be stripped of value and to present only "facts". Truth tells us about how things 
work "naturally" not ideologically. Finally, ideally truth is beyond time and space 
- singular, universal, eternal, and neutral" 
(Gordon 1988, p. 30). 
Biomedicine incorporates a naturalist epistemology as its "official" theory of knowledge, and uses 
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science to provide its criteria of truth. Psychiatry, which conceives of itself as a branch of 
biomedicine, generally follows suit. 
Since its beginnings in the nineteenth century, psychiatry has been at pains to demonstrate its 
medical and scientific credentials. In general psychiatric textbooks, an introductory chapter 
usually contains a brief statement of the positivist nature of psychiatric research and theory. For 
example, according to Mayer-Gross, Slater and Roth (1960, p. 24) : 
"The foundations of psychiatry have to be laid on the ground of the natural 
sciences". 
Most psychiatrists see themselves as working with a "medical model". In this is argued that 
psychological distress is best understood by reference to the traditional medical concepts such as 
aetiology, diagnosis, prognosis etc. Psychiatric problems are given disease names and discussed 
under the heading "psychopathology". The two basic tenets of positivism mentioned above are 
endorsed by this model; thus it is assumed that it is possible and preferable to make observations 
objectively in psychiatry. Just as physical medicine characterises a patient's condition in terms of 
temperature, pulse, blood pressure and other measurable phenomena so too psychiatry attempts 
to measure the "symptoms" of psychological distress in an objective manner. To this end various 
"instruments" have been developed. These take the form of standardised questionnaires which 
seek to identify and quantify psychiatric disorders in a precise and replicable fashion. Great effort 
has also been put into the development of operational definitions of symptoms and syndromes 
culminating in the now widely used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (mentioned in the last 
chapter). 
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Psychiatry has also sought to produce theoretical models based upon causal modes of explanation. 
As David Ingleby has shown this has taken both "strong" and "weak" forms: 
"The "strong" form, variously called the "faulty-machine" or "disease" model, 
suggests that the causal factors underlying mental illness are physiological 
disorders; the "weak" version still invokes causal explanation, but blames the 
problems on psychological or environmental factors" (Ingleby, 1980, p. 34). 
Ingleby argues that the positivist position is by no means eliminated simply by denying the 
physiological origins of madness and distress and arguing instead for an alternative set of 
aetiological factors whether these be psychological or social. Both forms of this theoretical model 
assume that psychiatric problems can be explained by analysing the effects of various "causal" 
factors. This is an important point because many critics of psychiatry have specifically targeted 
the medical model, or the "strong" positivist position, arguing that psychiatry's problems are all 
due to the stranglehold of the medical profession. 
Two important consequences which result from the adoption of the positivist position in both its 
medical and non-medical forms are, first, the conclusion that psychological problems have the 
same basic form cross-culturally and, secondly, that the history of psychiatry can be seen as a 
progressive identification of the true nature of mental illness. Through the adoption of the 
"scientific method" and the use of standardised questionnaires and operational criteria, psychiatric 
research has attempted to delineate the universal aspects of mental illnesses. Because such 
questionnaires and criteria are produced within the context of a positivist science, they are thought 
of as value-free and "neutral". They are not felt to incorporate any particular ethnic or social class 
bias. Their use in non- Western societies is seen as unproblematic and the results produced are 
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seen as universally valid. 
On the other hand positivism underscores psychiatry's claim to be in the process of unravelling 
the true nature of mental illness. As I have noted above, inherent in the positivist position is the 
assumption that science is a progressive endeavour. It is seen as leading inexorably towards a 
deeper understanding of how the world, including human beings, function. Scientific psychiatry 
holds that it, too, is leading to a deeper and continually more accurate picture of the nature of 
mental illness. Sir Martin Roth, founding President of Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists, in 
a book written with Jerome Kroll, asserts that: 
"... having regard to the successes of the medical models in recent decades, we can 
reasonably expect that clinical practice and the public health approaches to the 
problems of mental health will acquire a more solid factual foundation and thus 
become more precise and effective. This is because medical models pose clear 
questions that can be refuted or upheld by scientific investigation" (Roth and 
Kroll, 1986, p. 66). 
This sort of position fits happily with an account of psychiatry's history which emphasises its 
progressive nature. In such an account it is proposed that in the modern Western world we are 
enjoying the fruits of a scientific enlightenment which has allowed us to discover that psychiatric 
problems are not due to witchcraft, possession or any other supernatural force but are the effects 
of disease processes, whether organic or psychological. We look back on centuries of barbarism 
when the mentally sick were not treated properly. As Peter Sedgwick puts it: 
"The basic perspective of this variety of psychiatric history is, roughly speaking, 
liberal, evolutionist and sympathetic to modern diagnostic categories as the 
criterion of reality against which earlier discoveries are to be tested and found 
wanting" (Sedgwick, 1982, p. 129). 
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In the positivist account madness is seen to be waiting for psychiatry to describe and classify it. 
From this position the object of a science is seen to exist prior to the science which slowly begins 
to apprehend and eventually understand it. Knowledge is seen to develop in an evolutionary and 
teleological fashion. This position has been challenged recently from a number of directions. I will 
not discuss these critiques here. My aim has been simply to highlight the relationship between 
psychiatry and the cultural agenda initiated by the European Enlightenment. However, as I have 
already introduced the work of Foucault in the introduction I wish to briefly mention his work in 
this area. The positivist account of the history of psychiatry is one that Foucault opposed 
strenuously. Instead, he argued that madness could not have become the object of a special 
science, as it did to psychiatry in the 19th century, unless it was previously the object of 
exclusion, internment and correction. Alan Sheridan summarises Foucault's position thus : 
"Madness did not wait, in immobile identity, for the advent of psychiatry to carry 
it from the darkness of superstition to the light of truth. The categories of modern 
psychiatry were not lying in a state of nature waiting to be picked up by the 
perceptive observer : they were produced by that "science" in its very act of 
formation. Similarly, the sudden, massive resort to confinement in the 
mid-seventeenth century was not a necessary response to a sudden upsurge of 
"asocial elements". This act was as sudden as that by which the lepers were 
expelled from the city : but its significance cannot be reduced to its actual result 
(Sheridan, 1980, p. 26). 
2.4 SY 
I have argued in this chapter that one result of the European Enlightenment has been a cultural 
preoccupation with reason and rationality. This is evident in the philosophy of Descartes which 
is still influential in psychology and psychiatry. An important result of this focus on reason is the 
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dominance of a positivist paradigm within psychiatry. In essence, positivism asserts the possibility 
of framing all human problems in a technical idiom. It is proposed that such problems can be 
investigated adequately with the tools of a causal science and solutions developed accordingly. 
While commentators such as Bolton and Hill argue that biological and psychological sciences 
require a concept of'intentional causality' they remain broadly committed to the positivist agenda. 
In chapter four I shall examine the growing importance of cognitivism in psychology and 
psychiatry and indicate how this process has been supported by, and in turn has offered support 
to, a functionalist approach within philosophy of mind. As mentioned before, functionalism is 
premised upon the central tenets of Cartesianism outlined above. However, before doing so, I 




POST TRAUMATIC ANXIETY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the current discourse on trauma lies the diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), which was first given full recognition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
-Version Three (DSM III) of the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 (APA, 1980). Prior 
to this a separation had been made between the acute reaction to stress and more enduring 
consequences. For example in DSM 1 (1952) the entity "gross stress reaction" was conceived as 
a disorder which resolved rapidly unless there was preexisting personality pathology. Similarly, 
DSM II (1968) included the disorder "transient situational disturbance" which was said to be 
present if the response to a stressful event was shortlived. If more long-lasting effects were noted 
then the disorder became simple "anxiety neurosis". Again this implied that stress responses were 
short-lived unless the individual patient had some preexisting vulnerability. DSM II is quite clear 
about this: 
"If the patient has good adaptive capacity his symptoms usually recede as the 
stress diminishes. If, however, the symptoms persist after the stress is removed, 
the diagnosis of another mental disorder is indicated" (APA, 1968). 
DSM III PTSD thus represents a considerable shift, in that it involves the notion that traumatic 
events in adulthood can, of themselves, produce prolonged adverse psychological consequences. 
There is a moral implication to this change. If trauma can, of itself, produce prolonged psychiatric 
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sequelae, then responsibility for this suffering lies with whoever caused the trauma. On the other 
hand if prolonged morbidity only occurs in someone with preexisting problems, then this 
responsibility is somewhat lessened. Allan Young, whose work on the history of PTSD was 
quoted in chapter one, argues that this moral issue was one of the main reasons why PTSD 
achieved full nosological status in the U. S. classification in 1980, at the end of the war in Vietnam. 
Young cites the work of Wilbur Scott, who interviewed the principal people involved in getting 
PTSD recognised. Scott points out that during the 1970s American psychiatrists and other mental 
health professionals, particularly those working in the Veterans Administration (VA) medical 
system, were faced with a virtual epidemic of suicides and severe psychiatric problems among 
veterans returned from Vietnam. A number of veterans and their supporters started to become 
fiustrated with a psychiatric system which attached little importance to their terrible experiences 
during the war: 
"Mental health professionals across the country assessed disturbed Vietnam 
veterans using diagnostic nomenclature that contained no specific entries for war- 
related trauma. ... 
VA physicians typically did not collect military histories as part 
of their diagnostic work-up. Many thought Vietnam veterans who were agitated 
by their war experiences, or who talked repeatedly about them, suffered from a 
neurosis or psychosis whose origin and dynamics lay outside the realm of combat" 
(Scott, 1990, p. 298). 
Gradually a campaign emerged involving veterans, their families, politicians and prominent 
psychiatric clinicians. This aimed at achieving full official recognition of the role of war-time 
suffering in the causation of psychopathology. As Young notes : 
"the advocates were able to make a compelling moral argument for PTSD, albeit 
one that fell on deaf ears in the VA and the traditional veterans' organizations. The 
failure to make a place for PTSD would be equivalent to blaming the victim for 
his misfortunes - misfortunes inflicted on him by both his government and its 
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enemies. It would mean denying medical care and compensation to men who, had 
been obliged or induced to sacrifice their youths in a dirty and meaningless war. 
Acknowledging PTSD would be a small step toward repaying a debt" (Young, 
1995, p. 114). 
Contrary to the dominant positivist perspective (as outlined in the last chapter), Young argues that 
PTSD was created at a particular time, in a particular place and according to a particular moral 
and political agenda. It was not simply a medical condition waiting to be discovered. It fulfilled 
the need of American society to recognise the suffering of the young people who were damaged 
by the war in Vietnam. This is not, of course, how psychiatry sees it. As Scott (1990) notes, those 
psychiatrists and others involved in the campaign for the recognition of PTSD saw it as an 
'always-already-there object in the world'. It was understood to be a hidden and neglected 
syndrome, and they were fighting for its 'recognition'. Interestingly, at the same time that PTSD 
was being 'recognised', homosexuality was being 'de-recognised' as a psychiatric condition which 
did not appear in the DSM III. 
However, the DSM claims to be 'atheoretical' and based purely on scientific investigation. As 
a result, this background agenda is given little attention in psychiatric discussions of trauma. 
PTSD is presented as a 'straight-forward' medical condition which can be defined in terms of 
aetiology, diagnosis, psychopathology, treatment and prognosis. The 'symptoms' described in the 
DSM are held to be universal and not associated with any particular cultural situation. 
In this chapter I will first describe the 'syndrome' of PT SD as presented in the DSM. I will then 
argue that different reactions to trauma, with different patterns of symptoms, have been described 
historically in the medical literature. I will also look at evidence that the symptoms of PTSD, as 
described in the DSM, do not have the same significance in different situations cross-culturally. 
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These themes will be taken up again in the chapter five. In the second half of this chapter I will 
examine theoretical approaches to PTSD and show how cognitivism has come to be of central 
importance in current understandings of the syndrome. 
3.2 THE SYNDROME OF POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
According to the recent versions of the American Psychiatric Association's DSM a diagnosis of 
PTSD can be made if the patient exhibits a certain combination of symptoms. These symptoms 
fall into three groups: 
a) symptoms of intrusion; such as recurrent thoughts about the trauma, nightmares, flashbacks 
and exaggerated reactions upon exposure to reminders of the trauma. 
b) symptoms of constriction and avoidance; such as efforts to avoid thoughts about the trauma, 
efforts to avoid places or activities which remind one of the trauma and evidence of more general 
withdrawal from the world. 
c) other symptoms such as irritability, insomnia, poor concentration and hypervigilance. These 
'other' symptoms are sometimes described as 'hyperarousal symptoms'. 
In the 1980 DSM III the last group of symptoms included feelings of guilt about surviving when 
others had not and the presence of an exaggerated startle response. This version also described 
three forms of PTSD: acute, when the onset of symptoms was within 6 months of the trauma and 
the duration was less than 6 months; chronic, when the duration was for more than 6 months; and 
delayed, when the symptoms were not present in the first 6 months after the trauma. The DSM 
III was quite clear that the symptoms were the direct result of the trauma, even though there was 
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an acknowledgment that pre-trauma psychopathology could be a predisposing factor. 
In 1987 a revised version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was produced : DSM III-R 
(APA, 1987). In this, the third group of symptoms were named as symptoms of 'increased arousal' 
and survivor guilt was dropped from the criteria. DSM III-R had an expanded list of avoidance 
symptoms. It also asserted that symptoms must usually begin in the immediate aftermath of the 
trauma and last for no less than one month. In addition the revised version elaborated an account 
of the syndrome in children. Like the original DSM III it continued the idea that the traumatic 
event was the central aetiological factor. 
By the time the next version was produced in 1994, psychiatric thinking about the syndrome had 
shifted somewhat and a number of important alterations were made. In the DSM IV (APA, 1994) 
account ofPTSD a stronger role is given to individual history and personality. The new version 
also incorporates recent thinking about the stressor criterion. Thus, it is acknowledged that being 
a witness to a distressing event can be traumatising, even in the absence of direct threat to self 
While in DSM III the stressor criterion simply reads : 
"The existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms 
of distress in almost anyone", 
in DSM IV this has changed to : 
" The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both the following 
were present: 
(1) The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events 
that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of self or others. 
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(2) The person's response involved fear, helplessness, or horror. Note : In children, 
this may be expressed instead by disorganised or agitated behaviour. 
DSM N also included a new category: Acute Stress Disorder. This is separate from PTSD and 
to make the diagnosis the symptoms must occur within four weeks of the trauma and resolve 
within that four week period. In spite of these changes, the characteristic symptoms of PTSD are 
now widely accepted as defining the essential elements of human reactions to trauma. Within the 
discourse on trauma there is continuing debate about specific symptoms, and the DSM 
description of PTSD will no doubt continue to be revised. However, there appears to be a 
consensus about the formulation of post traumatic reactions in terms of intrusive, constrictive and 
hyperarousal symptoms. These symptoms are held to be universal and it is argued that they can 
be seen in children as well as adults. It is assumed that they are expressive of conflicts and 
disturbances happening within individual minds. 
3.3 INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS TO TRAUMA : HISTORICAL ASPECTS 
While PTSD was first defined as an entity in 1980, since its formulation a number of researchers 
have claimed to have found evidence that the syndrome has always existed. This is not surprising, 
given psychiatry's positivist self-understanding. Daly (1983) argues that the symptoms of PTSD 
are described in the famous diary of Samuel Pepys. In this, Pepys describes his experience of the 
Great Fire of London. His account of this begins on the 2nd of September, 1666. Pepys describes 
the gradual progression of the fire towards his home and details his own fear and the terror he 
sees in other people as they are unable to protect their property. He describes how he 
subsequently developed "dreams of the fire and falling down of houses". He was still unable to 
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sleep "without great terrors of fire" six months later. Daly suggests that Pepys' symptoms include 
intrusive images of his frightening experience, feelings of detachment, and memory impairment. 
The claim is that Pepys' diary establishes that PTSD (as defined by modern psychiatry) existed in 
the past. 
O'Brien makes the point that several authors have championed this claim that: 
"PTSD is merely the renaming or the synthesis of an age-old condition" (O'Brien, 
1998, p. 5). 
He calls for caution, and in a review of various anecdotal papers which make this claim, found few 
which actually made a convincing case in its favour. While historically there is considerable 
evidence of physical and psychological reactions to terrifying events in the medical and non- 
medical literature, most of these reports point to symptom complexes which are not co-terminus 
with the defined symptoms of PTSD. For example, there are descriptions from the American Civil 
War of soldiers who developed symptoms of lethargy and withdrawal. These were thought to be 
due to 'nostalgia', in turn due to their being far away from home. There were also descriptions of 
syndromes such as 'soldier's heart' and 'irritable heart' which, whatever their aetiology, clearly 
manifested in physical symptoms located in the chest. The syndrome of 'shell shock' was described 
in the First World War. The symptoms of this were said to be the result of loss or impairment of 
the functions of the central nervous system and were assumed to be the result of organic damage 
(Mott, 1991). The symptoms of shell shock have been variably described but included daze, fear, 
trembling, nightmares and an inability to function. Conversion hysteria was also commonly 
described in the First World War. The most common symptoms among British soldiers were : 
paralyses, contractures, muscle rigidity, gait disorders, seizures, tremors, spasms, blindness, 
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muteness, fugue states and other symptoms of nervous system dysfunction. In addition to these 
syndromes, military doctors also described syndromes of 'neurasthenia' and 'disordered action of 
the heart'. In other words, the symptoms of Shell Shock are simply not the same as those of 
PTSD. In the Second World War, there were a number of studies of symptoms associated with 
combat. Grinker and Spiegal (1945) documented the 19 most common symptoms that persisted 
long after soldiers were removed from combat. According to frequency of occurrence the top 5 
were: restlessness, irritability, fatigue on arising, difficulty falling asleep and anxiety. 
On reviewing these studies one is led to the conclusion that the symptoms of intrusion and 
avoidance, which are at the heart of the DSM concept of PTSD, actually figure quite infrequently. 
Somatic symptoms appear much more often. On this account it is simply wrong to conclude that 
PTSD (as currently defined) has always existed. In spite of this, PTSD is often presented as 
though it was something 'discovered' by psychiatrists, something which, since being discovered, 
throws light on other unexplained areas of psychological functioning. In fact, as we have seen 
above, Allan Young has argued that PTSD is something created by psychiatry at a particular 
historical and cultural moment. This is not to say that the suffering which the PTSD concept 
attempts to capture is in any way fictional or unreal. It is not to say that in the past people did not 
suffer in the wake of life-threatening, terrifying or deeply distressing events. It is to assert that the 
symptoms defined by the DSM, and the way in which they are grouped and related to one 
another, constitute one particular way of approaching and understanding the sequelae of such 
events. 
3.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTRUSIVE-AVOIDANCE MOTIF CROSS-CULTURALLY 
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In keeping with this historical evidence, there is also cross-cultural support for a cautious 
approach to the universality of PTSD. The trans-cultural psychiatrist, Laurence Kirmayer, argues 
that there has been a neglect of somatoform and dissociative disorders in Western psychiatry in 
recent years. He suggests that trauma can be 'inscribed on the body' in different ways and in many 
non-Western societies somatization and dissociation are the mechanisms most commonly 
involved. Kirmayer argues that : 
"The mechanisms of the cultural shaping of symptomatology ... 
differ in some 
details for somatic, anxiety and dissociative symptoms. Models of somatization 
emphasize somatic amplification and symptom attribution ... models of anxiety 
emphasize cognitive evaluation leading to catastrophizing loops ... models of dissociation involve alterations of attention, absorption in imagery, and 
attributions of involuntariness ... 
(T)he specific social mechanisms posited ... all involve a hierarchy of attentional mechanisms, attribution and interpretation, 
narratization, discourse, and praxis in which simpler psychophysiological 
processes are embedded in more complex levels of social meaning" (Kirmayer, 
1996, pgs 149-150). 
In other words, traumatic experiences will effect different responses in individuals, depending on 
the culture in which they live. Cultures differ in how they promote conscious and non-conscious 
ways of dealing with distress. Individuals experience and endure suffering in different ways and 
with different symptomatic outcomes: 
"Thus the effort in the PTSD literature to isolate a simple cause-and-effect relation 
between trauma events and specific symptoms ignores the social and cultural 
embedding of distress that ensures that trauma, loss, and restitution are 
inextricably intertwined" (Kirmayer, 1996, p. 150). 
If Kirmayer's analysis is correct, then it would be safe to assume that the intrusion-avoidance 
symptom complex described in DSM PTSD, would have varying levels of significance in 
different societies. An empirical study carried out by the author of this thesis in Uganda provides 
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some support for this conclusion (Bracken, 1994). In the study, 148 people from two 
neighbouring villages were interviewed by the author and a social worker from the same area. 
These villages were in the Luwero Triangle, a part of Uganda which had suffered greatly during 
the war years (see chapter five for further details). As part of the interview a number of 
questionnaires were used. One of these was the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al, 1979) 
which seeks to measure the respondent's level of intrusive and avoidance symptoms. In addition, 
the social worker made an assessment of each individual's 'level of social functioning', using the 
Axis V scale from the DSM III. This is a measure of the 'highest level of adaptive functioning' 
over the preceding year. It ranges from a score of 1 (superior functioning) to 7 (grossly impaired). 
The score is arrived at after consideration of the person's functioning in terms of (a) social 
relations, (b) occupational functioning and (c) use of leisure time. It was found that intrusive and 
avoidance symptoms were reported when specific questions were asked about them. Furthermore, 
their presence was associated with the level of suffering endured during the war years. However, 
there was no association between these symptoms and the level of social functioning. In other 
words, those who had suffered most and who had the highest scores on PTSD symptoms were 
not necessarily the ones who had the poorest social functioning. In the study poor social 
functioning emerged as being most clearly associated with living alone, having no children and 
illiteracy. The presence of PTSD symptoms (as defined by DSM III) did not seem to affect the 
individual's ability to function. 
Similar results were reported from a study carried out in Nicaragua by Summerfield and Toser 
(1991). This research was of war-displaced peasants who were all survivors of atrocities. 
Summerfield commented on their results : 
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"I studied peasants displaced by war in Nicaragua, all survivors of atrocities, and 
found that features associated with post-traumatic stress disorder were common, 
but these people were nevertheless active and effective in maintaining their social 
world as best they could in the face of the continuing threat of further attacks ... When these people did seek treatment it was for psychosomatic ailments, which 
are not included in the definition of the disorder. ... 
The diagnosis of post- 
traumatic stress disorder says little about ability to function" (Summerfield, 1991, 
p. 1271) 
Similar findings have been reported in Cambodian war refugees in the United States (Mollica et 
al, 1987). Thus, while the intrusive-avoidance symptom complex might be found in different 
settings this does not mean that it has the same significance in these settings. Depending on the 
cultural position of the people involved, other symptom complexes may be present and may be 
of more importance. In addition, the level of social functioning may be influenced by factors other 
than these PTSD symptoms. In spite of this, PTSD researchers have, in the main, assumed the 
universal significance of PTSD symptoms and the cross-cultural validity of the concept. We shall 
return to these concerns in chapter five. In the rest of this chapter we shall examine how these 
researchers have conceptualised the concept and approached the question of treatment from this 
universalist position. My account of theoretical models of PTSD is not meant to be 
comprehensive. Instead I am attempting to give the reader a sense of how the debates in this area 
are moving and what assumptions are involved. 
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3.5 BEHAVIOURAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF PTSD 
A number of PTSD researchers have argued that traditional behavioural frameworks are adequate 
to conceptualise the way in which the clinical syndrome is produced. These involve learning 
theory and models based on the notion of conditioning. Such researchers point to the similarity 
between the symptomatology of simple phobias and that of PTSD. In the former there is a 
recognisable stimulus (trauma), following which the individual shows fear and avoidance when 
confronted with similar or associated stimuli. In Watson and Rayner's paradigmatic experiment, 
"Little Albert" was exposed to a loud and frightening noise when playing with a white rat. Two 
year old Albert subsequently showed fear when exposed to the rat, even when the noise was not 
present. However, individuals with the syndrome of PTSD fear and 'avoid' a range of situations 
not directly related to the original fearful situation. This feature needs to be explained by any 
theory which claims to provide an adequate conceptualisation. With this in mind behaviourists 
have looked to Mowrer's (1960) "two-factor" learning theory. According to this, two types of 
learning, classical and instrumental, occur in syndromes involving sustained reactions of fear and 
avoidance: 
"In the first stage, via temporal contiguity, a previously neutral stimulus becomes 
associated with an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) that innately evokes discomfort 
or fear. The neutral stimulus then acquires aversive properties such that its 
presence elicits anxiety; it now becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS) for fear 
responses. When this conditioned stimulus is paired with another neutral stimulus, 
the latter also acquires aversive overtones and its presentation will also evoke 
anxiety. Through this higher order conditioning, many stimuli, including words, 
images and thoughts, acquire the capacity to engender anxiety. The number of 
conditioned stimuli is further increased via a process of stimulus generalization: 
Stimuli that are similar to the original conditioning stimulus also gain anxiety 
eliciting properties. Anxiety or discomfort is experienced as an aversive or 
unpleasant state. The second stage, then, consists of the development of learned 
responses, i. e. avoidance or escape responses, which decrease or terminate the 
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discomfort arising from the presence of the conditioned stimuli" (Foa et al, 1989, 
p. 157). 
Thus, in the first stage the victim develops fear of various stimuli and tends to avoid these. In the 
second stage (involving instrumental learning) he/she develops a range of 'escape' and avoidance 
behaviours which are selectively reinforced because they reduce exposure to a noxious stimuli. 
This theory has been used to understand the symptoms reported by Vietnam veterans (Keane et 
A 1985) and victims of rape. With regard to the latter, Becker et al. (1984) have proposed that 
the assault situation operates as an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) which provokes extreme 
anxiety and fear. Originally non-threatening aspects of this situation can subsequently operate as 
conditioned stimuli (CS) and generate anxiety in the victim, on their own. Thus, rape often leads 
to a fear of sexual activity, a fear of men in general and to other fears associated with the original 
assault. To avoid discomfort the victim may avoid sexual encounters entirely and actively inhibit 
sexual feelings in herself A similar conceptualisation is used by Kilpatrick et al. (1985). They 
point out that thoughts, words and images associated with the original assault situation can come 
to provoke anxiety, and thus it becomes extremely difficult for the victim to discuss her 
experience without anxiety. Victims may thus find the therapy context extremely stressful. In spite 
of this, Kilpatrick et al. are confident about the need to face the "feared object": 
"Given that the key element in resolution of a phobia is exposure to the feared 
object, or extinction, avoidance behaviour must be changed if fear responses are 
to be reduced" (Kilpatrick et al, 1985, p. 119). 
Although these theories appear able to account for the fear and avoidance often seen after 
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traumatic experiences, they have difficulty explaining why some events result in simple phobic 
avoidance while others give rise to the additional symptoms of the PTSD syndrome. In particular, 
behavioural approaches have difficulty accounting for the reexperiencing symptoms, which some 
researchers regard as the cardinal features of the syndrome. Friedman and Marsella (1996) note 
that: 
"Criterion B, the intrusive recollection criterion, includes symptoms that are 
perhaps the most distinctive and readily identifiable symptoms of PTSD" (p. 15). 
The consensus among theorists of PTSD is that learning theory, on its own, simply cannot 
account for the intrusive-avoidance symptom complex which is key element in the syndrome, as 
presented in the DSM. As a result, even former proponents of these behavioural approaches have 
tended to stress the importance of cognitive elements such as appraisal and expectancy in 
understanding post-traumatic sequelae. As we shall see below, cognitivism is now the dominant 
framework used in conceptual work on trauma. Before discussing this work it is important to look 
at contributions from the psychodynamic point-of-view. 
3.6 PSYCHODYNAMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
Trauma played a central role in the early theories of Freud. In his work up to 1896 he held that 
all adult neurosis had its origins in some form of traumatic event. He distinguished between the 
"actual neuroses" and the "psychoneuroses". The former originated in sexual frustrations 
encountered in adult life, while the latter were due to sexual traumas experienced in early life (the 
so-called "seduction theory"). Most of his attention was directed towards the latter. While 
obsessional neurosis was the result of "active seduction", hysteria was brought about by "passive 
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seduction". Hence obsessionality was more common in men while hysteria was more common in 
women. In his early work with Josef Breuer, Freud expressed a great deal of therapeutic 
optirisrn with regard to hysteria: 
"Each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared 
when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by 
which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the 
patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the 
affect into words" (Breuer and Freud, 1955, p. 6)1. 
As is well known, between 1896 and 1914, Freud abandoned the seduction theory and with it his 
ideas about the traumatic origins of neurotic symptoms. Actual traumatic events were never to 
figure very highly again in his work. However, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, published after 
the First World War, in 1920, he returned to the subject. In this book he proposed a second 
model of psychic trauma. He suggested that the ego has a "stimulus barrier" which acts to control 
the amount of information and energy entering the psychic system. This varies in different people 
and thus different people respond to the same event in different ways. Freud hypothesized that 
traumatic neuroses occur when the mind is overwhelmed and overexcited by stimuli from outside. 
The mental system becomes overloaded. The excessive excitation disorganises ego functioning 
and gives rise to the various different post-traumatic sequelae. This flooding of the ego can lead 
to psychosis but usually a spontaneous process of recovery and reorganisation occurs. However, 
as James Titchener writes: 
"The implication of the traumatic or stressful event at unconscious and conscious 
'This early Freudian belief in the importance of 'facing up to the trauma' resonates with 
the sentiments quoted from Kilpatrick, above, with regard to the importance of challenging 
'avoidance behaviour'. 
72 
levels of understanding and the dreaded memory of the moments of fear and helplessness give it a meaning with widespread effects on individual mental life. 
Resistances against reexperiencing the event vie with intrusive images of it during 
the daytime and with dreams of it at night. Conflicts over the guilt of surviving 
when others did not, neurotic and real guilt about responsibility for the traumatic 
happening, shame of how one behaved under stress, and the overwhelming feeling 
of helplessness are all aspects of the psychodynamics of the stress response 
syndrome" (Titchener, 1986, pgs. 11-12). 
Psychodynamic theorists tend to emphasise the ways in traumatic experiences resonate with 
experiences from infancy and childhood. They point to the ways in which traumas can activate 
conflicts from the past, conflicts around issues such as safety, trust, parental protection, 
dependency and autonomy. Marmar et al write: 
"Adult trauma may activate specific pre-oedipal or oedipal constellations, 
particularly those concerning maternal protection and nurturance, control of 
emotions and bodily functions, and conflicts about potency, rivalry, aggression, 
and fears of retaliation. The trauma-activated themes are seen as bridges from 
current concerns to self-representations, representations of other, affect states, 
and defences arising during early development periods" (Marmar et al, 1995, 
p. 495). 
Freud described the phenomenon of 'repetition compulsion', in which the person re-experiences 
the traumatic event in an effort to gain mastery over it. This was an important precursor for 
Horowitz's theory of the 'completion tendency' (discussed below) which has played an major role 
in cognitive theories of PTSD. However, as we noted in chapter one, psychoanalysis has actually 
influenced psychiatry away from a concern with traumatic phenomenon during the greatest part 
of the 20th century. As Van Velsen notes: 
"classical Freudian analytical theory, with its emphasis on drives, instincts and 
regression, meant that for a long time analysts thought that it was not the stressor, 
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in particular, that was traumatic but the recrudescence of a previously repressed 
infantile conflict" (Van Velsen, 1997, p. 61). 
In more recent times, analysts have again become interested in the phenomenon of trauma and its 
sequelae. However most have turned away from the classical analytic theory and towards 
cognitive ideas, in this process. Horowitz, who has developed the most influential theoretical 
account of PTSD, is himself an analyst who has turned towards cognitivism. Marmar et al (1995), 
quoted above, put forward the conception of traumatic events activating "earlier mental 
schemas". As we shall see below this is very similar to the ways in which explicitly cognitivist 
approaches describe what happens. 
3.7. COGNITIVE APPROACHES 
The central concern of cognitivist psychology is information-processing. There is an underlying 
assumption that the mind-brain relationship is similar to the relationship between computer 
software and hardware. The mind is like the programmes running on a computer. These 
programmes are made up of schemata which structure the individual's orientation to the world 
and determine the way in which he/she experiences events in the world. Human beings are said 
to 'process' information about the world just as a software programme processes information and 
stores it in particular ways. The cognitivist orientation towards trauma involves the idea that there 
has been a failure in processing. This can happen for a number of reasons; for example the 
preexisting schemata may have been inadequate or the information contained in the traumatic 
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event may be overwhelming. In turn, as we shall see below, therapeutic approaches involve 
attempts to promote processing of the traumatic material in different ways. 
3.7.1 Cognitive appraisal 
We have seen above that both traditional behavioural approaches and classical psychodynamic 
theory have been found inadequate in the face of the PTSD syndrome, as defined in the DSM. 
They have different shortcomings but, in essence, neither are able to provide an adequate 
conceptualisation of the sort of psychological sequelae involved in PTSD, and in particular the 
persistence of an intrusion-avoidance symptom complex. A number of researchers have argued 
that an adequate theory has to cover the fact that human beings try to 'make sense' of their 
environment. The intrusion-avoidance symptoms are understood to result when this fails. Foa 
et al (1989) argue that there is a strong case for a theory which invokes 'meaning concepts' when 
it comes to the full syndrome of PTSD. They argue that strong evidence for this is the fact that 
perceived threat is a better predictor for the occurrence of PTSD than actual threat. 
Cognitive appraisal is theorised as a process through which individuals attach meanings to events. 
This has been invoked by a number of researchers in relation to trauma. Thus, both Frank and 
Stewart (1984) and Schepple and Bart (1983), in studies of women who had been raped, showed 
that victims who were assaulted in situations where they felt safe were more likely to suffer severe 
reactions compared to those who were attacked in conditions they, themselves, had thought to 
be dangerous. These researchers postulated the existence of cognitive schemas which influence 
the individual's response to trauma and affect their ability to process it successfully. However 
there are limits to what the idea of cognitive appraisal can explain. As Lee and Turner remark: 
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"By placing the emphasis on pre-existing cognitive schemata, the research further 
sheds light on possible factors that determine why some individuals but not others 
develop PTSD, and also its severity of presentation. Yet in terms of offering an 
overall theoretical perspective of PTSD, these approaches lack a convincing 
means of explaining the core symptoms of PTSD" (Lee and Turner, 1997, p. 67). 
For example, invoking the notion of cognitive appraisal does not help in an explanation of 
emotional numbing or why some people develop delayed symptoms. 
3.7.2 Information-processing 
Perhaps the most influential model of post traumatic stress disorder is the one developed by 
Mardi Horowitz in California in the late nineteen seventies. It combines both psychodynamic and 
cognitivist theories. Horowitz proposed in his book, Stress Response Syndromes (1986), that 
traumatic experiences disrupt an individual's life by producing a block in cognitive and emotional 
processing. Horowitz, echoing Freud, assumes the presence of a'completion tendency' in which 
the : 
"mind continues to process important new information consciously and 
unconsciosly until the situation or the models change and the reality and the 
schema of that reality reach accord" (p. 100) 
A traumatic event presents information which conflicts with pre-existing schemas. There is thus 
an incongruity which gives rise to distress. This provokes a 'stress response' which involves 
reappraisal of the event and revision of the schemas. If the event is highly traumatic this process 
is prolonged. However, until such time as the process is complete, the event remains stored in 
'active memory'. Horowitz elaborates his theory in terms of 'cognitive processing' and suggests 
that there are natural and protective limits to the rate of such processing: 
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"The recurrence of a familiar nonstressful event is likely to be quickly and 
automatically assimilated. The cognitive processing will be completed, and the 
information in active memory storage will be rapidly terminated. The information 
in novel and stressful events, however, cannot be processed rapidly. Thus the 
point of relative completion is not achieved, and the active memory retention is 
not terminated, with relevant codings of information remaining in active storage. 
Assuming a limited capacity for processing, such codings will remain stored in 
active memory even when other programs have greater priority in the hierarchy 
of claims for channels. These actively stored contents, however, will generally be 
repeatedly represented. Each episode of representation will trigger a resumption 
of processing. Thus, whenever this set of information achieves a high-enough 
priority, representation and processing will resume. If the contents are interrupted 
by controls that regulate priorities, they will remain in coded form in active 
memory" (Horowitz, 1986, p. 95). 
Because the representation of the traumatic event is stored in active memory it is replayed over 
and over again, each time causing distress for the individual. To prevent emotional exhaustion, 
inhibition and facilitation processes become involved and these act as a feedback system which 
modulates the flow of information. Horowitz argues that the response to trauma has a phasic 
nature and involves periods of active memory alternating with periods of inhibition. These 
processes are the mind's innate response to stress and occur in all individuals after all stressful 
events. If there is a failure of inhibition, intrusive symptoms such as nightmares and flashbacks 
occur. On the other hand, if inhibition is too strong, symptoms of withdrawal and avoidance 
occur. According to Horowitz, there are substantial individual variations in the ways in which 
intrusion and avoidance phenomena interact. He focuses on personality structure and gives 
examples of reactions to stress in people with hysterical, compulsive and narcissistic personalities. 
Like other theorists from the cognitivist tradition, Horowitz uses the concept of internal schemas. 
As noted above, in cognitivist terms, schemas are held to be similar to the programs running on 
a computer. Such programs encounter new 'information' from a particular perspective and process 
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it in particular ways. This 'information' is then incorporated by the program which either changes 
elements of itself in response to the new 'information' or remains the same. Traumatic experience 
is held to contradict our 'grandest schemata' and overwhelm our ability to process and incorporate 
new experiences. As the traumatic experience remains unincorporated it continually presents itself 
to consciousness in the form of intrusive symptoms. As Bolton and Hill formulate it : 
"There is in post-traumatic stress reaction a failure to integrate the trauma into 
the system of belief about the self and reality. (Bolton and Hill, 1996, p. 359). 
3.8 APPROACHES TO THERAPY 
From the cognitivist point of view, processing the trauma is essential if the person is going to be 
able to 'move on'. This requires reliving the experience in one way or another and the therapist 
is required to help the patient face the trauma. Processing also involves work on the patient's 
beliefs and models, or in cognitivist terms: their schemas. The psychologists Hodgkinson and 
Stewart write: 
"One of the major goals of emotional processing after trauma may be to achieve 
'cognitive completion', to integrate the stressful experience with enduring models 
of the world and one's relation to it ... 
The experience of being victimised causes 
a rupture in the person's personal, family and community identity; if unprocessed, 
the rupture continues, severing the meaning of all that happened in the past from 
the present and the future. A continuity needs to be re-established between past 
and present, and the experience integrated (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991, p. 21) 
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A basic assumption in the cognitivist framework is that the meaningful nature of reality is 
something 'conferred' on it by the schemas, or programs, running in individual minds. Trauma 
disrupts the meaning of the world through its impact on these schemas. Trauma is thus conceived 
of as acting on individuals, and therapy is oriented towards restoring or renewing the schemas in 
discrete individuals. Therapeutic strategies have involved a number of measures aimed at helping 
the individual adult, or child, to process and assimilate the traumatic experience. Numerous 
descriptions of these measures are available (see Meichenbaum (1994) for a comprehensive 
review). With adults, 'cognitive restructuring' is usually performed through talking about the 
trauma on numerous occasions. With children, drawing, painting and story-telling are often used 
with the same aim that the trauma should be relived. This approach has become so widespread 
that it now appears as 'common-sense' to many people living in Western societies. 
Joseph et al (1998) suggest a conceptual framework for the planning of therapeutic interventions. 
There argue that there are a number of components of the 'adaptation process' and it may be 
possible to intervene with any, or all, of these: 
"-promoting re-exposure to the event and to stimuli associated with the event for 
reappraisal; 
-promoting reappraisal of the traumatic experience and its meanings and in 
promoting reappraisal of the emotional states to which appraisals give rise; 
-promoting the direct reduction of emotional arousal; 
-promoting helpful coping strategies to deal with emotional arousal; and 
-promoting the reviewing of previously held cognitive styles and rules 
for living, 
some of which may be maintaining symptoms through blocking re-exposure, 
others of which may determine primary traumatic appraisal" (p. 119). 
All of these strategies are focused on the individual and are aimed at making changes on an 
individual basis. While Joseph et al discuss the importance of social support this is very much as 
an 'additional item'. This is in keeping with other therapeutic approaches. 
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3.9 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CURRENT DISCOURSE 
In the cognitivist framework traumatic events produce their effects by clashing with the victim's 
internal schemas, the ways in which their thoughts about themselves and the world around them 
are ordinarily structured. After a traumatic experience the individual has to modify his/her 
schemas to fit the new reality. They have to find new meanings for themselves and their world. 
The intrusive-avoidance symptom complex is understood to be the result of this process. These 
symptoms reflect the desperate attempts of the individual to incorporate the new 'information' 
involved in the trauma. Most researchers in the area of trauma are now adherents of some form 
of cognitive approach. 
The accepted understanding is that the centrality of the intrusion-avoidance motif reflects this 
desperate search for meaning and order. For Horowitz and others, this process is conceptualised 
as a purely internal phenomenon located entirely within the confines of the individual self It is 
a process which can be understood scientifically and can be helped by a series of technical 
interventions which encourage the processing of the traumatic material. While Horowitz 
acknowledges that there are social, cultural and somatic aspects to the reaction to trauma, his 
approach is to separate out the cognitive phenomena and focus upon the these. Other cognitive 
theories work in a similar way to this. These conceptualise the social world in terms of 'social 
factors', discrete aspects of the environment, which can be individually measured. Support from 
relatives, friends and community is conceptualised in terms of'social support factors' which are 
then put forward as acting as 'buffers' or 'moderating variables' against the impact of traumatic 
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events. These social factors are conceived of as acting on the individual 'from the outside'. 
In the cognitivist framework the basic form of human psychology is held to be universal and not 
determined by social or historical context. Human reality is structured by psychological laws 
which can be scientifically investigated. While the content of cognitions and emotional states can 
be historically and culturally influenced, the way in which these cognitions and emotions are 
structured and ordered remains the same. Just as a database running on my computer will contain 
information relating to my work, and my neighbour can have the same programme with 
completely different information, so too human beings, according to cognitivism, have the same 
programmes running with different content. Because of this, it makes perfect sense for researchers 
in this area to search for a 'unifying theory', an account of trauma which explains how all the 
different 'factors' relate and which can be empirically investigated. A typical call is made by Lee 
and Turner: 
"A wholly persuasive model is required which offers an explanation of the 
complexity and range of the associated symptomatology. Also such a theory needs 
to answer why some people develop PTSD and others do not. Furthermore, no 
theory of PTSD can be complete without empirical data to back up the findings" 
(Lee and Turner, 1997, p. 71). 
Thus, in the current discourse of trauma we see a very good example of how cognitivist models 
work in the clinical area. This discourse incorporates all the markers of Cartesianism, identified 
at the end of the last chapter : individualism, separation of mind from the 'outside' world and 
positivism. In addition this discourse works with a traditional linear approach to the question of 
time and causality. In fact, the very diagnosis of PTSD makes a strong statement, in itself, about 
the nature of time. As Allan Young writes: 
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"PTSD is a disease of time. The disorder's distinctive pathology is that it permits 
the past (memory) to relive itself in the present, in the form of intrusive images 
and thoughts and in the patient's compulsion to replay old events. The space 
occupied by PTSD in the DSM-III classificatory system depends on this temporal- 
causal relation : etiological event - (to) - symptoms. Without it, PTSD's 
symptoms are indistinguishable from syndromes that belong to various other 
classifications" (Young, 1995, p. 7). 
In this thesis I will not be exploring, in any depth, the biological aspects of PTSD. However, it 
is worth noting that much of the biological research in this area has been predicated upon this 
temporal-causal framework. Thus researchers have tended to assume the causal nature of the 
traumatic event and examine biological reactions to this. The traumatic event, or stressor, is 
understood to bring about pathological changes in an otherwise normally functioning 
physiological system. As we have seen above (section 3.1) DSM III PTSD represents a 
considerable shift in thinking about trauma compared to earlier accounts. Specifically, in DSM 
III, traumatic events come to be seen as causative factors in their own right. `Normal' people, with 
no prior psychopathology, can be rendered severely ill by exposure to trauma. In the work of 
Horowitz, and others, PTSD is understood to be at the end of a continuum of 'normal' responses 
to frightening events. Biological researchers have used this paradigm and used animal models of 
responses to stress to investigate the biology of PTSD. As Yehuda and McFarlane note : 
"The concept of an apriori biological response was an appropriate 
counterargument to critics who attacked the diagnosis of PTSD as having a 
political and philosophical origin, and it provided a post hoc scientific hypothesis 
that a biological response to trauma reflects a natural physiologic process" 
(Yehuda and McFarlane, 1995, p. 1707). 
In chapter five I shall argue that this understanding of time and causality is proving inadequate to 
explain the biological research findings in relation to trauma. I shall suggest that a substantially 
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different paradigm is needed. 
3.10S MARY 
In this chapter I have explored the concept of PTSD. After discussing the symptoms involved in 
the syndrome, as currently defined, I pointed to research evidence which calls into question its 
universal validity. In spite of this evidence, PTSD is generally held to capture the central 
psychological sequalae after traumatic experiences. It is also assumed that it is valid cross- 
culturally and trans-historically. In the second part of the chapter I reviewed various 
conceptualisations of the disorder and argued that cognitive models are currently dominant. In 
the concluding section I pointed to the philosophical assumptions at work in these models. In the 
next chapter I will explore these assumptions in more detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COGNITIVIST PARADIGM IN PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
In chapter two I introduced the cognitivist framework in philosophy and psychology. In the last 
chapter I argued that this framework is now the dominant one in relation to the understanding of 
trauma. In addition, therapeutic interventions which draw on this framework are currently very 
fashionable. In this chapter I will explore the philosophical assumptions of this approach in greater 
depth. 
4.1 THE POPULARITY OF COGNITIVISM 
In recent years cognitive therapy has become very popular in psychiatry and psychology and 
some variant of it is now prescribed regularly for a range of psychiatric problems including 
anxiety, depression, symptoms of psychosis as well as post-traumatic conditions. It is a form of 
therapy which appears "clear" in its concepts and is relatively easy to learn. It also appears able 
to define its operations and to measure and quantify its benefits. Its popularity is understandable 
in the midst of a culture which places a high priority on efficiency. However, cognitive therapy, 
like all other forms of psychotherapy, is based on a certain set of assumptions concerning the 
nature of the self and its relationships to others and to the world in general. In fact the therapeutic 
element is just one aspect of an overall approach to psychology. It is premised upon the 
"cognitive model" of mind, in which disorders of mind are understood to be caused by 
"dysfunctional beliefs" and "faulty information processing". Cognitivism has become popular, not 
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only in the area of therapy, but as we shall see below, across most of the sub-disciplines of 
psychology. A very particular philosophy of mind is involved in the cognitive approach and in 
the background are a set of metaphysical and epistemological orientations. The cognitive 
paradigm is not "value-neutral" but involves a particular orientation towards the self and the 
world and to the problems of suffering and healing. In this chapter I will first attempt to outline 
this background paradigm and then point to its Cartesian foundations. In the last section I will 
point to the limitations of this approach which arise from the limitations of these foundations. 
4.2 THE COGNITIVIST APPROACH TO MIND AND ITS DISORDERS 
Cognitivism is essentially a paradigm, a framework, through which researchers have found an 
order in human reality and a way to explore this reality. Within any paradigm there are competing 
theories and approaches. I will not attempt to give a comprehensive overview of all the different 
approaches which could be called cognitivist. I will attempt to give a general description of 
cognitivism which I believe accurately reflects the model at work in most psychiatric research. 
This account is broadly based on Rom Harre's and Grant Gillett's characterisation of cognitivism 
in their book The Discursive Minas This refers to a cognitivism which involves a computational 
approach to thought. While this has been challenged by approaches which rely on connectionist 
models, computational approaches are still central in cognitivist accounts of trauma'. 
The basic premise of cognitivism is that there is an underlying structure to mentation. This 
structure is based on the biological organisation of the brain but needs a separate, non-biological, 
'see discussion at the end of chapter one. 
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set of concepts to fully grasp it. In this model the brain is akin to computer hardware, whereas the 
mind, or mental activity, is like the software, the programmes which run on the basis of the 
hardware. In this framework it is logical to treat the brain and the mind as separate realms and the 
project of cognitivism is about exploring the structures and the underlying basic elements of the 
software, of the mind. While the content of these programmes might differ between cultural 
groups the form of the programmes remain the same. Because of this, cognitivism involves an 
adherence to the positivist agenda of exploring the mind through the framework of causal science. 
It also involves adherence to a model of psychological universalism, in which thought and emotion 
are understood to involve similar basic elements and structures cross-culturally. The challenge for 
cognitivism is to delineate the nature of these underlying structures and to allow for therapeutic 
developments based on this understanding. 
While cognitivism retains the same positivist scientific approach which guided behaviourism, it 
has wanted to explore the contents of the "black box" which lies between stimulus and response. 
As Harre and Gillett put it : 
"Cognitive psychologists attempted to understand the mechanisms that mediated 
the transition from stimulus to response by examining such things as semantic 
categorization and its effect on recall of information, explicit instructions and 
problem -solving strategies, the effect of cognitive anticipations on perception, 
the 
relationship between images and propositions in the internal processes subserving 
cognition, the hierarchical relationships between categories in the ordering and 
retrieval of knowledge. The overall model was that the mind was an 
internal realm 
of operations and computations hypotheses that could be tested 
by experimental 
tests of their logical consequences via the systematic manipulation of specifiable 
inputs and outputs to the black box of cognition" (Harre and Gillett, 1994, p. 
15) 
A fundamental assumption was that these mechanisms could be characterised in causal terms and 
thus causal hypotheses could be generated which could then 
be used to produce predictions of 
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what behaviour would be produced under certain sets of circumstances: 
"In the conception of the information processing model, it seemed that psychology 
had now found a format that would allow it to become fully scientific, in the realist 
sense. Its theories would consist of hypotheses about information processing 
mechanisms. Predictions, describing behaviour, could be drawn from these 
hypotheses. All forms of activity including the use of speech, the display of 
emotions, the evincing of attitudes, the solving of problems, and so on ought to 
be comprehensible in principle" (Harre and Gillett, 1994,14). 
As cognitivism has become increasingly influential, more and more areas of psychology have 
come to adopt the paradigm. Thus in developmental psychology, under the influence of Piaget, 
there was a preoccupation with the kinds of operations that could be performed by the 
developing subject at different stages, and with the underlying structures which underpin these. 
In personality theory there was a shift towards an examination of the cognitive framework of the 
subject. Personal Construct Theory emerged in the 1960s and has become increasingly popular 
as formulations based on unconscious drives and traits have faded (Kelly, 1955). The idea that 
human beings operate personally and socially on the basis of unconscious models and rules has 
become something of an orthodoxy. These models and rules have been formulated differently, 
and the terminology has also differed, but the basic proposition has remained the same. Thus there 
were the "rules and roles" described by Rom Harre in an early model of social behaviour (Harre 
and Secord, 1973). There were also the concepts of internal, cognitive "scripts" described by 
Schank and Abelson (1977), and the "grammars" of linguists influenced by Chomsky. The 
concept of unconscious "schemas" is currently very popular. The social psychologist Ronnie 
Janoff-Bulman defines the term in the following quotations: 
"Yet, in all instances, whether the organised knowledge is about 
a common object or a broad class of people, the relevant schema 
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is essentially a theory that goes beyond the data given. A schema 
is not simply a straightforward accumulation of specific original 
instances and encounters but rather a generalization or abstraction 
involving organized knowledge about a stimulus or concept" 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992, P. 29) 
"Our fundamental assumptions about the world are essentially our 
grandest schemas, our most abstract, generalized knowledge 
structures" (p. 29) 
"Schema research demonstrates the theory-driven (rather than 
data-driven) nature of our perceptual and cognitive processes" 
(p. 29). 
She quotes Daniel Goleman : 
"... Schemas embody the rules and categories that order raw 
experience into coherent meaning. All knowledge and experience 
is packaged in schemas. Schemas are the ghost in the machine, the 
intelligence that guides information as it flows through the mind" 
(Goleman, 1985, p. 75). 
In clinical psychiatry the notion that human beings operate with unconscious models or schemas 
has been used in a number of ways. We saw in the last chapter how this approach has become 
dominant in the area of post-traumatic conditions. However, it was in relation to the clinical 
syndrome of depression that cognitive therapy first achieved prominence. Indeed Aaron Beck's 
theory of depression has become something of a "paradigm" case in psychiatry and has guided 
thinking in many other areas. 
Beck proposed that in the person who later develops depression, faulty or dysfunctional 
assumptions are laid down as cognitive schemas in early life. They are activated by critical 
incidents in later life and a meshing between the particular incident and the dysfunctional 
assumptions brings about a complex of "negative automatic thoughts". These thoughts underlie 
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the clinical state of depression and are essentially distorted, negative, dysfunctional and unhelpful. 
He says: 
"In brief, the theory postulates that the depressed or depression-prone individual 
has certain idiosyncratic patterns (schemas) which may become activated whether 
by specific stresses impinging on specific vulnerabilities, or by overwhelming 
nonspecific stresses. When the cognitive patterns are activated, they tend to 
dominate the individual's thinking and to produce the affective and motivational 
phenomena associated with depression" (Beck, 1972, p. 129-130). 
Depression is, for Beck, not simply an affective disturbance but rather involves a specific disorder 
of thinking, of cognition. In contrast to the disorder of thought characteristically seen in 
conditions labelled schizophrenic, depression does not involve a disorder of rationality as such: 
"... the ideas are generally not irrational, but are too absolute, broad and extreme; 
too highly personalized; and are used too arbitrarily to help the patient to handle 
the exigencies of his life" (Beck, 1976, p. 246). 
The "cognitive disorder" involved in depression can be defined in terms of : overgeneralization, 
selective abstraction and negativism. For Beck depression is a specific condition with a specific 
form of psychopathology and a specific form of therapy to match. It involves the patient's 
cognitions being out of step with the surrounding culture in a specific way, a distorted way which 
requires a specific form of therapeutic intervention. In contrast to dynamic approaches, cognitive 
therapy does not involve any great exploration of the past. It is very much focused on the "here 
and now". It does not theorise about the relationship between patient and therapist in terms of 
unconscious forces, or in terms of transference and countertransference. It involves the therapist 
in "training" the patient to examine his/her thoughts in a systematic and "non-distorted" way. The 
patient, in turn, is involved in "homework" and "exercises" which are carried out between 
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sessions. The therapist's job is basically to help the patient confront his/her cognitive distortions, 
and, largely through blunt persuasion, provide much of the motivation for the patient to carry out 
the homework. 
4.3 THE EMERGENCE OF COGNITIVISM 
There are many reasons for the emergence of the "first cognitive revolution" in psychology (Harre 
and Gillett, 1994). Clinical and theoretical psychology had limited scope to develop within the 
strict confines of a behavioural paradigm. Behavioural approaches in psychology and 
psychotherapy were in many ways the direct legacy of the empiricist tradition in science. 
Behaviourism involved a relegation of mental processes, including reason, to a minor role in 
influencing human action. As Kenneth Gergen puts it: 
"In many respects, the behaviourist and neo-behaviourist movements in 
psychology recapitulate, at the theoretical level, the empiricist emphasis in the 
philosophy of science. That is, the theories of human psychology represent 
reformulations of the empiricist metatheory that informs the behaviourist and neo- 
behaviourist projects of science ... 
However, these movements simultaneously left 
unexplored the rationalist contribution to the reigning metatheory. Unexplored 
was the implicit implicature, in which rationalist processes could be credited with 
a contribution to human action - not simply pawns to antecedent conditions, but 
possessing intrinsic properties with their own demands on action" (Gergen, 1995, 
pgs 13-14). 
Behavioural approaches refused to engage with the "inner voice", the internal aspects of mind. 
The advent of cognitive models and therapies represented a fundamental shift in psychology to 
an acceptance not only the mind's existence, but also an acceptance of the central premise of 
rationalism : the primacy of thought over sensation and the experiential world. In the cognitivist 
paradigm active mental processes come to have a central and dominant role in directing human 
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action. 
As well as a growing dissatisfaction with the limitations of behaviourism, the emergence of the 
computer as a cultural icon in the West has been an important factor. In the past twenty years it 
has become possible not only to think of the mind as being like a computer, but to propose that 
the mind is a computer. As psychology became concerned to understand the mind in terms of 
causal mechanisms and various versions of rule-following formulae it found a natural ally in the 
developing world of artificial intelligence (AI). In fact the assumptions underlying Al and 
cognitivist psychology are essentially the same. If it is possible, in principle, to account for 
different aspects of human thought and behaviour in terms of rule-following formulae, then, also 
in principle, it should be possible to build machines which would operate on the basis of these 
formulae and so replicate human intelligence and behaviour. Both developments assume that the 
human mind works in the same way that computers do. Two major proponents of Al, Newell and 
Simon, conclude that their work: 
"provide(s) a general framework for understanding problem-solving behaviour ... 
and finally reveals with great clarity that free behaviour of a reasonably intelligent 
human can be understood as the product of a complex but finite and determinate 
set of laws" (Newell and Simon, 1963, p. 293). 
4.4 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN THE COGNITIVIST PARADIGM 
In chapter two I have already argued that cognitivism is, in essence, a modern day version of 
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Cartesianism. I defined the latter in terms of methodological individualism, separation of 'inner' 
mind from 'outer' body and surrounding world, and a positivist causal understanding of human 
reality. In this section I will develop this argument further. 
4.4.1 FUNCTIONALISM 
Theoretical and practical developments in Al and in cognitive psychology have been given 
substantial support from contemporary developments in philosophy of mind. Philosophers such 
as Jerry Fodor argue the case for a computational view of thought, a position which is perhaps 
the dominant one in current philosophy of mind (Crane, 1995). Functionalism, as this philosophy 
of mind has come to be called, has, in fact, become: 
"something approaching an orthodoxy over the last ten years" (Lyons, 1995, p. 
lviii). 
Functionalism involves the belief that mental states are defined by their causes and effects. It 
asserts a distinction between role and occupant. Thus a similar functional state can be realized 
in different systems. In many ways a response to, and a rejection of, the ideas of eliminative 
materialism, functionalists draw on the dualism implicit in the computer model to argue the case 
for a separate mental realm. Just as computer software cannot be fully accounted for by reference 
to hardware alone, so too mental states cannot be reductively explained through an account of 
brain states alone. Mentation has its own elements and structures which cannot be explained in 
the language of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology. There are, now, a number of separate 
versions of functionalism. In his book Mind, Language and Reality Hilary Putnam made the case 
for 'computer functionalism' (also called 'Turing machine functionalism') : 
92 
"According to functionalism, the behaviour of, say, a computing machine is not 
explained by the physics and chemistry of the computing machine. It is explained 
by the machine's program. Of course, that program is realized in a particular 
physics and chemistry, and could, perhaps, be deduced from that physics and 
chemistry. But that does not make the program a physical or chemical property 
of the machine : it is an abstract property of the machine. Similarly, I believe that 
the psychological properties of human beings are not physical and chemical 
properties of human beings, although they may be realized by physical and 
chemical properties of human beings" (Putnam, 1975, p. xiii). 
The mind is not only separable from the body (brain) in functionalist accounts but also from the 
world around. It is a realm which exists in relation to this outside world and which represents it. 
Mental operations exist in a self-contained internal domain. Thus while functionalists reject 
Cartesian (ontological) dualism they continue to think (in a Cartesian idiom) about the mind as 
something 'interior' and separable from an 'external' world. 
In addition to its assertion of the mind-brain distinction, functionalism also makes assertions about 
the nature of thinking. It proposes that representational mental states, such as beliefs, desires, 
memories, aspirations are related to one another in a computational way. They are processed in 
a rule governed way, as are the representational states of a computer. Fodor calls this the 
"Representational Theory of Mind". He writes: 
"At the heart of this theory is the postulation of a language of thought : an infinite 
set of "mental representations" which function both as the immediate objects of 
propositional attitudes and as the domains of mental processes" 
Fodor spells out what the notion of "propositional attitude" means for him : 
"To believe that such and such is to have a mental symbol that means such and 
such tokened in your head in a certain way; it's to have such a token 'in your belief 
box' ... 
Correspondingly, to hope that such and such is to have a token of that 
same mental symbol tokened in your head, but in a different way; it's to have it 
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tokened 'in your hope box"'. 
Furthermore this theory of mind involves the claim that: 
"Mental processes are causal sequences of tokenings of mental representations" 
(Fodor, 1995, p. 258). 
Thus functionalism, as a theory of mind, incorporates assumptions which emerge from the 
Cartesian tradition, discussed in chapter two. Its focus is the individual 'mind', which is 
understood to be 'something' which exists in relation to an 'outside' world. The contents of the 
mental realm are held to exist in 'causal' relations with each other, and are thus open to scientific 
investigation. 
We shall see in the chapter six how a Heideggarian perspective challenges the basic tenets of 
Cartesianism and thus undermines these orientating assumptions. However before outlining such 
a Heideggarian perspective it is first important to identify a further assumption which also 
underscores current cognitivist approaches in psychology. This involves a particular orientation 
to the question of time, in particular of how past and present are related. 
4.4.2. TIME AND CAUSALITY IN THE COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK 
Within functionalism, meaningful behaviour is understood to be an outcome of intentional mental 
states which can be characterised in terms of representations. In this framework the meaning of 
a piece of behaviour consists of those mental representations in the mind of the person involved 
which give rise to the behaviour. Grasping the meaning of a piece of text involves correctly 
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accounting for the system of representations in the mind of the author. Because all mental states 
are held to be representational, in this framework there is, in principle at least, a single correct 
answer to the question of what the meaning of any piece of behaviour is. It is always theoretically 
possible to provide a full account of the system of representations in a person's mind at any given 
time. Cognitivism is concerned with how these representations are structured and related to one 
another. As Jerome Wakefield puts it: 
"The cognitivist holds that representational states are determinate in meaning 
because the content of a mental sentence or a mental picture, like the contents of 
sentences and pictures generally, can be discerned and described from their 
structure alone. If meanings are inherently determinate, then an interpretation is 
an attempt to use language to match as closely as possible the actual content of 
the intentional state, and the interpretation either gets it exactly right or suffers 
from some degree of inexactitude" (Wakefield, 1988, p. 135). 
In the cognitivist view the relationship between past and present involves a relationship between 
such determinate intentional states. Furthermore the move from one intentional state to another 
comes about through interactions with the external world which can be characterised in terms of 
operations and thus systematically defined. Just as the software in a computer can be changed by 
inputs from keyboard, so too schemas in the human mind can be changed through inputs from the 
experiences of the individual. Within cognitivism memory plays an extremely important role. It 
is the matrix in which past and present are related. Memory is essentially about storage and 
retrieval and again computer models have helped organise theoretical developments in this area. 
In this framework past and present are clearly separable states of mind. The model of time which 
underlines this framework involves a linear series of 'nows'. For the human being each 'now' 
involves a particular intentional state of mind, with certain representations organised in a 
particular way. Just as the contents of any particular mental state can be defined and formalised, 
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so too change from one state to another can be accounted for in terms of certain causal laws. 
These laws are themselves fixed and atemporal. Memory involves reaching out of the present. 
As Frederick Olafson says: 
"memory is typically construed in terms of episodic acts in the course of which we 
reach out of the present and back into the past so as to recapture something from 
our earlier life. The facts that are so recovered may also be thought of as having 
being "stored" after their actuality had lapsed and, as so stored, continuing on with 
us through each of the successive presents in which we live" (Olafson, 1987, p. 
86). 
Post traumatic sequelae are essentially seen to be the result of a disordered interaction of past and 
present conceived in causal terms. In chapter six we show how hermeneutics offers a very 
different approach to the question of time and causality. 
Before ending this chapter I wish to briefly introduce the work of Charles Taylor, a North 
American philosopher, who has developed a critical engagement with the legacy of the Cartesian 
tradition. This discussion will hopefully serve to raise some initial questions about the cross- 
cultural validity of the cognitivist model. 
4 
.5 
CARTESIANISM AND THE MORAL ORDER 
In a series of books and other works Taylor has argued strongly that modern notions of self, 
individuality and agency are historically contingent. This is in spite of the fact that they often 
appear to those of us who have lived and grown within modernity as self-evident facts about 
being human. It is hard for us to imagine other ways of thinking about our selves apart from the 
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ways we have been given by this culture. In his book Sources of the Self. The Making of the 
Modern Identity Taylor traces the origins of our modern notions about self Furthermore he traces 
the particular sense of a moral order which has been established around this approach to the self 
Modern ideas about good and bad, right and wrong are often predicated upon a certain concept 
of the individual self and how this self is related to the wider order of the natural world and the 
universe at large. He is exploring, what he calls, the "background picture" lying behind our moral 
and spiritual intuitions. He calls this our "moral ontology" (Taylor, 1989, p. 8). 
For Taylor, investigating the moral ontology of modernity brings him straight away to modern 
notions of human agency and how these in turn are influenced by modern ideas about the mind 
and epistemology. He argues that a Cartesian approach to mind and the self, what he calls the 
"epistemological tradition", is inextricably bound up with certain modern ideas about morality and 
spirituality. He explains the ease with which computer models of thinking have become established 
in Western societies by pointing to this connection. We have seen above that the world of Al is 
closely allied to a philosophy of functionalism. Empirically such models have had only limited 
success. Al has not lived up to its original aspirations and is, at least in its traditional form 
(described by John Haugeland as Good Old-Fashioned Al (GOFAI)), a good example of what 
Imre Lakatos called a "degenerating research program" (Dreyfus, 1994). However the computer 
model of thought is still widely accepted and functionalism remains one of the dominant positions 
in modern philosophy of mind. It has already been noted that cognitivism is of growing 
importance in psychology and psychiatry. This contradiction leads Taylor to assert that the : 
"... the great difficulties that the computer simulations have encountered ... 
don't 
seem to have dimmed the enthusiasm of real believers in the model. It is as though 
they had been vouchsafed some revelation a priori that it must all be done by 
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formal calculi. Now this revelation, I submit, comes from the depth of our modern 
culture and the epistemological model anchored in it, whose strength is based not 
just on its affinity to mechanistic science but also on its congruence to the 
powerful ideal of reflexive, self-given certainty. 
For this has to be understood as something like a moral ideal" (Taylor, 1997, p. 
6). 
In other words our acceptance of cognitivism and computer models of mind and thinking cannot 
be explained by the empirical success of these approaches alone. This acceptance appears to be 
driven by other cultural aspirations and ideals as well. The moral ideal referred to in the quotation 
above is about our cultural concern with autonomy and freedom. In the modern sense a free 
agent is one who is able to rely on his/her own judgements, able to look inside at his/her own 
needs and desires and who is able to seek fulfilment of these inner needs and desires in the 
outside world. A free agent is one who can stand back from the world and be responsible 
according to one's own agenda. Thus our very notion of freedom involves some sort of separation 
between inside and outside and some sort of calculating self-reflexivity. According to Taylor 
there are three aspects of the modern view of the self which are particularly bound up with the 
cartesian, or epistemological , tradition: 
"The first is the picture of the subject as ideally disengaged, that is free and 
rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the natural and 
social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies 
outside him in these worlds. The second, which flows from this, is a punctual view 
of the self, ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds- and even some 
features of his own character-instrumentally, as subject to change and reorganizing 
in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others. The third is the 
social consequence of the first two: an atomistic construal of society as constituted 
by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual, purposes" (Taylor, 1997, 
p. 6) 
Taylor makes the point that to challenge one tradition automatically brings us into conflict with 
the other. The epistemological tradition gives support to the moral order of modernity and 
its 
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ideals of disengaged rationalistic agency. In turn this order gives support to the apparent clarity 
and naturalness of the Cartesianism account of self and thought. These traditions stand together 
in "a complex relation of mutual support" (Taylor, 1997, p. 8). 
In the modern world of psychiatry and psychotherapy this mutuality becomes explicit in the 
credence our culture give to analysis of the self Reflecting upon oneself in a detached and 
"objective" manner has become something of moral imperative. Analysing one's desires, motives 
and aspirations either through cognitive forms of therapy or psychodynamic approaches is 
generally accepted as a "good" way to deal with anxiety, depression and more recently psychosis. 
Nikolas Rose has developed a sustained Foucauldian analysis of how, in this century, psychology 
and psychotherapeutics have penetrated into many different corners of everyday life. He points 
to the political dimension of these developments and argues that to a significant degree we are 
now governed, ironically, through our own individual quests for freedom and self-expression: 
"Psychotherapeutics is linked at a profound level to the socio-political obligations 
of the modern self. The self it seeks to liberate or restore is the entity able to steer 
its individual path through life by means of the act of personal decision and the 
assumption of personal responsibility. It is the self freed from all moral obligations 
but the obligation to construct a life of its own choosing, a life in which it realizes 
itself 
... 
It promises to make it possible for all of us to make a project of our 
biography, create a style for our lives, shape our everyday existence in terms of 
an ethic of autonomy. Yet the norm of autonomy secretes, as its inevitable 
accompaniment, a constant and intense self scrutiny, a continual evaluation of our 
personal experiences, emotions, and feelings in relation to images of satisfaction, 
the necessity to narrativize our lives in a vocabulary of interiority. The self that 
is liberated is obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity" (Rose, 
1989, p. 253-254). 
Cognitive therapy, in particular, aims to bring a rational ordering to the world of unconscious 
"scripts" and "schemas". In this paradigm the idea is to rid ourselves of anxiety and despair 
99 
through the Cartesian ideal of self-reflexivity. The end result of therapy is a self which is more 
self-aware and detached, a self which can monitor itself in a rational way and detect emerging 
difficulties. 
Thus cognitive therapy and other self-reflecting therapies endorse the two traditions described 
by Taylor and which offer each other mutual support: Cartesian approaches to the self and 
thought and a moral order based upon individualism and atomism. These theories and therapies 
are at home in a culture which operates with a strong notion of the "ideally disengaged" subject. 
One of the central themes of this work (i. e. the thesis) is around the question of whether such 
approaches are relevant in other cultures. We shall return to this question again in chapters five 
and six. An important question is whether different societies operate with fundamentally different 
notions of self and agency. This question can only be answered by reference to the literature of 
social anthropology. My treatment of the issue here will not be intensive, I will simply point to 
a few examples which make the point. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines the issue at 
stake in characteristic terms: 
"the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural 
background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world's cultures" (Geertz, 1975, p. 48). 
Arthur Kleinman, a prominent American academic and Professor of Anthropology and Psychiatry 
at Harvard Medical School has conducted extensive research on the problem of depression in P 
Chinese and American patients. In his book Rethinking Psychiatry. From Cultural Category to 
Personal Experience he writes: 
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"Psychiatry in the West is strongly influenced by implicit Western cultural values 
about the nature of the self and its pathologies which emphasize a deep, hidden 
private self In contrast, both classical Chinese texts and the contemporary 
common-sense viewpoint among Chinese, both laymen and psychiatrists, affirm 
that the self is chiefly interpersonal. The Chinese view the self, to a large degree, 
as consensual -a sociocentfically oriented personality that is much more attentive 
to he demands of a particular situation and key relationships than to what is deeply 
private... Social context, not personal depth, is the indigenous measure of validity 
(Kleinman, 1988, p. 98). 
Laurence Kirmayer points out that in Japan autonomy in interpersonal relationships is much less 
valued than in the West. He notes that for the Japanese the moral value of the self is expressed 
through an idiom of social connectedness rather than personal achievement. He contrasts, what 
he calls the "sociosomatic" origins of distress in Japan with the more familiar psychosomatic 
framework developed in the West. He says: 
"The moral value of the self is expressed through social connectedness and 
endurance rather than through mastery or control of the physical or social 
environment. This supports a sociosomatic theory of the origins of distress, in 
which the self endures bodily suffering as a consequence of inescapable social 
conditions. Japanese sociosomatics emphasizes inborn constitution and the stress 
of fufflIng social roles as causes of disease. Morally upright behaviour may lead 
to illness when the person overextends himself ... this contrasts with 
Western 
psychosomatics, in which the intrapsychic self mediates the body's suffering and 
the person is morally culpable not only because of how he acts toward others but 
because of how he acts toward himself ' (Kirmayer, 19 8 8, p. 79). 
Shweder and Bourne (1982) distinguish two different approaches to the individual-social 
relationship. They characterize these as the "egocentric contractual" and the "sociocentric 
organic". Societies which endorse the former as an ideal tend to emphasize the intrapsychic and 
promote reflection upon the self and its desires and cognitions. In sociocentric societies there is 
much less focus on the psychological realm and instead there is an orientation towards 
integration 
of the individual with the natural, supernatural and social worlds. This 
differentiation is now 
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generally accepted in social anthropology and is increasingly accepted by mainstream transcultural 
psychiatrists (e. g. Leff, 1988). 
4.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have examined the cognitivist approach in psychology and psychiatry. I have 
shown how this approach works with many of the assumptions of Cartesianism. Specifically it 
incorporates an individualist and positivist approach to the understanding of human reality and 
adheres to a linear model of time and causality. It works with the basic assumption that the mind 
exists as separate from, and in relation to, an outside world. This tradition informs much of what 
might be called "common-sense" ideas about the self and the nature of thought in much of 
modem Western society. However I have pointed to the fact the disengaged self, idealised in this 
tradition, is not a notion which is "at home" in many other parts of the world. Of necessity 
therefore, psychological theories and therapies which are based on this tradition, and which 
promote this orientation to the self will have major difficulties cross-culturally. In the next chapter 
I will begin to develop a very different account of trauma and human reality in general, one which 
seeks to move beyond the assumptions of Cartesianism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE DISCOURSE ON TRAUMA: 
CASE MATERIAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter three I examined the current Western discourse on trauma. I argued that this has been 
premised upon a strongly individualistic and positivistic approach to psychology, and currently 
is dominated by a cognitivist framework. In this chapter I will begin by discussing a literature on 
trauma which, in contrast to that presented in chapter three, points to the importance of social 
and cultural context in determining the outcome after traumatic events. In the second section of 
the chapter I will outline an alternative framework which gives priority to context. In this section 
I will use a series of case vignettes from work in Uganda to illustrate my points. At the end of 
this chapter I point to a number of tensions which have emerged in the individual trauma 
framework (what I have been calling the discourse on trauma, or PTSD-based accounts of 
trauma). I will argue that these issues do not present difficulties for a context-centred approach 
which looks to hermeneutics rather than cognitivism for its conceptual grounding. While the 
individual trauma model works from an initial focus on individual psychology and explains the 
influence of social factors in terms of individual psychologies, a hermeneutic approach 
begins with 
an initial focus on contextual issues and works from these towards an understanding of 
how 
individuals deal with suffering and seek help. In addition, while the cognitivist tradition 
locates 
meaning inside individual psychologies, the latter understands meaning as a social and cultural 
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issue. This chapter is empirical in content, in section two of the thesis I will explore the nature of 
philosophical hermeneutics in greater depth. 
5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL CONTEXT 
The French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1951), in his work on suicide, noted that in the 19th 
century there was a widespread reduction in the suicide rate in those European countries affected 
by civil war. According to Durkheim the "common enemy" acted as a source of social cohesion 
which in turn acted to lessen the isolation of individuals and diminish feelings of loneliness and 
depression. The reduced suicide rates were due: 
"not to the crisis but to the struggles it occasions. As they force men to close 
ranks and confront the common danger, the individual thinks less of himself and 
more of the common cause" (Durkheim, 1951). 
The suicide rate fell in nearly all European countries during the two world wars. At the outbreak 
of World War II it was widely assumed in Britain that one of the effects of the war would be an 
increase in the number of patients. Arrangements were made at the start of the war to receive 
large numbers of psychiatric casualties from the civilian population as the war began to involve 
urban communities (O'Brien, 1994). Such people were subjected to terrifying bombing raids, food 
shortages, family bereavements and lack of sleep, all of which were thought of as causal, or at 
least participatory, factors in mental breakdown. However, following 15 months of continuous 
warfare there was found to be no increase in the admission rate in the Bristol area (Hempill, 1941) 
and in Coventry there was a decrease in the attendance at the psychiatric out-patients. It was even 
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argued that the war was having a beneficial effect on the mental health of many people, possibly 
because family and social life had become more intimate as entertainments, shopping, and 
travelling were restricted. Hempill expressed the view that: 
"the war has had little adverse effect on the mental health of the general 
population, and has been of benefit to certain types of individuals, especially 
women". 
He noted a decrease in admissions to his mental hospital in the year 1941 and showed that, for 
those people who did attend for treatment, factors attributable to the war did not play a 
significant part in the reasons for admission. He wrote: 
"The necessity of extending hospitality to neighbours, friends and the homeless 
seems to have brought reality closer to the shut-in mind : as one hypochondriacal 
woman said, "You can't think of yourself when everyone is going through so 
much"" (Hempill, 1941, p. 180). 
During the Spanish Civil War large numbers of civilians were again involved. Furthermore, the 
enemies in this war were not from a different country with a different language, rendering them 
more easy to 'dehumanise'. Rather they were fellow Spaniards, often from the same village or even 
the same family. Again it was assumed that in these circumstances there would be a significant 
increase in mental breakdown, but this proved not to be the case. In 1939, at the end of the war, 
Emilio Mira, Chief Psychiatric Inspector to the Spanish Republican Army, noted that the amount 
of psychiatric illness which developed during the war did not call for the provision of more 
psychiatric beds than had been available during peacetime. In addition he noted that : 
"Depressed and neurotic patients whom I had looked after in private found relief 
in working for some public service - for example, social work. There was no 
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increase in the average rate of suicide. I had the impression that many depressed 
and other mentally ill people were better when confi7onted with the actual demands 
and situations that arose during the war than when they were concerned only with 
their conflicts" (Mira, 1939, p. 1219). 
Closer to the present time, a number of studies have been reported from Northern Ireland, where 
a guerilla war has been waged over the past 30 years. In 1969 when the first riots broke out, an 
increase in psychiatric admissions or clinic attendance was expected. Not only did this not happen, 
but Lyons (1972) observed an actual decrease in the recorded rates of depression. He postulated 
that this was directly related to the outbreak of street violence, which allowed a discharge of 
aggressive impulses that otherwise would be inwardly directed, causing depression'. In a review 
of studies from Northern Ireland, Curran (1988) states: 
"Judging from hospital referrals and admission data, suicide and attempted- suicide 
rates, the practices of psychoactive-drug prescriptions, and community-based 
studies ... the campaign of terrorist violence 
does not seem to have resulted in any 
obvious increase in psychiatric morbidity" (p. 470). 
He suggests a number of reasons why the war has failed to produce a rise in observed psychiatric 
morbidity. In keeping with the work of Durkheim, Curran puts emphasis on the notion of 
increased social cohesion in times of war. He says: 
"During rioting and other spells of sectarian disorder, followings killings of the 
most horrific nature, certain subpopulations and communities may bind together 
in a sense of common purpose and common outrage ... 
Maybe, in the Belfast 
ghettos, there is a feeling of a real or indeed a supposed common enemy, whether 
it be the British, the Irish, the Catholics, the Protestants, the Army, the police or 
whoever. Identification and feeling 'one of us' against 'them' may defend each 
population and its members against overt psychological disturbance in the face of 
'This effect of rioting on mental health has also been observed in the U. S. A, see Fogelson 
(1970) and Greenley et al (1975). 
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chronic civil disorder and tension, sectarianism, and acts of terrorist violence" 
(p. 475). 
Thus there is good evidence that war-time suffering and trauma is not inevitably associated with 
increased psychiatric morbidity. A common theme in the reports quoted above is the importance 
of social processes such as increased cohesion and solidarity in times of war. However it would 
be wrong to assume that all wars are the same, or that all people in a given population are 
affected in the same way. The social position of women in many societies may mean that rape in 
wartime is something about which there is little discussion. There may well be substantial social 
stigmatisation associated with rape and thus social cohesion will not extend to victims of sexual 
violence. In different ways, depending on social norms and expectations, this failure of solidarity 
and cohesion may affect others groups as well. 
In a number of conflict situations, particularly in South America, there is evidence that oppressive 
states actually worked systematically to undermine social cohesion and solidarity, particularly 
during conflicts of the 1970s and 1990s (Jenkins, 1991). For example torture has been deliberately 
used in preference to assassination by such regimes, as simply killing a community leader may 
create a martyr for the communIty, a symbol of strength and resistance, while torturing such a 
person to the point where they break down psychologically and then releasing them in a disabled 
state means that the person returns to the community inarticulate and frightened. He/she has 
become a living symbol of the community's vulnerability and weakness (Ritterman, 1987). 
We can conclude that the social context in wartime profoundly affects the ways in which 
communities and individuals experience and react to the various traumas that violence brings. 
Social context can be supportive or destructive, have positive or negative effects. What I am 
107 
emphasising here is simply the fact that not only is social context important but it can also be the 
most important issue determining outcome. 
5.3 CULTURAL ISSUES 
Cross-cultural studies of emotion have recently tended to undermine the notion that emotional 
states have the same form universally and that these forms are independent of culture. In fact it 
is now generally accepted ( at least within anthropological circles) that culture mediates in a very 
pervasive way the experience and expression of emotion. Jenkins (1996) quotes Rosaldo's 
formulation of emotion as: 
11 self- concerning, partly physical responses that are at the same time aspects of 
moral or ideological attitudes; emotions are both feelings and cognitive 
constructions, linking person, action and sociological milieu. Stated otherwise, 
new views of culture cast emotions as themselves aspects of cultural systems, of 
strategic importance to analysts concerned with the ordering of action and the 
ways that people shape and are shaped by their world" ( p. 168). 
This has implications for the cross-cultural understanding of emotional reactions, including 
reactions to frightening or violent events. If culture shapes emotional experience in a pervasive 
and profound way, where does that leave the 'emotional processing' theories of cognitive 
psychology, and with them the current discourse on trauma? Based on her work with Salvadoran 
women refugees living in North America, Jenkins raises questions about the validity of using the 
individual trauma model in cross-cultural situations. She argues that there is a need to look at 
'collective trauma' : 
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"Because traumatic experience can also be conceptualised collectively, person- 
centred accounts alone are insufficient to an understanding of traumatic reactions. In addition to the social and psychocultural dynamics surrounding any traumatic 
response, the collective nature of trauma may be related to what was ... referred to as the political ethos characterizing an entire society" (Jenkins, 1996, p. 177). 
Jenkins suggests that accounts which start at an individual level will never be "fully adequate in 
understanding traumatised cultures" (p. 177). Derek Summerfield, a psychiatrist working in 
London at the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, has published widely on 
this theme. He argues that the individualistic concept of PTSD cannot grasp the cultural 
dimension of suffering in times of war, particularly in non-Western settings: 
"Western diagnostic classifications are problematic when applied to diverse non- 
Western survivor populations. The view of trauma as an individual-centred event 
bound to soma or psyche is in line with the tradition in this century for both 
Western biomedicine and psychoanalysis to regard the singular human being as the 
basic unit of study" (Summerfield, 1997, p. 150). 
Summerfield draws on a wide range of examples to make his point. For example, the war in 
Southern Sudan has not only caused lost of life and injury to individual victims, it has also 
destabilised a way of life: 
"Disruption of the traditional cycle of animal husbandry resulting from the 
Sudanese civil war has brought social breakdown to the pastoralist Southerners. 
Cattle are crucial to them, being a form of currency not just in trading, but in 
rituals and disputes. Tribal marriages can no longer be arranged because of 
dislocation and lack of cattle (the only traditional dowry) and women are driven 
to prostitution in the town, something previously unheard of Because of the 
endemic killings and rape in the countryside, security conditions have become 
prime determinants of social behaviour, to the extent that families with noisy 
children are pushed out. Half this population has been forced to abandon villages 
regarded as ancestral places, seeking precarious safety in urban areas where their 
traditional skills are worthless. One study of teenagers displaced to Juba showed 
the resultant estrangement and loss of social identity : none could write a history 
of their clan and many did not even know the names of their grandparents or the 
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village their clan came from (Summerfield, 1996, p. 6). 
Summerfield, who has extensive experience of working with refugees in London and has worked 
as a consultant with Oxfam in Rwanda and Bosnia, argues that cultural factors are not only 
important in determining the degree of disruption and dislocation facing individuals in times of 
war, but culture also determines how people cope with their suffering and seek help: 
"psychological trauma is not like physical trauma: people do not passively register 
the impact of external forces (unlike, say, a leg hit by a bullet) but engage with 
them in an active and problem-solving way. Suffering arises from, and is resolved 
in, a social context" (Summerfield, 1996, p. 25). 
The anthropologist Maurice Eisenbruch introduced the concept of cultural bereavement in 1990 
in a deliberate attempt to move beyond the individualistic discourse based on PTSD. Eisenbruch 
argues that for many refugees and others displaced from their homelands and home cultures loss 
of a known way of life is the key issue which determines psychological and social outcome. In 
an empirical study he examined differences between two groups of unaccompanied and detached 
Cambodian adolescents. The first group were fostered in Cambodian group care in Australia 
while the second group were living with foster families, both American and Cambodian , in the 
U. S. Eisenbruch found that the cultural bereavement among those in the U. S. was significantly 
greater than that found among those in Australia. In the latter context there was less pressure to 
nil abandon the old way of fife and the children were actively encouraged to participate in traditional 
ceremonies. Many of the children who were fostered by American families in the U. S- saw little 
of other Cambodians and experienced little exposure to Cambodian culture. These children were 
in a precarious position psychologically, according to Eisenbruch, and displayed sustained feelings 
of regret at having lost their homeland. They continued to be immersed in the past and were 
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preoccupied with thought of their families. Eisenbruch comments. 
"The fieldwork showed that much good could be done by promoting access of the 
refugee children to Buddhist monks and Cambodian kruu kmae (traditional 
healers). It was striking how often my young Cambodian informants expressed 
their yearning to participate in traditional Buddhist ceremonies. They wanted to 
learn how to chant with the monks and the older participants, and how to 'make 
merit' for their dead or lost parents and ancestors for a better life in the next 
incarnation and to protect themselves from vengeful spirits" (Eisenbruch, 1991, 
p. 674). 
5.4 CONCEPTUALISING CULTURE 
Eisenbruch's work takes us out of and beyond the individualistic focus of PTSD and the 
therapeutic concern with 'processing'. It is beginning to emerge with increasing clarity that if the 
individual trauma model works at all, it works in a culture with a strong individualist agenda. 
Most non-Western cultures do not work with such an agenda and so major practical difficulties 
arise when this model is exported. In spite of this a number of clinicians and researchers have 
continued to assert the universal relevance of the PTSD framework. Laurence Kirmayer, whose 
work was referenced in chapter three, points out that this model is attractive because it: 
" it performs three great simplifications : (a) morally, it simplifies the issue of 
animal models and simple experiments; (c) therapeutically, it allows clinicians to attribute a wide 
range of problems to a single wound and so to organize treatment along clear lines that may 
include both the moral and scientific models" (Kirmayer, 1996, p. 155) 
However the assumption that PTSD is universally relevant also echoes a wider assumption with 
in psychiatry concerning the relevance of Western diagnostic categories and therapies. In the field 
of transcultural psychiatry a debate has emerged in the past 10 to 20 years around what has 
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become known as the 'new cross-cultural psychiatry'. Traditional cross-cultural psychiatry, 
alongside the rest of psychiatry, locates itself firmly within the embrace of medicine. As we saw 
in chapter two medicine has long been anxious to proclaim its scientific credentials. The nature 
of science itself is a subject rarely interrogated from the side of medicine. It is simply assumed that 
there is a'scientific method'which has been established and contains within it some necessary and 
objective truth about the proper investigation of phenomena. 
5.4.1 The new cross-cultural psychiatry 
A good example of the theoretical debate within cross-cultural psychiatry appeared in a 1987 
edition of the British Journal of Psychiatry in which two articles appeared side by side. In one, 
Allen German argued that the increased use of standardised interviews in psychiatric research 
enabled: 
"psychiatrists in different settings, to study the distribution of symptoms and syndromes 
in various cultures and to draw conclusions as to the nature of such phenomena in 
various parts of the world" (German, 1987, p. 440). 
In the other article, Arthur Kleinman argued that the simple use of such questionnaires in 
different situations cannot by itself lead to any valid conclusions about the nature of psychiatric 
disorders in such different settings. The possibility of making a categoryfallacy is inherent in such 
an approach. According to Kleinman: 
"A category fallacy is the reification of a nosological category developed for a 
particular cultural group that is then applied to members of another culture for 
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whom it lacks coherence and its validity has not been established. " (Kleinman, 
1987, P. 452) 
In other words, Kleinman argued that while standardised questionnaires may improve the 
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis they do not help us really to understand the nature of madness 
and distress in different groups and so do not, as Gen-nan believes, enable us "to draw conclusions 
about the nature of such phenomena in various parts of the world". The juxtaposition of these 
two opinions served to illustrate the tension which is at the heart of conceptual debate in 
cross-cultural psychiatry. Researchers are guided by widely differing views as to the relation 
between culture and individual psychology, as to proper approaches to research and ultimately 
as to the importance, or otherwise, of the contribution of disciplines such as medical anthropology 
and sociology. 
Some are still happy to continue looking for evidence to show that psychiatric disorders are 
basically the same the world over, assuming that the traditional nosology developed in Western 
industrialised countries has universal application. Mainstream cross-cultural psychiatry follows 
this path and broadly accepts the traditional view of psychiatry as 'applied science' discussed in 
A, 
chapter two. In his review of psychiatry in Affica, German argues that, while different approaches 
to management may be needed : 
"the "medical model" - or perhaps more precisely the "Western nosological 
model" - seems capable of adequately accounting for the nature of the majority 
of these African mental ill-health problems" (German, 1987, p. 445). 
Meanwhile, other researchers are seeking to understand the various ways in which madness and 
distress are represented in different cultures, and to understand the ways in which local people and 
healers approach these problems in order to comprehend them more fully. Such workers emphasise 
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the importance of understanding the meaning of behaviours and symptoms within local contexts, 
and apply Western concepts in a tentative fashion only. The 'old cross-cultural psychiatry' 
continues to assert the adequacy of the traditional medical model while the 'new cross-cultural 
psychiatry' argues for a recognition of the role which other forms of knowledge can play. The 
medical model of the"old" approach is based on certain fundamental assumptions which include: 
a) a belief in the adequacy of the positivist approach to research b) a belief that the individual is 
the appropriate focus of attention both from a research and clinical point of view, and c) the 
assumption that certain psychological processes, because they are biologically determined, are 
universal. This model is currently the dominant one within psychiatry generally and is supported 
by cross cultural psychiatrists such as German (1987), Kiev (1972), Leff (1990) and others. The 
individual trauma model shares its basic assumptions. The "new" psychiatry denies the adequacy 
of the positivist model (Good and Good, 1982). It seeks to show that in many ways our familiar 
notion of the individual is a purely "Western" one (Schweder and Bourne, 1982) and questions the 
universality of postulated psychological processes (Marsella, 1982). The anthropologist and 
psychiatrist, Prof Roland Littlewood, wrote a comprehensive review of the 'new cross-cultural 
psychiatry'for the British Journal of Psychiatry in 1990. This is an interesting and valuable summary 
of the themes and debates in the field. Of interest to our discussion of trauma and PTSD (and the 
content of the last chapter) is Littlewood's observation that: 
"It seems likely that the more individualised and Cartesian a particular society's 
notion of the self (whether as a consequence of industrialisation, Westernisation, 
or whatever), the more some notion of 'stress' or 'pressure' has then to be 
introduced to fink the individual back to society and to articulate constraints on 
autonomy" (Littlewood, 1990, p. 322). 
5.5 TOWARDS A'CONTEXT-CENTRED'FRAMIEWORK 
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It is not my intention to propose some new universalist model to replace, or try to improve on, 
PTSD or the other syndromes. I am suggesting that by focusing first on the individual and his/her 
symptoms there is a tendency to conceptualise the effects of trauma in purely individual and 
medical terms. Issues of context are seen as secondary and as being merely "factors" which impinge 
on the progress of a now reified psychological or biological process. 
In contrast to this I am proposing that issues of context in terms of social, political and cultural 
realities should be seen as central. A context-centred approach looks away from Cartesian models 
of mind and is more consonant with hermeneutic ideas because it attaches priority to the issues of 
meaning and interpretation. Events, reactions and supports are not conceptualised as separate items 
which can be analysed and measured in isolation from one another but are, rather, bound together 
in a web of meaningful connections which can be explored and illuminated, but which can never be 
grasped in a causal explanatory framework (see chapter six, below). In addition, such an approach 
is interested in an examination of itseý(and the assumptions behind its own questions and priorities. 
In a context-centred approach to trauma any individuals' experiences and reactions are understood 
to be largely dependent on the social, political and cultural context in which they live. Social reality 
refers to such things as family circumstances, available social networks, economic position and 
employment status. Political reality refers to the individual's engagement, or otherwise, in a political 
movement, their social position as determined by gender, class and ethnic factors and whether they 
are the victims of state repression or other forms of organised violence. By the term cultural 
reality I am referring to such things as linguistic position, spiritual or religious involvement, basic 
ontological beliefs and concepts of self, community and illness. Obviously there is much overlap 
between these realities and these terms are used here to provide a framework, not as an attempt 
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to develop a strict categorisation. These realities structure any individual's response to violence by 
determining both the semantic and the practical context in which the violence occurs and in which 
the individual recovers. 
In what follows of this section I would like to illustrate this framework with case vignettes from 
my own work in Uganda 2- The work in Uganda took place in the Luwero Triangle, an area to 
the north-west of the capital Kampala, which became known as the "killing fields of Uganda" in 
the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed in government counter-insurgency 
operations there. During a three year period spent in Uganda (1987-1990) 1 worked with many 
survivors in local medical clinics and the case material used here is drawn from this work. My 
work in Uganda, with my colleague Dr. J. Giller, was under the auspices of the London-based 
Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. 
Social, political and cultural realities structure the context in which violence is experienced and 
determine to a greater or lesser degree: 
a) the subjective meaning of the violence or trauma, 
b) the way in which the distress associated with violence is experienced and reported, 
c) the type and extent of general support available to the individual and 
d) what type of therapies are available and are appropriate. 
5.5.1 The subjective meaning of viOlence and trauma. 
These have been presented previously in the article by Bracken et al (1995). 
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Within the D. S. M. III and D. S. M. Ill-R accounts of P. T. S. D. it was assumed that frightening 
events, outside the range of normal experience would be, of themselves, psychologically 
damaging'. In other words it was assumed that certain events could be objectively described as 
damaging or traumatic. The following cases would suggest otherwise: 
case I: A 40 year old Ugandan man who had been a prominent politician in the past was arrested 
and brought to an army compound. He was held for seven days. During this time he was beaten 
and humiliated while being interrogated. After his release he was referred to see me by a friend 
who assumed that he would be in need of some form of psychiatric help. When interviewed, 
however, he denied any great distress. He told me that he was a Christian but that prior to his 
imprisonment his faith had not meant a great deal to him. While he was in detention he felt a strong 
identification with the figure of Jesus Christ who had also suffered torture and humiliation. He 
found that his own suffering and his identification with Christ brought him closer to his religion 
and since his ordeal the quality of his spiritual life was intensified. He indicated that because of this 
the overaH effect of his experience had been positive for him. 
case 2: A 28 year old woman who witnessed her husband being killed by the army was unable to 
bury his body as she was forced to flee the area immediately with her children for fear that she,, 
herself, would be killed. When she was able to return 6 months later his body had gone. When she 
was seen by members of our team some 5 years later she was still haunted by nightmares and 
feelings of shame because she had not been able to bury her husband according to traditional rites. 
3 As discussed above (chapter three, section 3.2) the authors of DSM IV were cognisant 
of the difficulties inherent in the notion of an 'objectively' traumatic event and substantially 
changed the definition of 'criterion A' in their description of PTSD. 
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It was this aspect of her loss that she spoke most about when interviewed and which seemed to 
cause her most distress. 
In both these cases the nature of the trauma cannot be accounted for without reference to the 
subjective meaning of the events. This, in turn, cannot be understood without reference to the 
cultural context in which the individuals lived and in which the events occurred. For one his 
religious beliefs meant a positive framework for his suffering. For the other, the tragic loss of her 
husband was compounded by the belief that his soul was not at rest because certain rites had not 
been performed. 
War and organised violence often damage traditional ways of life and cultural institutions. This 
damage can then mean that the events of war are even more traumatic for the individuals who are 
left without a meaningful framework in which to structure their suffering and live their lives. 
Eisenbruch's concept of 'cultural bereavementwas mentioned above. As Summerfield (1996) notes 
there are subsistence peoples who may not be able to imagine personal survival if their way of life 
does not survive. 
5.5.2 The way distress associated with violence is experienced and reported. 
According to traditional models of responses to trauma there are certain universal effects of trauma 
and these are accounted for within the syndrome of PTSD. This assumption has been questioned 
both in the first half of chapter three and in the earlier sections of this chapter. In Uganda we 
looked for the symptoms of PTSD and found that while these were often present, they seldom 
dominated the person's account of his or her suffering. For example in a series of rape victims the 
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commonest presenting complaints were somatic in nature (Giller et al, 1991). These were felt by 
the women to have stemmed from the rape experience. In a society where fertility is of great 
importance, subsequent failure to conceive ranked highly amongst presenting complaints. Although 
on farther questioning many admitted to symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD, very few 
chose to present with these and instead sought treatment for the somatic problems. These somatic 
complaints were not just "epiphenomena", but the way in which these women actually experienced 
their distress. Interventions had to be structured accordingly with an initial focus on physical 
therapy and investigation and subsequent discussion about relationships. 
Case 3: A 25 year old woman was raped by several soldiers. Wile relatives and neighbours almost 
certainly knew that her ordeal had happened, before talking to members of our team she had never 
before discussed what happened nor its consequences for her with anyone else. The rape had taken 
place approximately 4 years prior to our interviews with her. She had become convinced that she 
had developed a venereal disease and reported a foul smelling vaginal discharge. She had attended 
many medical clinics for this and had received several courses of different antibiotics. Swabs were 
taken by members of our team and no infection was identified. However it was difficult to reassure 
her and she was convinced that she had been rendered infertile by the rape and its aftermath. She 
had not sought marriage because of this. 
In El Salvador, the psychologist Martin Baro has written persuasively about the need to analyse 
the impact of state violence in his country in terms of the relationship between individual and 
society (Baro, 1990). He reminds us that what was left traumatised were not just Salvadoran 
individuals, but Salvadoran society. Jenkins, whose work was cited above in section 5.3, writing 
about Salvadoran refugees in North America argues that their fear and anxiety is- 
119 
"framed by bodily experience, knowledge of illness, and the ethnopsychology 
of emotion within the context of chronic political violence and poverty" 
and suggests that: 
"trauma, conceived within a framework of individual psychopathology, cannot 
account for the global affective consequences of terror and distress" (Jenkins, 
1991, p. 157). 
5.5.3 The type and extent of general support available to survivors of violence. 
As noted in section 5.2 many situations have been described where traumatic events have not above 
been followed by psychopathological sequelae. Contextual issues, as outlined above, detern-ýine the 
extent to which the individual's environment will be supportive or not. We noted that in some 
situations of war and violence there may actually be increased levels of social cohesion and thus 
mutual support. The following cases illustrate this: 
case 4- 52 year old Ugandan man described how he had suffered greatly in prison. He told me 
about the solidarity felt among the prisoners. Even though they were packed into a small cell so 
that they could barely breathe and were unable to lie down, he told me that there was no fighting 
amongst thený that they shared food and generally looked after one another. He reported that each 
day all the prisoners would pray together. The Muslims learnt some of the Christian prayers and 
the Christians learnt some Muslim prayers so that they could worship together. This man remarked 
that it was such things which helped him endure his imprisonment and saved him from despair. 
case 5: Another 45 year old man who was tortured during counter-insurgency operations in 
Luwero had both hands cut off by soldiers and he was seParated from his wife whom he had never 
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seen or heard of since. An operation was performed on one of his forearms at a rural mission 
hospital. In this, the bones and muscles were divided, and he ended up with some use in one of his 
stumps. Apart from this he was totally dependent on his neighbours. He was referred to me as a 
victim of torture but when I interviewed him in his home four years after his traumatic experience 
he reported no symptoms of PTSD or any other psychiatric syndrome. He remarked that the 
support and solidarity shown to him by his neighbours had allowed him to return to a fairly normal 
fife. His current difficulties were all of a practical nature. 
In the other direction, the absence of social support and understanding, or the absence of cultural 
institutions which can help make sense of suffering can leave individuals, or groups of individuals, 
isolated and fearful. War and violence can rupture social worlds and destroy preexisting social 
situations characterised by cohesion and mutual support. Looked at in this way, it was the ability 
of the concentration camps to undermine these social forces which left their inirnates 
psychologically vulnerable. The problems of the Vietnam veterans were compounded by, and in 
some ways specific to, the particular social, cultural and political ethos which existed in the Umted 
States after that countrys defeat in Vietnam (Figley, 1978), This ethos denied the veterans the sort 
of social support given to returned soldiers after previous wars. In Luwero, we found that rape had 
often worked to destroy processes of mutual support: 
case 6-A 34 year old woman with five children had been rejected by her husband because of the 
fact that she had been raped by two soldiers. He had turned her off the small holding which she had 
struggled to cultivate. As the rest of her own fan-ffly had perished or been dispersed during the war, 
she had to survive on what she could find in the bush until ultimately she found her way to the home 
of some distant relatives who took her in. Unable to explain what had happened to her because of 
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the shame she felt regarding her circumstances and the fear of further rejection, she relinquished 
any fights she had to the land and to her children and remained in the position of a servant in her 
relatives home. Five years later she still was still suffering terrible grief over the loss of her children 
and had no other relationship during that period. The lack of support because of social attitudes 
towards rape and the political position of women at that time in Uganda (which has subsequently 
improved during the Museveni era) prevented her from asserting any rights she may have had 
regarding the custody of her younger children. 
We found that the mending of social relations was the most important part of the healing process 
for the women in Luwero. Their response, once they felt it legitimate to talk about rape, was to 
organise themselves into meeting groups that focused on development projects and not specifically 
on their experience of rape or post-traumatic symptoms. 
5.5.4 The avaflability and relevance of specific therapeutic interventions. 
Arthur Kleinman has pointed to the fact that healing is always a multifaceted phenomenon. 
Professional-client encounters are only one type of healing relationship and in most societies, 
particularly in the Third World, form a small proportion of the whole (Kleinman, 1980). In the 
developing world, traditional healers, or the 'folk sector' of the 'health care system' according to 
Kleinman, are often much more important than the 'professional sector'. When it comes to dealing 
with the effects of war and violence, there is now considerable evidence that traditional beliefs and 
folk healers play an important role in the recovery process of both individuals and communities. For 
example, Wilson (1988,1989) discusses how, traditionally many societies had particular rituals 
which were performed when people returned from war. An example is the famous Sweat Lodge 
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purification ritual performed by certain Native American groups. This ritual (Inipi Onikare) is 
regarded as a: 
"a serious and sacred occasion in which spiritual insights, personal growth, and 
physical and emotional healing may take place. The purpose of purification is 
experienced on many levels of awareness, including the physical, psychological, 
social and spiritual" (Wilson, 1988, p. 44). 
Aspects of the ceremony are specifically designed to promote a sense of the continuity of the whole 
commumty and to resituate the person who has been'at war'back into the heart of that community. 
We have already noted above, in section 5.3, Eisenbruch's work on 'cultural bereavement'. He notes 
the important role of the Kruu Kmae (Cambodian traditional healers) and Buddhist monks in 
helping children who had lost their parents and suffered in other ways during the violence in 
Cambodia. 
In the Luwero Triangle it was apparent that local traditional healers, most of whom were from the 
Ganda tribe (abasawo abaganda), were quite numerous and very well attended. I had the 
opportunity to spend a good deal of time with some of the healers during the years I spent in 
Uganda. I spoke with them individually and as a group and attended a number of healing sessions, 
some of which involved shamanistic rituals. The healers agreed that all forms of illness had 
increased since the war. These included cases of madness (eddalu), foolishness (obusiru) and 
disturbed behaviour (akalogoijo). However, these healers did not recognise a particular syndrome 
associated with war-time trauma. They gave various reasons for the increased rates of sickness 
including poor diet and living conditions. Some thought that the drinking of dirty water during the 
war was of particular importance. It was thought that the mixing in the person's 
body of this 
contaminated water with clean water, drunk after the war had ended and the village supply 
had been 
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restored, was the cause of imbalance, and hence, sickness'. 
It was apparent that the traditional healers were playing a double role in Luwero at this time. They 
were providing therapies for sick individuals. Little Western medicine was available. But they also 
functioned as an important link with the past and thus contributed to a sense of continuity in a 
community which had just endured a very violent onslaught on its way of life, The healing activities 
of the traditional healers depended to a large extent on consultation with the ancient spirits of the 
tribe (the balubaale). During a healing session the healer would become possessed by the lubaale 
and pronounce on the cause of the sickness and prescribe a remedy. The ceremony of "settling the 
lubaale" ( Orley, 1970) was frequently perfonned and the balubaale Mukasa (spirit of the lake) and 
Kiwanuka (spirit of thunder) were often identified. Shrines to some of these balubaale were 
constructed near to the healer's ssabo (a round grass hut, used for healing purposes). Interestingly, 
writing before the destruction of the Luwero Triangle in 1970, John Orley commented that these 
ceremonies were considered "a little shameful" by his informants, and Mbiti (1969), also writing 
before the Luwero campaigns, observed an overall decline in the balubaale cults. During the years 
I spent in Uganda these ceremonies were regularly performed in Luwero and I detected no sense 
of shame associated with them. As noted above, it was my impression that traditional healing was 
flourishing during this post-war period. 
case 7: A 19 year old ex-soldier was interviewed at a village medical clinic. He complained of 
headaches and generally feeling unwell. At interview he also spoke about nightmares in which he 
would see friends of his who were killed in the war and also some of the people he had killed 
4 Anthropologists have often commented upon the importance of beliefs about balance, 
pollution and contamination in relation to health matters, e. g. see Douglas (1994). 
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himself He was very disturbed by these nightmares and believed that he was being visited by the 
spirits of the dead people. He told us that he had joined the army after his father was killed by a 
rebel group. He was only 16 when he joined. He left his mother and two sisters behind in the home 
village. He had spent many months in 'active combat' and had been nearly killed, on at least two 
occasions. On one of these he was hurt when a grenade exploded in fi7ont of the army lorry in which 
he was travelling. He was thrown from the lorry and broke his ankle in two places. Because of this 
11ý 
he was discharged fi7om the army on medical grounds. When this happened he returned to his home 
age. Although his ankle healed well and he was able to walk, he continued to feel ill. He found Vill Z: ) 
it difficult to settle back into civilian fife and became preoccupied with his nightmares. He was seen 
a few times by myself and the local medical assistant but also attended a local traditional healer. He 
diagnosed that the patient was being persecuted by harmful spirits (mayembe) and prescribed the 
sacrifice of a chicken and certain other rituals to be carried out by the patient and his family. The 
young man felt relieved when these had been performed and also felt closer to his family. 
Psychotherapy, as practised in Western countries, largely takes the form of an individual client 
consulting a therapist. The majority of therapy in Africa, and in other parts of the Third World, 
directly involves other farnily members and sometimes people from the wider community. Relevant 
and appropriate fon-ns of intervention will be determined by the cultural context. Contextual factors 
will also determine which forms of help are available. This very point is underscored by Judith 
Herman, a firm advocate of the individual trauma approach (I have already mentioned her work in 
section 1.4). She makes the point that specific therapeutic strategies associated with the discourse 
on trauma have become available in the past 20 years because the study of trauma has only become 
possible in this time: 
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"The systematic study of psychological trauma ... 
depends on the support of a 
political movement. Indeed whether such study can be pursued or discussed in 
Public is itself a political question. The study of war trauma becomes legitimate 
only in a context that challenges the sacrifice of young men in war. The study of 
trauma in sexual and domestic life becomes legitimate only in a context that 
challenges the subordination of women and children" (Herman, 1992, p. 9). 
5.6 FURTHER EVIDENCE OF TENSIONS IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
So far in this chapter I have presented evidence that the individual-trauma approach is severely 
limited in relation to cross-cultural work. In its place I have argued for an approach which 
incorporates insights from the 'new cross-cultural psychiatry'. In the rest of the thesis I shall be 
developing a philosophical grounding for this approach. Before moving to philosophy however, 
in what remains of this section, I would like to draw attention to two other serious problems which 
have arisen for the individual trauma model. The first problem concerns evidence which has 
emerged about the epidemiology of PTSD, the second concerns aspects of the biology of the 
syndrome. 
1. Traditional accounts of PTSD present a rather simple scenario: an individual, who carries the 
weight of a particular history, experiences a traumatic event. This is extremely stressful and the 
individual develops characteristic symptoms which are indicative of certain processes taking place 
within. Social factors impinge on these processes and can facilitate or interfere with their progress 
but do not determine their essence. The response to traumatic events is understood to be an 
exaggeration of the physiological and psychological response to stress. Thus animal models of 
stress reactions should be useful in understanding the human biology of PTSD. In different ways 
the problems which have emerged concern the'flow of time'in this account. In the original PTSD 
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framework the characteristic symptoms are understood to be a reaction to the trauma. This motif 
clearly underscores Horowitzs account and the thinking behind the DSM III version. Traumatic 
event happens first, then the symptoms emerge. We noted in the last chapter that the big innovation 
involved in the concept of PTSD was its proposal that the trauma was the aetiology of the 
syndrome. This proposal distinguished DSM III PTSD from earlier accounts of posttraurnatic 
reactions. It also distinguished PTSD fforn other psychiatric syndromes with similar symptoms such 
as depressive disorders and obsessive-compulsive states. It was assumed that empirical studies 
would confirm the validity of this formulation. 
In the original formulation of PTSD the role of the stressor was seen as obvious and clearcut. DSM 
1H merely states that to make the diagnosis there should be : 
"The existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms 
of distress in almost anyone" (APA, 1980). 
The epidemiological evidence about PTSD after disasters and other 'obviously traumatic' events 
calls this assumption into question. In fact it would appear that the development of PTSD after a 
significant trauma such as combat or rape is the exception, rather than the rule. Estimates of the 
prevalence of PTSD after a criterion A stressor event are given in DSM IV. They are said to range 
from 3% to 58% (APA, 1994). One of the major studies of Vietnam veterans found a 15% 
prevalence of current PTSD and a 30% lifetime prevalence (Kulka et al, 1990). Of those exposed 
to the Mount St. Helens volcano eruption, only 3.6% developed PTSD symptoms (Shore et al, 
1989). After reviewing such studies, Yehuda and McFarlane comment: 
"in documented epidemiological studies it is difficult to find even transitory 
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Symptoms in more than 50% of the population, and in the majority the symptoms 
will have usually resolved within 2-3 years. Thus, the available epidemiological 
data show that PTSD, and certainly chronic PTSD, is more unusual than usual following exposure to a variety of traumatic events (Yehuda and McFarlane, 
1995, p. 1708). 
The McFarlane quoted above is the same person quoted in chapter one. He is an Australian 
psychiatrist who, in the 1980s studied a large group of fire-fighters who were exposed to very 
traumatic events in the course of a major bush fire. These traumatic events easily met the original 
PTSD stressor criterion. McFarlane had access to the men's psychiatric records and he followed 
them up with interviews and questionnaires over an extended period of time. He has reported on 
a number of conclusions. Severity of exposure was not the most important factor determining 
symptomatic outcome. Only a small number of the men, described as "anxiety-prone" developed 
characteristic intrusive and avoidance symptoms. Indeed: 
"pre-morbid vulnerability accounted for a greater percentage of the variance of 
disorder than the impact of the disaster" (McFarlane, 1989, p. 227). 
Allan Young discusses McFarlane's findings at some length in his book Ae Harmony offflusions. 
We have already encountered this work in chapters one and three. Young argues that not all of 
those who develop symptoms after a traumatic event do so in a way which corresponds to the 
DSM III formulation. Thus a certain number of people will develop significant psychopathology 
but in them post-traumatic symptoms are not triggered by the trauma. Instead, anxiety and 
depressive symptoms are induced by the traumatic event. These then bring into being the PTSD 
intrusion-avoidance symptoms: 
"Once anxiety symptoms and/or depression have become established, afeedback 
effect begins to occur where the intensity and frequency of the memories of the 
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disaster are increased" (McFarlane, quoted in Young, 1995, p. 138). 
McFarlane's research was based on people who developed 'rapid-onset PTSD', in other words they 
became symptomatic very quickly after the trauma. The likelihood is that their anxiety or depression 
was induced by the events. However, Young makes the point that if we accept that anxiety or 
depressive states can bring about the intrusive-avoidance symptoms of PTSD at all, then we have 
to accept the possibility that at least some cases of delayed-onset PTSD are induced by anxiety or 
depressive states which occur independently of the actual event, which then becomes the focus of 
these intrusive-avoidance phenomena. In other words, Young interprets McFarlane's research as 
opening up the possibility that m some cases of PTSD the'flow of time' does not correspond to that 
incorporated in the DSM concept of the disorder. This has very serious implications for research 
on PTSD. The two sorts of case, i. e. one where the symptoms emerge from the event, the other 
where preoccupation with the event is the result of the prior emergence of other symptoms, cannot 
be distinguished by phenomenology alone, or even by presence/absence of a stressor. This 
ambiguity, about time and causality, is hopelessly engrained into the very definition of PTSD. As 
we saw in chapter three, more recent versions of the DSM have indicated an awareness of the 
complexity associated with the stressor criterion and it has been described differently in post-DSM 
III versions. However, PTSD remains defined as a syndrome in which symptoms flowftom the 
event. Those situations where the flow is in the other direction simply cannot be accommodated, 
and so are ignored. Part of this problem at least, stems from the model of time and causality 
operating within traditional accounts of PTSD. I have discussed this model in chapter two. As I 
shaff show in our discussion of Heidegger's philosophy, in the next chapter, he presents an approach 
to temporality in which simple distinctions between past, present and future cannot be made. For 
a hermeneutic approach the causal ambiguity identified in traditional PTSD research serves, not 
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a problem, but as a support for the theory. 
2) PTSD is presented, by traditional models, as involving an exaggeration of the normal stress 
response. This was clearly the guiding assumption of the work of Mardi Horowitz (see chapter 
three). The assumption was quickly made that animal models of stress reaction could be used, 
unproblematically, to investigate the human biology of PTSD. Initial results appeared to confirm 
this'. However more recent findings suggest that the symptoms of PTSD are associated with 
biological phenomena which are not a reflection of the normal biology of stress. For example, 
researchers looking at hypothalarnic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis alterations in PTSD have found 
results which are at odds with those found in the 'normal' stress literature. Yehuda et al (1995) 
summarize their research in this area as follows: 
"The findings suggest that, rather than showing a pattern of increased 
adrenocortical activity and resultant dysregulation of this system, individuals 
who suffer from PTSD show evidence of a highly sensitized BPA axis 
characterised by decreased basal cortisol levels, increased number of lymphocyte 
glucorticoid receptors, a greater suppression of cortisol to dexamethasone,, and 
a more sensitized pituitary gland compared to individuals without PTSD. Thus, 
in addition to the classic pattern of increased cortisol levels in response to stress, 
there may be a contrasting paradigm of cortisol abnormalities following stress, 
characterised by diminished cortisol levels as a result of stronger negative 
feedback inhibition. This paradigm compels us to expand the stress response 
spectrum" (Yehuda et al, 1995, p. 362). 
Like the epidemiological research findings quoted above, these findings point to the conclusion that 
human responses to trauma are simply more complex than initially proposed in the DSM 
formulation of PTSD. In particular, they tend to support Young's suggestion that the direction of 
5 see for example the review by Krystal et al. (19 8 9). 
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causality is in post-trauma psychiatric syndromes in ambiguous. Yehuda et al (1995) remark* 
"To the extent that PTSD is conceptualized as a stress disorder, the findings 
challenge us to regard the stress response as diverse and varied, rather than as 
conforming to a simple, unidirectional pattern" (p. 362-363) 
The dominant model of PTSD, predicated upon a cognitivist framework, suggests that the 
intfusive-avoidance symptom complex is associated with a loss of meaningfulness in the life of the 
victim after the traumatic experience. For example in the work of Janoff-Bulman, examined below 
in chapter 8, traumatic experiences are said to "shatter the assumptions" held by the victim about 
themselves and the nature of the world. If Young is correct and, in some cases at least, the flow is 
the other way around, then the implication is that a vulnerability with regard to meaningfullness may 
not simply be the result of trauma but might, in some way, be a predisposing factor for the 
development of problems after such events. 
The context-centred approach presented here, grounded in the hermeneutic philosophy to be 
presented in part two, would predict that, in reality, the situation is far more complex than originally 
proposed in the DSM account of PTSD, as the contexts in which people endure traumatic 
experiences differ greatly. We examined a literature above which provides support for this. 
However, ahnost the entire biological and psychological research literature on PTSD, as an entity, 
has been carried out from within the traditional framework and works with its assumptions. We 
should not expect it to provide direct support for a framework which works with a very different 
approach to human reality. However the points of contention within the traditional PTSD 
literature, I believe, point to a degree of complexity in the area of trauma which the traditional 




In this chapter I have presented empirical evidence from my own work and that of others which 
points to the importance of contextual factors in shaping how traumatic events are experienced,, 
endured, responded to, and reported. Based on my own, first hand, experience of cross-cultural 
work with victims of violence and based on an ever-increasing literature on culture and trauma, 
I have put for-ward an alternative framework to the individual trauma model and called this a 
context-centred approach. Methodologically, this fi7arnework involves two essential elements. First 
it gives priority to a research engagement with questions of context. Its orientation implies that 
the meaning and unpact of any event will be determined by the social, cultural and political context 
in which it occurs. It also implies that communal and individual psychological and behavioural 
reactions to such events wifl, likewise, be dependent on contextual elements, as will the availability 
and relevance of supportive and therapeutic inputs. I gave evidence from work in Uganda in 
support of this above. Secondly this approach attaches great importance to the issue of reflexivity. 
This involves a sustained analytic engagement with the origins and assumptions within our own 
knowledge. 
A large part of this thesis, thus far, has involved this second dimension. Thus, I have analysed the 
philosophical framework of cognitivism, its importance for the discourse on trauma, and its 
indebtedness to the Enlightenment project in the earlier chapters of this section. I have also pointed 
to the role that practical professional politics played in the advent of PTSD as a 
diagnosis in the 
DSM III in 1980. In the last section I have briefly examined other tensions within the traditional 
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approach. My suggestion is that these tensions stem directly from the conceptual grounding of the F 
traditional trauma model. They arebuilt into'the very concept of PTSD itself 
In the next part of the thesis I will go on to explore an alternative conceptual framework for 
theoretical work relating to trauma. This hermeneutic approach will draw on the writings of Martin 
fleidegger in which a very different understanding of human experience (to that of Descartes) is 
developed. As this understanding emphasises the importance of context it will serve to support the 
the fine of argument developed so far. 
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PART TWO 
A HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO HUMAN REALITY AND TRAUMA 
In part one of this thesis I examined the current discourse on trauma as developed within 
psychology and psychiatry. I attempted to show how this discourse has emerged within a 
particular philosophical understanding of the world and human reality. I identified the underlying 
Cartesian assumptions at work and, using the philosophical work of Charles Taylor, pointed to 
a strong association between these epistemological assumptions and specifically modem and 
Western assumptions about morality. 
Psychiatry, as a discipline desperate to establish its medical and scientific credentials, has easily 
embraced the cognitivist framework and avoided any sustained analysis of the assumptions 
involved. Psychiatry, as pointed out in chapter two, is a child of the European Enlightenment and 
works with the goal of bringing rational medical and psychotherapeutic techniques to bear on the 
problems of madness and distress. To do so effectively it needs to understand and frame these 
problems within a causal framework which allows for prediction and manipulation. Psychiatry, 
in its quest for medical and scientific status, has sought to be objective, value-free and culturally 
neutral. 
However, in the last chapter and in the first sections of chapter three I examined an empirical 
literature which raised serious questions about the cross-cultural validity of the current 
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psychological understanding of trauma. I demonstrated, with case material from my own work, 
that there was a need for an approach which emphasised the importance of social and cultural 
contextual issues. I also indicated some internal contradictions which have emerged within the 
PTSD framework with regard to questions of time and causality. 
In part two, I go on to present a philosophical critique of the underlying Cartesian assumptions 
involved in the prevailing approach to trauma. I do this by first outlining Heidegger's account of 
Dasem and being-in-the-world in chapter six. This gives us an understanding of human 
experience radically different to that offered by Cartesianism. My argument is that this 
hermeneutic understanding, with its emphasis on actual lived meaningful experience, takes us 
beyond the detached post-Enlightenment picture of human reality which is currently don-dnant 
in psychology. In chapter seven, I discuss how Heidegger's philosophy, through the efforts of the 
psychiatrist Medard Boss, gave rise to a specific psychotherapeutic approach known as 
Daseinanalysis. In the following chapter I bring together the Heideggarian understanding of 
anxiety with the issue of trauma. I explore some of the implications of Heideggarian philosophy 
for our understanding of the loss of meaning so often described after traumatic events. 
135 
CHAPTER SIX 
HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF HUMAN REALITY' 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the traditional psychiatric framework, disorders are defined and theoretically modelled as a 
first step. Then therapeutic techniques are developed and tested. The notion of cultural 
particularity only emerges as a sort of "afterthought" when these models and techniques are being 
applied to people from non-Western societies. In Heidegger's philosophy human beings are 
always temporal, embodied and culturally situated', always linguistically and historically located. 
Thus,, in a psychiatry organised around the concept of Dasein (see below), one can imagine the 
possibility of putting social, cultural and linguistic issues at the centre and exan-fining them as a 
first step. In the next three chapters I will examine this possibility. In the last part of this thesis, 
however, I wifl argue that because Being and Time is an attempt to provide a universal account 
'I am aware of the difficulties associated with the term 'human reality' in the context of 
Heidegger's philosophy. As we shall see below Heidegger attempted to distance himself from 
any form of humanism. I have used the term 'human reality' to help establish the contrast 
between Cartesian and Heideggerian approaches. 
2 In the introduction I pointed out that Heidegger, himself, was at pains to distance himself 
from cultural theory. As I shall show below he presented his account of experience as something 
which was universal. He did not consider his work to be 'anthropological' in any sense. However 
there is now a substantial literature which brings together hermeneutic philosophy with 
anthropological enquiry, see, for example, Bernstein, R. J. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis. In this thesis I am broadly following the 
interpretation of Heidegger developed by Hubert Dreyfus (1991). He writes that "Heidegger 
follows Wilhelm Dilthey in emphasizing that the meaning and organization of a culture must be 
taken as the basic given in the social sciences and philosophy and cannot be traced back to the 
activity of individual subjects" (p. 7). This is the sense in which I use the notion of human beings 
as always culturally situated'. I will comment again on Dilthey's influence on 
Heidegger in chapter 
nine, below. 
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of human experience it will fail to provide the philosophical basis upon which the sort of 'new 
cross-cultural psychiatry' described in the last chapter can begin to philosophically reflect upon 
itself However, I shall use some material from Heidegger's work, past Being and Time, to argue 
for a way forward. 
In this chapter I will attempt to outline the ways in which Heidegger's thought provides an 
alternative to cognitivism and Cartesianism. In particular, I wifl attempt to show how his approach 
demonstrates the limitations of methodological individualism, 'internal' understandings of mind 
and positivism. 
6.2 BEIDEGGERS CRITIQUE OF INDIVIDUALISM ANDINTERNAL'ACCOUNTS OF 
6.2.1 The concept of Dasein 
Heidegger's aim in Being and Time is to examine the question of being', the central preoccupation 
of traditional Western ontology, in a completely new light. Dreyfus (1993) maintains that- 
"what Heidegger has in mind when he talks about being is the intelligibility 
correlative with our everyday background practices" (p. 10). 
In other words. 
"to raise the question of being (is) to make sense of our ability to make sense of 
things" (p. 10). 
3There, is dispute about whether the German noun Sein should be rendered into English 
with a capital '13.1 shall follow the translators of Being and Time when quoting from the text. 
However at other times I shall follow Dreyfus and use a lower-case'b'. 
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Heidegger argues that traditional ontology has floundered because it has always sought some self- 
sufficient source to ground an answer to this question. He says: 
"If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists 
in 
........ not "teffing a story" - that is to say, in not defining entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if Being had the character of some 
possible entity. Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in 
a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are 
discovered" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 26) 
The question of being is the question of how the world makes sense for us, of how it is 
meaningful. According to Heidegger, the meaningfulness of the world is primary and cannot be 
generated or explained by recourse to an analysis of entities. He distinguishes two areas of inquiry 
which he labels "ontological" and "ontic". While he does not define these terms explicitly, his 
translators point out that ontological inquiry refers to the question of being while ontic enquiry 
refers to a concern with entities and the facts about them (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 1). Ontological 
inquiry has to be undertaken in a fundamentaHy different way to any type of ontic enquiry. Being 
has to be "exhibited in a way of its own". Heidegger's approach to the question of being, his way 
of revealing being, is through an analysis of the being "for whom that Being is an issue for it" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 32). He uses the term "Dasein" to characterise this kind of being'. Dasein 
' McCall (1983) indicates that no acceptable English translation of Dasein has been agreed 
on. A literal translation would be "to be there" or "being there". Dasein in colloquial German can 
mean "everyday human existence" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 13) and Heidegger is clearly referring to 
human reality when he uses the term. However Dasein means something more than simply 
11 conscious subjectivity". Heidegger is striving to get away from a view of human reality as 
something grounded in a meaning-giving transcendental subject. As we have seen in chapter four 
such a view has dominated Western thought from Descartes through Kant to the work of Husserl. 
He says: 
"One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an T or subject as that 
which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content 
(Bestand) of Dasein" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 72). 
So Dasein is not the personal self While it does have a quality of mineness (see Heidegger, 
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is different from all other beings because human beings exist, and relate to their world in a way 
that no other entity does. Dasein, human being, involves an openness to all things, including 
itself Indeed as McCall puts it "Human being is open being" (McCall, 1983, p. 70). Charles 
Scott, in a discussion of the work of Medard Boss, says that: 
"human being is irreducible, perceptive world-openness" (Scott, 1975, p. 183). 
As such, Dasein is the only being which is open to the question of being (in the sense indicated 
by Dreyfus, above) - 
"Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities ..... Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein 
is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 32). 
Thus an enquiry into Dasein provides us, according to Heidegger, with a unique possibility to 
"exhibit" being. Indeed he argues that this task is fundamental and a prion in relation to science 
and philosophy: 
"The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not 
only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such 
and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, 
1962, p. 68). it is apparent that Heidegger is trying to move beyond an aton-ýistic vision of human 
reality. This is an important issue because many in the existentialist psychiatry and psychotherapy 
school appear to have mistakenly interpreted Dasein as being an autonomous individual subject. 
This has led to a type of individualism which imbues many forms of existentialist therapy. In the 
next chapter I shall mention Heidegger's critique of the work of Ludwig Binswanger, which 
centred on this issue. McCall opts to translate the term as "being present" or "human presence". 
However "being present" is problematic given the importance in Heidegger's work of the concept 
of Vorhandenheit, which is usually translated as "present-at-hand". Emmanuel Levinas (1978) 
uses the French term "Pexistant", "the existent", and Dreyfus simply uses the term "human being". 
For the most part I shall stick to Heidegger's own ten-n: Dasein, and occasionally, when an English 
equivalent is needed, follow Dreyfus and use the term "human being". 
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but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the 
ontical sciences and which provide their foundations" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 1). 
6.2.2 Being - in - the - world 
As mentioned above the literal translation of the term Dasein is "being there". Heidegger's use 
of the term includes this element of "situatedness". To be human is to be involved, implanted, 
immersed in the everyday world. In contrast to the dominant tradition in philosophy Heidegger 
seeks to engage with Dasein in this grounded state. Flis work is an attempt to avoid the 
abstracting, separating tendency inherent in traditional philosophy with regard to issues around 
mind and world. As the very words and concepts used in this tradition are themselves the 
products of this separating tendency Heidegger uses the composite being-in-the-world (In-der- 
Welt-sein) to express this embeddedness of Dasein. Heidegger's aim was an understanding of 
the essential elements of human existence, and he deliberately avoids any temptation to describe 
a particular, or local human reality. Thus, being-in is not an attribute of Dasein in the sense of 
something that it just happens to be characterised by, and something Dasein could lack. He says: 
"Being-in is not a "property" which Dasein has and sometimes does not have, and 
without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that 
man "is" and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 
"world" -a world with which he provides himself occasionally" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 84). 
"In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something "a priori"; it is not 
pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole" (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 65). 
Heidegger criticised Descartes, because in his philosophy human subjectivity has the same 
ontological status as its subjects. For Heidegger human subjectivity is not just another entity in 
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the world but is rather, itself the transcendendental ground of the world. Louis Sass notes that 
both Kant and Husserl also made this criticism of Descartes but according to Heidegger neither 
was able to liberate himself completely from this tendency to treat human subjectivity ontically. 
Thus according to Heidegger both Kant and Husserl tend to portray the transcendental subject 
as if it could, in principle at least, be separated from the world around it. This is the result of 
treating the subject and world as two objects existing alongside within the world. Sass says. 
"Such a way of thinking obscures the essential inseparability of consciousness and 
its objects, and can lead to the error of conceiving the mind's epistemological 
constituting of experiential objects on the model of some kind of actual generation 
or production of one object by another. Heidegger considers this tendency to 
interpret, understand, or express ontological issues concerning the fundamental 
nature of the world on the analogy of empirical facts within the world ... to 
be the 
deepest and most treacherous source of confusion in the entire history of Western 
thought" (Sass, 1992, b, pgs 292-293). 
Not only is Dasein always being-in-the-world, according to Heidegger, but we are in fact 
"thrown" (geworfen) into the world. We do not know whence we came into being, he says, nor 
do we know towards what end (apart from inevitable death) we have been projected into 
existence. We sunply find ourselves in the raidst of the world, involved in it. The world is always 
already in us as we are always in it. Our orientations within the world are thus prior to any 
consciousness we may have of them. Reflection, of any sort, always takes place in the context of 
a worldly embedded life. It is never, and can never be, primary. Heidegger points to the 
derivative character of the detached reflective stance in human affairs. He argues that 
philosophically if we are to comprehend anything about our place in the world we have to return 
to our everyday involvement with things. When we do this, he argues, the detached reflective 
stance, is seen for what it really is. a secondary, derived position. Traditional Western 
philosophers, even before the Cartesian cogito, have stressed the primordial position of mental 
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states. They have argued that we get to the world, to reality, through reflection. Heidegger says 
in a latter work: 
"Being-anWst as existential is of course itself a problem. It is a problem precisely 
because of the seeming self-evidence of the premise of a subject-object relation. 
It is remarkable that the problem addressed by this claim cannot be budged. It is 
as old as philosophy and appears already in Parmenides. The view developed 
early and easily in the pre-philosophical understanding of Dasein that the soul, 
thinking and representing, consciousness, establishes a relationship to objects, or 
put conversely, that entities occur before and ie opposite to thinking, seeing and 
representing" (Heidegger, 1984, p. 130). 
In contrast to this Heidegger stresses our pre-cognitive, pre-reflective involvement with the 
world. Dasein is always already involved and the world is always primarily "ready-to hand" 
(zuhanden). As such it is always already meaningful, always already configured prior to any 
reflection. Our most basic understanding of the world is not in the form of "knowing-that" but 
of "knowing how". Objects in the world are first and foremost tools, equipment and instruments. 
For example, to understand a hammer, in the most basic sense, means knowing how to hammer, 
how to use it. The separation between consciousness and the object (such as hammer) that 
appears so self-evident to a philosopher who is sitting back in an attitude of reflection or 
observation, is not at all in evidence when one is actually using the object. 
Both Descartes and Kant began their reflections with the assumption of disconnection between 
mind and world (in Descartes this had an ontological dimension). They then sought to find 
mstances of epistemological connection which are certain and secure. By starting with the notion 
of Dasein as already in the world Heidegger actually reverses the direction of the problematic. 
Thus in the Heideggerian framework what needs to be explained is not the connection, which is 
the basic given, but the instances of disconnection. Such instances of disconnection occur when 
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we are interrupted in our practical, cognitive or emotional involvement with the world and we 
find ourselves in the position of reflection. 
6.2.3 The reversal of the cogito 
This position allows Heidegger to effectively reverse the Cartesian cogito, which confidently 
asserts the primacy of detached thought: "cogito ergo sum". For Heidegger the reverse is the 
case: III am. ) therefore I think". Existence, in the sense of lived human existence, involved and 
embedded in the world, is the necessary precedent and the enabling condition of thought. George 
Steiner writes: 
"Platonic-Cartesian cogitation and the Cartesian foundation of the world's reality 
in human reflection are attempts to "leap through or across the world" (ein 
Uberspringen) in order to arrive at the noncontingent purity of eternal Ideas or of 
mathematical functions and certitudes. But this attempted leap from and to 
abstraction is radically false to the facticity of the world as we encounter it, as we 
live it" (Steiner, 1992, p. 88). 
Heidegger's reversal of the cogito has important implications. For our purposes it has implications 
for the philosophical assumptions of cognitivism. Perhaps most importantly it challenges the 
underlying assumptions of the Cartesian or "rationalist" tradition as characterised by Taylor 
(1993) in his discussion of the notion of "engaged agency". Taylor says- 
"the dominant conception of the thinking agent that Heidegger had to overcome 
was shaped by a kind of ontologizing of rational procedure. That is, what were 
seen as the proper procedures of rational thought were read into the very 
constitution of the mind and made part of its very structure. 
The result was a picture of the thinking agent as disengaged, as occupying a sort 
of protovarient of the 'view from nowhere', to use Nagel's suggestive phrase. 
Heidegger had to struggle against this picture to recover an understanding of the 
agent as engaged, as embedded in a culture, a form of life, a 'world' of 
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involvements, ultimately to understand the agent as embodied" (p. 317 - 318). 
Taylor works with the concept of embodiment to tease out some of he implications of a reversed 
cogito as developed by Heidegger'. Taylor begins his argument by making the point that the 
idea that the world of the agent is shaped by his or her world is actually generally accepted. in 
particular it is uncontroversial to suggest that our experience is shaped by the fact of our 
em o. ent. However there are two distinct ways in which we can understand this shaping. On 
the one hand my experience is shaped in psychophysical causative fashion. Thus as a perceiving 
agent I cannot see the wall behind me. This can be explained in causal terms. Thus the light 
coming from the wall cannot reach my retina because the back of my head is in the way and my 
retina is pointed in the wrong direction. The physical, material characteristics of my body make 
my seeing the wall impossible. In this way my perception is shaped by my embodiment. My 
world is shaped by it. 
A completely different notion is involved when shaping is understood as the provision of context 
and background so that my experience as agent becomes intelligible. This is a Heideggarian way 
of understanding the concept of one's world being shaped. For example, as I take in the room 
around me, even before I think about it, the scene already has a structure for me. It is already 
orientated for me. Some things are "up", some things "down". Some are "near", some are "far". 
Some objects "lie to hand" whole others are "out of reach". My world is shaped by my 
embodiment in the sense that this is the world of an agent with this particular kind of body. It is 
an agent who can move and deal with things in certain ways: 
5 In the next chapter I will discuss some of Heidegger's own thoughts on the subject of 
"bodyhood", as presented in the Zollikon Seminars. 
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"To understand what it is to 'lie to hand' one has to understand what it is to be an 
agent with the particular bodily capacities that humans have. Some creatures from 
another planet might be unable to grasp this as a projectile term. Of course the 
creature might work out some descriptions that were roughly extensionally 
equivalent. But to project this term the way we do, one has to understand what it is to be human" (Taylor, 1993, p. 319). 
Thus there are two distinct ways in which we can understand the shaping of or experience by our 
embodiment. The first type of relation between embodiment and experience can be stated in causal 
terms. The second type of relationship is more in the way of a relating of the background facts 
of our embodiment- 
"These two senses in which experience is shaped by embodiment help to explain 
the dialogue of the deaf between critics and exponents of artificial-intelligence- 
inspired theories of the mind. The former ...... 
have often insisted that the 
computer offers a model of 'disembodied' consciousness. Proponents of the 
artificial intelligence model, insulted in the very heart of their materialist 
commitment, generally find this accusation unintelligible. But it is easy to see why 
the criticism is not understood. Proponents of strong artificial intelligence are 
thinking of the first kind of relation. The second kind has not swum into their 
conceptual ken, and hence they have great trouble understanding what they are 
being accused of' (Taylor, 1993, p. 334). 
Thus embodiment provides the pre-cognitive, pre-reflective lived experience which is the 
condition of intelligibility for any statements about ourselves. We act as agents embodied. Taylor 
uses the term "engaged agency". The form of our agency - our embodiment - stands to our 
expenence as a context conferring intelligibility. Embodiment, as context or background, can be 
described but cannot be made fully explicit. Embodiment is known implicitly. We have, what 
Heidegger calls a "pre-understanding" (see Taylor, 1993, p. 327) of what it is to act as human 
beings. Dreyfus says: 
11 Such an understanding is contained in our knowing-how-to-cope in various 
domains rather than in a set of beliefs that such and such is the case. Thus we 
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embody an understanding of being that no-one has in mind. We have an ontology 
without knowing it" (Dreyfus, 1993, p, 18). 
For Heidegger our primordial type of understanding is know-how. He says: 
"With the terrn 'understanding' we have in mind a fundamental existentiale, which is neither a definite species of cognition distinguished, let us say, from explaining 
and conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something 
thematically" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 385). 
"When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding 
something' with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a 
match for it', 'being competent to do something"' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 183). 
In summary, according to Heidegger, human being is always engaged being, embodied being. 
Human reality is always in the world and the world is always involved in that reality. It is 
impossible to conceive of any human existence which is not engaged thus. Our sense that we have 
an interior mind which exists in relation to an outside world only arises when we attempt to cease 
our involvement and start to reflect in a detached way. Such detachment is, according to 
Heidegger, impossible and we only have the sense of separation because our culture and the 
prevail-ing philosoph&al attitude asserts that it is a fundamental aspect of human nature. 
6.3 HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC REDUCTIONISM AND POSITIVISM 
6.3.1 Significance 
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We have noted above Heidegger's argument that reflective thought is derivative and secondary 
to the practical involvement of Dasein in the world. One of his most original and important 
insights relates to the derivative nature of traditional concepts of the natural world, nature, in a 
number of different ways: 
"Nature is itself an entity which shows up within the world and which can be 
discovered in various ways and at various stages" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 92). 
Primarily we encounter nature in "available" forms: iron tools, wood etc as part of our practical 
involvement with the world. In this way natural objects form part of our human environment and 
are useful, beautiful, harmful etc. The scientific understanding of the natural world is achieved 
only by ridding it of such qualities. "Worldliness" is Heidegger's term for the underlying 
environmental context in which Dasein exists. The scientific mode of our relating to nature only 
arises when we deprive ""the world of its worldliness" in a definite way" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
94). Only by stripping the world of its values for us do we engage with it scientifically. We 
remove its significance and recontextualise it in scientific theory. These processes "produce" a 
nature which is understood in causal terms. Such is the work of the natural sciences. 
Because philosophy has traditionally regarded detached reflective thought as our primary mode 
of involvement with the world the derivative nature of the natural science project has not been 
noticed by scientists or philosophers. This detached mode of thought "passes over" the "world" 
of being-in-the-world. In the traditional ontology dating from Descartes: 
"The Interpretation of the world begins, in the first instance, with some entity 
within-the-world, so that the phenomenon of the world in general no longer comes 
into view" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 122). 
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Because of this it has not seemed implausible to propose the possibility of explaining the world, 
including the human world, in the terms of natural science. Thus emerged the positivist agenda. 
Heidegger's demonstration of the primacy of worldliness however brings such a project into 
question. He says. 
"Even if (traditional) ontology should itself succeed in explicating the Being of 
Nature in the very purest manner, in conformity with the basic assertions about 
this entity, which the mathematical natural sciences provide, it will never reach the 
phenomenon that is the'world"' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 92). 
His point is that we produce the natural science concept of nature by stripping the world of human 
significance. We cannot then reverse the project and explain significance in terms of such a 
dehumanised nature. Harrison Hall writes: 
"Heidegger argues that this practical world, the intentionality appropriate to it, and 
the sense things have for us within it are more fundamental that the traditional 
sense of the world as a collection of things in objective space, the intentionality of 
cognitive acts, and the sense things have for us within such acts. That priority or 
flandamentality comes to at least the following: 
The practical world is the one we inhabit first, before philosophising or 
engaging in scientific investigation - in Heidegger's words, it is where we 
find ourselves 'proximally for the most part'. 
2 The world in the traditional sense can be understood as derivative from the 
practical world, but not the other way around - that is, starting from 
Heidegger's account of the practical world we can make sense of how the 
traditional sense of the world arises, whereas any attempt to take objective 
perception and cognition as basic and construct the practical world out of 
the resources traditionally available is doomed to failure" (Hall, 1993, 
p. 128) 
Human values are built into the world and are implicit in the skills with which we involve 
ourselves with people and things. They are part of our embodiment and involvement in a culture. 
In terms of embodiment, experiences such as pain, pleasure, hunger and sexuality provide a 
"valued" orientation towards the world but this orientation cannot be stated explicitly because 
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such values are not always open to cognitive formulation. Such embodied experiences arise in 
particular human settings and have significance only in such settings. Their significance exists 
because of the background embodied and "encultured" context in which they occur. For 
Heidegger such significance is primary and cannot be reduced to explanation in terms of a 
secondary derived theory. For Heidegger, explication of the realms of human significance, of 
worldliness" , is only properly undertaken in a hermeneutic mode. The casual explanatory 
framework of the natural sciences is singularly unsuited to the task. 
Some interpreters of Heidegger, most notably Dreyfus and Taylor, have argued that his analysis 
reaffirms the Diltheyan distinction between the natural and the human sciences. They suggest 
there is a clear distinction between the two types of investigation in terms of what counts as 
appropriate methodology. For them the investigation of the natural world with a causal 
explanatory framework is valid but the human realm needs to understood in hermeneutic terms 
alone. Both Dreyfus and Taylor have used Heidegger's work to support this approach. Their 
basic assertion that human beings are unique, in being self-interpreting, is most clearly developed 
by Heidegger in Being and Time. They contrast this with the position of objects in the natural 
world which are not seen as having this self-interpreting quality. Both Dreyfus and Taylor are 
mindful of the post-empiricist challenge to the status of natural science. In this, philosophers of 
science such as Kuhn, Hesse and Feyerabend have argued that natural science is infact not the 
sort of neutral, objective, detached discipline that it was once understood to be. Instead they 
argue that all natural sciences are loaded with assumptions and exist in social and historical 
contexts that determine their priorities and agendas to a large extent. As such, they all involve 
a hermeneutic dimension. The implications of this development in the understanding of scientific 
theory and practice is not underestimated by Dreyfus and Taylor. Taylor, in a now famous 
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quotation, summed up the irony involved: 
"Old-guard Diltheyans, their shoulders hunched from years-long resistance against 
the encroaching pressure of positivist natural science, suddenly pitch forward on 
their faces as all opposition ceases to the reign of universal hermeneutics" 
(Taylor, 1980, p. 26). 
However, both philosophers have worked hard to maintain the distinction. They have presented 
various arguments to underscore the difference between the two. For example, Taylor has argued 
that although the natural sciences are interpretive, the human sciences have to be doubly 
interpretive. This is because not only are the human sciences involved in interpretation but the 
objects of their study are themselves involved in self-interpretation. This does not hold in the 
natural sciences. 
All of the arguments presented by Dreyfus and Taylor involve the Heideggarian notion of human 
being as interpretive. They contrast this with the ontologically distinct position of the natural 
world. They suggest that Heidegger's presentation of the derivation of the concept of nature in 
the scientific framework supports their view. However an alternative interpretation of Heidegger 
is used by Joseph Rouse (1987) to support his critique of these neo-Diltheyan arguments. Rouse 
argues that the hermeneutic circle as elaborated by Heidegger radically undermines the Diltheyan 
position- 
"Traditional Diltheyan hermeneutics emphasized the meaningful character of the 
obje of interpretation, and the hermeneutic circle involved an interplay between 
the object as a meaningful whole and the parts that both compose the whole and 
acquire their sense from it. For Heidegger, the hermeneutic circle is an interplay 
between the understanding of the world as the meaningful configuration within 
which things are manifest as what they are and the interpretation of particular 
things within the world. The circle thus has the same structure for the 
interpretation of persons and of things, because it has nothing to do with the 
presumptively meaningful character of the object" (Rouse, 1987, p. 182). 
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Thus, nature only "shows up" in relation to Dasein. Rouse does not argue for an anti-realist 
position but aligns himself with the pragmatist position that the "world is what shows up in our 
practices" (p. 165). From this perspective what count as things, relations, causes do so only 
within particular social and cultural contextS6 . Not only is the social world constructed through 
human practice and language but so too is the very concept of nature. Thus, Rouse argues that 
Heidegger offers a way of being grounded in particular human circumstances: 
"To say with Heidegger that only Dasein is meaningful is not to say that only 
Human beings 'have' meaning, but rather to say that a practical, purposive 
configuration of world is the condition for anything's having any intelligible 
properties of any sort. Meaning is a 'formal' condition of the intelligibility of 
beings rather that a substantive characteristic of some particular being" (Rouse, 
1987, p. 183). 
In spite of Rouse's usage of Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics he is also critical of 
Heidegger's "early philosophy of science". He argues that this account presents science as 
essentially a theoretical activity which disengages the scientist and the objects of science from 
local, functional situations. In contrast, Rouse presents science as a practical, experiment- 
orientated activity which never manages to disengage itself from its social and political context. 
He says that Heidegger failed to give adequate attention to the actual practices involved in 
scientific research. Science is always, according to Rouse, "local knowledge". 
These arguments concerning the proper relations between the natural and human sciences do not 
affect the argument developed above that human significance cannot be understood in terms of 
a dehumanised nature. Rouse, Taylor and Dreyfus all agree with the basic Heideggarian argument 
This is similar to the position taken by Rorty (1979,1980). 
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that human reality can only be understood in a holistic way. Significance is always generated 
against a broad background of linguistic structures and social practices. As such it can only be C 
grasped and understood in relation to such background structures and practices. These are always 
multiple and unformalisable. Thus, understanding of human significance always requires a 
hermeneutic element. The attempt to generate human significance solely within the framework 
of a dehumanised natural science is thus doomed to failure. As pointed out in chapter four 
Dreyfus has demonstrated tl-ýs in relation to artificial intelligence (AI) models of mind. He says 
the practical failure of Al. research to develop convincing models of human activities is practical 
support for Heidegger's position- 
"It is easy to say that to account for the equipmental nexus one needs simply add 
more and more function predicates and rules describing what is to be done in 
typical situations, but actual difficulties in Al - its inability to make progress with 
what is called the common-sense knowledge problem, on the one hand, and its 
inability to define the current situation, sometimes called the frame problem, on 
the other - suggest that Heidegger is right. It looks like one cannot build up the 
phenomena of world out of meaningless elements" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 119). 
6.3.2 'Intentional causality' 
These arguments hold even in relation to the sort of 'sophisticated' cognitivism put forward by 
Bolton and Hill (see chapter two). They argue the case for a psychological science, which, while 
sharing a great deal in common with biology, cannot be reduced to the forms of explanation which 
exist in physics and chernistry. Psychology and biology are said to exhibit 'intentional causality', 
and explanations in these sciences require 'intentional explanations'. These are explanations which 
incorporate notions such as 'normal/abnormal', 'information', 'design', 'mistake' and 'rules'. 
According to Bolton and Hill, this terminology cannot be 'reduced' to the terminology of physics 
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and chemistry. DNA and the haemoglobin molecule are put forward as exhibiting intentional 
causality, as well as such things as human thought and reason. The transitions between the two 
levels are said to be 'seamless' (p. 260). Because of this it is appropriate to talk in terms of a 
'predictive' science of psychology, albeit one which pays attention to human meanings. While they 
reject the idea that human reality can be explained by reference to 'physical laws', they 
nevertheless assert that cognitive psychology is in the business of establishing 'natural laws' and 
'norms of function' in the mind. They write, unproblematically, about people who develop 
psychotic episodes as possibly exhibiting a'design fault' (p. 284). If psychology can descfibe what 
the 'normal design' of a human being actually consists of, and can describe 'norms of function', 
then it can predict what will happen under particular conditions, given that the system is 
functioning 'normally'. They are quite clear that once such norms are established, psychology 
becomes a true causal science. They maintain: 
the idea that the causal status of cognitive explanations derives from their 
place within a well-entrenched systematic empirical theory about relations between 
stimuli, cognitive states, and behaviour. There is something correct about this 
suggestion, but it is not yet complete. It omits special features of descriptions of 
functional systems, namely, that they essentially invoke norms of function, and 
that this accounts for their necessity" (Bolton and IFEll, 1996, p. 200). 
Asserting that there are 'norms of function', which can be established, leads Bolton and I-Ell to 
elaborate an account of human beings as 'rational agents'. Unless human beings act in a rational 
and consistent way, the predictive power of psychology starts to evaporate. Because of this, they 
are led to propose that there are 'laws of reason', according to which particular behaviours can 
be judged to be rational or otherwise. Thus - 
"If a person believes such-and-such, then she must, in appropriate circumstances, 
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act in a way that accords with that belief This 'must', however, has nothing to do 
with scientific theory or natural law. If the consequent of the hypothetical fails, no 
scientific theory has been refuted, still less has there been a miracle! Rather, the 
inference would be that, for one reason or another, the person has apparently 
acted irrationally. The nomological character of the prediction pertains to the 
'laws' of reason, not to laws of an empirical science" (Bolton and I-Ell, 1996, p. 
201)ý 
The problem with this theory is that there simply are no universally accepted 'laws of reason'. 
There are only human judgements about what it is to be rational or irrational. Anthropologists 
have been interested in the question of rationality for many years. Hobart (1985) describes how 
Balinese epistemology is highly sophisticated and subtle. He argues that in Balinese culture, 
language is recognized as polysemic and 'double-edged' and always influenced by the interests and 
intentions of both speakers and listeners. Truth is always relative to context. Hobart writes: 
"Balinese ideas of what is manifestly so or not so cannot be grafted onto our 
model of propositions being true or false. Scepticism over human abilities sets the 
Balinese sharply apart from Hellenic, and later, traditions of the omnipotence of 
reason" (Hobart, 1985, p. 113). 
If this is the case, and complex and different rationalities exist in different cultures, it is very 
difficult to see the value of talking about 'laws of reason' at all. Any proposed set of 'norms, 'rules' 
or 'laws' of thought will always be the product of a particular perspective. This is the central 
difficulty with the approach of Bolton and f1ill. While they claim to endorse a'post-empiricist' 
epistemology, they appear to locate this epistemology solely in the subjects of psychological 
research, and not in the researchers themselves. What a researcher puts forward as 'normal 
functioning' may well be uncontentious and generally agreed in the world of biology, but 
disagreement about the nature of normality is the usual state of affairs in the world of 
psychology and psychiatry. Bolton and IFEII admit that generalizations in the area of human 
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psychology are 'vague' and 'non-specific' (p. 207). Nevertheless they argue that such 
generalizations do exist and can be used scientifically. For example, they quote the work of 
Seligman on the phenomenon of 'learned helplessness'. Seligman's original work was with animals, 
but the concept of learned helplessness has been widely used as a model for depression in human 
beings. Bolton and IEII argue that -. 
the cognitive-affective state of helplessness (which) results from persistent or 
traumatic (perceived) lack of control over major aversive events, such as pain, or 
deprivation, and ensues in behavioural inertia.. " (Bolton and IFEII, 1996, p. 206) 
... 
is an example of a generalization over a cognitive-affective state. This 'learned helplessness' 
which results from negative life-events is understood by many to lead to a state of intense 
hopelessness and through this is held to account for many features of the syndrome of 
depression. Presumably this would be an example of what Bolton and fEll mean by'intentional 
causality'. In a similar vein one could develop 'causal' theories about the origins of depression from 
the work of Brown and Harris. The Sri Lankan anthropologist, Gannanath Obeyesekere, quotes 
the following passage from their work: 
"The immediate response to loss of an important source of positive value is likely 
to be a sense of hopelessness, accompanied by a gamut of feelings, ranging from 
distress, depression, and shame to anger. Feelings of hopelessness will not always 
be restricted to the provoking incident - large or small. It may lead to thoughts 
about the hopelessness of one's life in general. It is such generalization of 
hopelessness that we believe forms the central core of depressive disorder" 
(Brown and Harris, 1978, p. 134). 
However, Obeyesekere makes the following observation : 
"This statement sounds strange to me, a Buddhist, for if it was placed in the 
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context of Sri Lanka, I would say that we are not dealing with a depressive but a 
good Buddhist. The Buddhist would take one further step in generalization : it is 
not simply the hopelessness of one's own lot; that hopelessness lies in the nature 
of the world, and salvation lies in understanding and overcoming that 
hopelessness" (Obeyesekere, 1985, p. 134). 
In other words, hopelessness is not something which has a fixed meaning. How it relates to 
sorrow and loss is deten-nined by cultural context. Thus the relationship between life events, states 
of helplessness and hopelessness and the syndrome of depression cannot be stated in terms of an 
aculturaL decontextualised law. States of depression can be interpreted in terms of life events, but 
such interpretations emerge in the context of a particular culture which places certain values on 
affective states and differentiates such states in particular ways. 
Similar observations have been made by Janis Jenkins and Marvin Karno in relation to the concept 
of'expressed emotion'. This is, currently, one of the most researched constructs in psychosocial 
research and is cited by Bolton and FRII. fEgh'expressed emotion' in the families of patients with 
schizophrenia is understood to be causally related to relapse in such patients after they leave 
hospital. However, Jenkins and Karno, demonstrate that there are substantial cultural influences 
on the way in which family context, symptoms and relapse are related. Because most researchers 
in this area of research are committed to psychology as a causal science they have assumed the 
generalizability of the'expressed emotion' construct and faded to see the cross-cultural difficulties- 
"Quite striking from a cross-cultural psychiatric point of view is the neglect on the 
part of expressed emotion researchers in calling for a systematic examination of 
the relationship between culture and expressed emotion. Since the 
anthropological and cross-cultural psychiatric literature of the past several decades 
has documented substantial cultural differences in conceptions of psychosis, 
display of emotion, behavioral rules and norms, and family structure and 
identification, it is reasonable to expect that features such as these are of key 
relevance to the explication of expressed emotion. In our view, it is these features 
156 
that go to the very heart of what the construct of expressed emotion embraces" 
(Jenkins and Karno., 1992, p. 19). 
One can only speak confidently about'norms of function' and 'rational action' in the human world, 
after one has bracketed out contextual phenomena such as culture, language, gender, social and 
political circumstances etc. However, according to hermeneutic philosophy (and most 
anthropologists) these phenomena actually constitute the meaningful reality of human beings. 
When one enters debates about cultural norms, beliefs and practices, and how these relate to 
metaphysical and ontological assumptions, one has defacto moved away from any sort of causal 
framework. This is a realm of interpretation and hermeneutics. 
Bolton and Hill convincingly argue that biological science involves a strong element of 
'functionality' which cannot be reduced to the terms of physics and chemistry. However, the 
question being posed here is - to what extent have they been effective in developing a conceptual 
bridge between biological systems and lived human reality? As we have seen in the last section, 
the Heideggerian argument is that the scientific account of the world is produced by systematically 
stripping the language we use of human value terms. It is a move away from the 'ready-to-hand' 
reality within which we live, to another way of ordering the world. Positivism seeks to use this 
'de-valued' language of science to explain the nature of lived human reality. As Bolton and MR 
argue that biology can only 'work' if we do not 'de-value' our language completely, and continue 
to use terms such as 'normal', 'information' and 'mistake', it is not really surprising that their 
version of biological reality has certain affinities with the human reality from which they are 
borrowed. But this position is nothing less than a tautologY. Their failure to engage with the 
position of the observer, the one who decides what is 'normal' or 'faulty' and writes the theories 
of biology and psychology, renders their account unstable and open to the sort of hermeneutic 
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critique developed above in relation to more traditional forms of positivism. 
6.3.3 Temporality and Historicality 
Before ending this chapter, I wish to examine Heidegger's approach to time. Just as Dasein is 
always situated in a world of significance, it is also always temporal. In fact, according to 
Heidegger, it is because Dasein is temporal that a world of significance opens up at all. The title 
of Heidegger's great work emphasises the importance of time. For him a fundamental ontology 
is one in which being is shown to be inseparable from "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit). In the 
introduction to Being and Time, he says - 
"We shall point to temporality (Zeitlichkeit) as the meaning of the being of that 
entity which we call Dasein' " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 8). 
There is a close relationship between the way Heidegger approaches the question of Dasein's 
being in-the-world and Dasein's temporality. In both cases there are established philosophical and 
commonsense understandings of the relationship which Heidegger wants to oppose. Dasein is not 
in a contingent relationship to time, but rather temporality is part of its very make-up. Dasein 
'temporalises'. fEs account of temporality runs contra to the traditional philosophical approach 
to time dating back to Plato. In the tradition time is modelled on a spatial metaphor. In this it 
becomes possible to be "in time" or "outside time". To be outside time, to be atemporal, is to be 
in a transcendental relationship to the world and to Dasein'. By invoking a viewpoint on the 
7Within modernity this extemporal vantage point has been associated with the search for i 
certainty and the emergence of the "transcendental pretence" discussed in chapter two. 
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world which is extratemporal the human imagination exalts itself and reaches out of its 
embeddedness. Olafson says: 
"The distinction between what is in time and what is not has been deeply 
entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition since Plato. That distinction 
treats what is not in time as superior, both intrinsically and for the purposes of 
knowledge, to what is in time. This Platonic conception of knowledge as directed 
ultimately to what is timeless became the model for the Christian idea of God's 
mind and knowledge. God himself was taken to be outside time, so his knowledge 
was in no way qualified by a temporal position. Instead, he knew everything, 
including things M time, in a timeless manner. In Heidegger's view, this conception 
of God's knowledge became, in the modern period, the model for understanding 
human knowledge" (Olafson, 1987, p. 77). 
In the traditional account) the notion of an atemporal vantage point is combined with a vision of 
time itself as a linear phenomenon. Time is understood to be a series of moments, a series of 
"nows". each essentially disconnected from each other. While Aristotle conceived the "now" as 
having a certain "thickness", modem thought has sought to model the "now" in atomistic terms. 
It is only fi7om outside the series of nows that what is past, present and future can be established. 
Furthermore the necessity of a possible extratemporal position is also required to explain how 
any individual has a sense of his/her own position in time. In the model of linear time the person 
who is in time knows the past through representations. But there is a difficulty here as these 
representations are always present. Thus it is not clear how the person can reach out of the 
present and establish certain representations as being of the past and then relate to them as such. 
Why is it that all representations do not simply collapse into the present? This is only avoided by 
postulating an atemporal position fi7om which it is evident which representations are in the present 
and which are from the past. In someway it is understood that the person who is in time has 
access to the atemporal viewpoint. This model is obviously problematic and has caused a number 
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of difficulties for philosophy. However the postulation of an extratemporal position is often an 
implicit rather than explicit element of the model and so the problematic usually does not come 
to fight. Modern commonsense and psychology simply assume a clear distinction between what 
is present and what is past. 
The notion of an aternporal. vantage point is deeply entwined with the positivist notion of causality 
discussed in chapter two. Causal laws are understood to exist as "hard and fast" unchanging 
connections between things. Such laws, by definition, do not change with time but work at 
different times and in different situations. As the psychologists Faulconer and Williams assert* 
"The positivist notion of causality ... relies on the assumption that static, 
atemporal entities are the fundamental kind of existing things and that other things 
exist only to the degree that they can be reduced to these static entities and their 
atemporal characteristics. Causal explanation is explanation in terms of these 
atemporal entities. In this sense causality is atemporality; the causal account is the 
atemporal. one, and it is the only account by which human being is intelligible 
according to the positivist point of view" (Faulconer and Williams, 198 5, p. 1182) 
Heidegger contradicts this by pointing out that time is at the essence of human being. To be 
human is to be temporal, involved in possibility and change. Without the presence of possibility 
no human event can really occur. Dasein relates to itself and to the world in a temporal way and 
cannot be grasped in terms of atemporal, static causality. 
"Now", like the word "there", is an indexical term. It works to date and locate events in the world 
by reference to the time at which it is used and thus to the person who uses it. In the traditional 
account this indexicality is seen as an interference and attempts have been made to establish an 
non-indexical set of time concepts such as objective metric time. Heidegger rejects this move and 
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with it rejects the linear notion of time. For him, just as the scientific concept of nature is 
producedby an active stripping away of value terms from the language in which we contemplate 
nature, so too our notion of linear time is produced by stripping temporality of its indexicality. 
In the traditional account human beings have a sense of the past, the present and future because 
they have access to a transcendental atemporal point from which events show up as being in time. 
Heidegger reverses this and argues that it is only because Dasein is temporal and as such has a 
"built in" understanding of the movement of time that it then becomes possible for Dasein to 
imagine an atemporal position. In other words the notion of linear time and non-indexical time 
concepts are only possible because Dasein always already has a sense of change and a sense of 
past, present and future. 
Heidegger argues that we have to stop thinking about the "now" as a self-contained independent 
moment, existing as logically distinct from the past or the future. IFEs move is to point to the 
internal complexity of the "now" as it is actually experienced. For Dasein, the now is not simply 
a point in a series but rather it holds, or frames, time in such a way as to set up contrasts within 
itself between the past, present and future. Olafson says: 
"Another way of putting this is to say that, in the Now, time is stretched 
(erstreckt) in such a way that it holds on to what has been and awaits something 
that is to come. The former is thus taken as that which is no longer, the latter as 
what is not yet; and what is now the case is present in the strong Heideggarian 
sense of that term as what once was not and later will (or may) no longer be the 
case. If what is now the case were simply replaced in the next moment by 
something else, then in each of these moments what is the case would be a Now 
without a contrasting Then, a present without a past or a future. But there 
is a 
future only if what is not yet the case is something other than just a state of the 
world that is located, for some transcendental and nontemporal observer, 
further 
along the time dimension" (Olfason, 1987, p. 85). 
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Because Dasein is ontological it is in a relationship of "care" (Sorge) to the world and this 
relationship implies a continuity, In his discussion of care Heidegger writes: 
"The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must 
therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead- 
of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered 
within-the-world) " (Heidegger, 1962, P. 237). 
Thus Dasein has three basic dimensions- it is 
1) ahead-of-itself This is evidenced in our understanding. In this we are always thinking ahead 
in some way or another, always projecting into the future. 
2) already in. This is evidenced by the fact that we are always already disposed to the world in 
some particular way. This is manifest through our moods or states of mind (Befindlichkeit). 
3) alongside. We are always present to the world around us. 
He says- 
"The "ahead-of-itself' is grounded in the future. In the "Being-already-in ...... the 
character of "having been" is made known. "Being-alongside becomes possible 
in making present" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 375). 
The essential point being made is that the present is not and cannot be something which is 
separate from the past and the future. The three are involved inextricably with one another. This 
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is seen clearly if we attempt to imagine a person existing in the present tense alone, without 
access to a past or future. it is simply impossible to imagine such a state. Our worlds are always 
already configured for us and this configuration implies a past. It makes no sense to think of a 
present moment in which the world is not configured in some way. Likewise it makes no sense 
to think of a present without a future. It is akin to attempting to think of night without a concept 
of day, or vice versa. By speaking about a present at all we are implying the existence of 
something else, we are implying a movement onwards. 
Olafson discusses the implications of this approach for the notion of memory. He points out that 
memory is usually thought of in terms of "episodic acts" through which we somehow reach out 
of the present into the past and through this we have access to representations of some previous 
events. In addition the representations which are so recovered are often thought of, particularly 
in cognitive frameworks, as having been "stored" . 
We thus carry them with us all the time but 
only retrieve them at certain moments. In this account the present is given a highly privileged 
position. It is fi7om the present that we reach out and encounter our memories. This account of 
memory gives us a picture of a strong present which carries the past with it, stored away but 
accessible. Olafson points out that this picture is problematic : 
"What this misses, of course , is the way this supposedly present world 
bears a 
burden of pastness that is not at all a mere external supplement that a helpful 
memory is constantly adding to an otherwise rigorously present state of affairs. 
The identities in terms of which we understand and deal with the things and places 
and artifacts in our world are not construed on the basis of such a rigorous 
distinction between present reality and added information about the past. ... If we 
are to be thought of as carrying our pasts with us, the place where we "store" 
them is the world, not our heads. We move and act and live within a world that 
is instinct with pastness; and although it is true that we do on occasion suddenly 
recollect things that we had forgotten, that recollection itself occurs within a 
world that is itself historical - that is, a world in which what happens (geschehen) 
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happens in a present that has a past and a future" (Olafson, 1987, p. 87) 
Thus Dasein always and everywhere inhabits a world which is historical. ) a world which is 
structured and ordered and orientated in the past. For Dasein, in an ironic way, the present is its 
own past. Similarly in regard to the future. Just as the notion of "stored memory" cannot do 
justice to the way in which lived Dasein experiences the past's involvement with the present, so 
also the notion of prediction does not properly grasp the way in which the future is involved with 
Dasein's present. Many, if not most, of Dasein's actions and thoughts involve an element of 
futurity. In many ways Dasein's present is pregnant with its future. The future is not something 
contingently related to the present, rather every present is conunitted to a future. Dasein's 
existence is primordially orientated towards the future and possibility: 
" Ihe primary meaning of existentiality is thefuture " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 76). 
For Heidegger the spatial metaphor in which we understand ourselves to be "in time" confuses 
the true nature of our temporality. For him Dasein is not "in time" as the entities of the world are, 
rather Dasein is the entity which has time. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
Heidegger offers us a way of understanding the human world which is very different to that 
presented by Descartes and other philosophers who have followed his strongly 
'subjectivist' 
orientation. I believe that his philosophy can help us to ground a critique of traditional approaches 
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to trauma because it directly engages with the philosophical assumptions upon which these 
approaches are built. His thought provides support for the sort of context-centred approach 
advocated in the last chapter. In particular, his move away from a focus on the individual mind 
existing in relationship to an 'outside' world and towards an embedded notion of being-in-the- 
world, promotes a perspective in which contextual issues are not simply'acting from the outside' 
on a series of reified psychological processes. IFEs notion of 'worldliness' moves us away from 
scientific reductionism. Instead,, existence in a world 'of significance' is primary and cannot be 
grasped or explained in an idiom of causal science. This works to contradict the fundamental 
tenets of positivism. Thirdly, Heidegger's account of human temporality, in which the future, past 
and present exist in a unified way helps us to avoid the difficulties encountered in the very concept 
of PTSD and highlighted by Allan Young (discussed in the last chapter). 
In the next chapter I will explore the way in which Heidegger's thought was brought to bear, 
directly, on the fields of medicine and psychiatry through his long collaboration with Medard 
Boss. In the f6flowing chapter I will tease out some further implications of this approach for our 
understanding of trauma. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
A HEIDEG ý; ERIAN APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY' 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the end of World War 11, because of his earlier association with the NAZI party, Heidegger 
had to appear before a Denazification Conu-nission' in Freiburg. He was forbidden to teach for 
three years, the ban lasting up to 1949. He was, however, allowed to keep his library and was 
granted an emeritus professorship by the University. In 1946 he received a letter from the Swiss 
psychiatrist, Medard Boss, who expressed an interest in applying the insights of Being and Time 
in his psychiatric work. Boss wrote later that he received 'an extremely warm response' from 
Heidegger. The two men met for the first time in Heidegger's ski-hut near his home in the Black 
Forest in 1947. This was the beginning of a long and productive friendship. According to Boss, 
Heidegger later revealed that to him that he (Heidegger) originally saw their involvement with one 
another as a means whereby : 
"his thinking would escape the confines of the philosopher's study and become of 
benefit to wider circles, in particular to a large number of suffering human beings" 
(Boss, 1988, a, p. 7). 
In this chapter I will examine the product of this collaboration. I will first point to some of the 
'This chapter is not crucial to the development of the thesis which is focused specifically 
on conceptualisations, of trauma. However, one of the'subtexts'of this work is an attempt to show 
how hermeneutics can provide a philosophical framework for a very different approach within 
psychiatry and psychology. In this regard I think it important to review one of the major ways in 
which this has already been tried. 
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ways in which Heidegger's original account of Dasein was developed in the Zollikon Seminars 
(see below) and then discuss aspects of Boss's Daseinanalytic psychotherapy. In the next chapter 
I will discuss Heidegger's approach to moods, and to the mood of anxiety in particular, as this 
relates directly to the question of trauma and loss of meaning. 
7.2. MEDARD BOSS AND TBE ZOLLIKON SEMINARS 
Boss was a psychiatrist who received psychiatric training from the two Bleulers (father and son) 
at the famous Burgh6lzhi hospital in Switzerland. He also had a training in psychoanalysis. He 
had begun his own analysis with Freud in 1925 and had continued it with Karen Homey in Berlin. 
He was also taught by Reich, Fenichel and Jones, amongst others, and participated, for 10 years. ) 
in a bi-weekly seminar with Carl Jung (Richardson, 1993). In spite of this exposure to the major 
psychiatric and psychoanalytic thinkers of his time, Boss was dissatisfied with the prevailing 
accounts of human psychology and mental illness. He found Heidegger's account of Dasein in 
Being and Time extremely convincing. After reading this, he spent the rest of his life developing 
an approach to medicine and psychiatry based on Heidegger's thought. He received substantial 
support and encouragement from Heidegger himself in this endeavour. In the preface to the first 
edition of his 'magnum opus'Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology Boss wrote 
that : 
"... this work actually evolved under Heidegger's watchful eye. There is not one 
section of "pUosophical" import which was denied his generous criticism" (Boss, 
1979, p. xxiii -xxiv) 
At Boss's request Heidegger gave a series of seminars for Zurich-based medical doctors and 
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psychiatrists between the years 1959 and 19692 . 
Although these seminars occured many years 
- 
il 
aner the publication of Being and Time, and in other writing of this time Heidegger had moved 
away from a central focus on Dasein, the familar themes of being-in-the-world and the existential 
structure of Dasein in terms of spatiality and temporality are the major topics of discussion'. In 
addition, Heidegger discusses certain psychosomatic phenomena and developed an account of 
the bodily existence of Dasein which is not well developed in Being and Time. He also discussed, 
and severely criticised, Freudian psychoanalysis and distanced himself from the type of 'psychiatric 
daseinanalysis' being developed at that time by Binswanger. In this section I shall give an account 
of Heidegger's position on these issues, with supporting material from Boss. In the next section, 
will briefly outline the main tenets of Boss's form of daseinanalysis. 
In the sen-dnars, Heidegger distinguished between the body as K6rper and body as Leib. The 
former refers to the physical body whose limit is the skin, the latter is the 'horizon' of the world 
for Dasein as being-in-the-world. He says: 
"We cannot "see" because we have eyes, rather we can only have eyes because 
according to our fundamental nature we come to presence as beings that see. 
Likewise) we could not be bodily (leiblich) in the way we are unless our Being-in- 
the-world always consisted fundamentally of a perceptive/receptive relatedness to 
something that addresses us out of the Open of our World, [that Open] as which 
'These seminars took place at Boss's home in Zollikon, near Zurich, up to three times each 
semester during this period. Boss published transcripts of these teaching sessions in German 
(Zollikoner Seminare, published by Klostermann) in 1987, but they have never been translated 
into English. However, two translated extracts are available - Boss (1988) and Heidegger (1998). 
In addition, Richardson (1993) and Dallmayr (1991, pgs 211-237) have provided English 
language readers with accounts of the seminars. 
3 Heidegger's orientation is basically the same as that in Being and Time, which goes 
someway to demonstrate that the separation of his work into 'early' and 'late'is artificial, even 
though I shall make use of it in part three of this thesis. 
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we exist" (Heidegger, quoted in Richardson, p. 52). 
Boss develops this approach to the body in a number of works. In the English translation of 
Existential Foundations ofMedicine and Psychology (translation by Stephen Conway and Anne 
Cleaves) the word Leib is said to have the connotation of body as 'lived bodyliness. The 
translators use the word 'bodyhood' in the text and give the dictionary definition of this as 'the 
quality of having a body or of being body' Boss argues that scientific medicine has fundamentally 
nusunderstood the nature of human bodyhood. By defining it in purely material terms as an object 
which can be measured and manipulated, science misses its specifically human dimension. He 
says- 
"By positing the human body as some self-contained material thing, natural science 
disregards everything that is specifically human about human bodyhood. The 
natural scientific research method treats the body as it might treat works of art. 
Given a collection of Picasso paintings, for instance, this method would see only 
material objects whose length and breadth could be measured, whose weight could 
be determined, 
) and whose substance could 
be analyzed chemically. All the 
resulting data lumped together would tell us nothing about what makes these 
paintings what they are; their character as works of art is not even touched by this 
approach" (Boss, 1979, p. 100). 
Un 
Ife, makes the point that when a human being is existing in the most characteristically human way 
it ceases to be aware of its bodyhood. Ironically, to be involved in a task whereby one puts one's 
'body and soul' into it, is to be involved in such a way that one is not conscious of being a body 
at all. In spite of this, there is no aspect of human existence which is not bodily in some way. 
Being-in-the-world is to be a body. Even the most intellectual task involves what we have read 
or heard at some point. The point is that while Dasein is always embodied, simply regarding the 
human body as a thing fails to grasp the nature of this embodiment. Boss talks about human being 
as bodying forthbeyond the limits of the skin. When I perceive something, or point to something 
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I am extending myself bodily beyond the reach of my finger tips. Just as there can be no 
independently existing time outside human temporality so too there is no no such thing as a 
human body outside a human life. For Boss, echoing Heidegger in the quote above: 
"The borders of my bodyhood coincide with those of my openness to the world. 
They are in fact at any given time identical, though they are always changing with 
the fluid expansion and contraction of my relationship to the world"(Boss, 1979, 
103). 
In this interpretation of bodyhood, even the least gesture :a move of the hand for example, can 
never be fully understood if the hand is simply regarded as a physical object made up of skin and 
bone and muscle. The human hand is so intimately related to being-in-the-world that it ceases to 
be a hand if this relationship is severed. A hand cannot exist except as a bodying-forth, an aspect 
of human engagement with the world. Thus a hand is only a hand because it is involved with a 
particular human existence. Likewise my organs of sensation : ears, eyes, touch owe their being 
to their involvement with an ongoing human openness to the world'. Thus bodyhood always 
presupposes a perceiving and acting existence, a human encounter with the world. Human 
existence 'bodies forth' through the different parts of our bodyhood. This means that bodyhood 
is 'phenomenologically secondary, though our senses tell us that it is primary' (p. 105). 
'Although I will not expand on the issue here, there are clear resonances between 
Heidegger and Boss on bodyhood and the approach developed later by Merleau-Ponty, in his 
Phenomenology of Perception. The following quotation serves to make this connection: 
"The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be actually in 
itself, because its articulations are those of our very existence, and because it 
stands at the other end of our gaze, or at the terminus of a sensory exploration 
which invests it with humanity. To this extent, every perception is a 
communication or a communion ... the complete expression outside ourselves of 
our perceptual powers, and a coition, so to speak, of our body with things" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 320). 
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The meaning of this assertion becomes clearer in Boss's discussion of illness. This he defines as 
a state in which the potential to be fully human and free is undermined. With Heidegger, he argues 
that the fundamental existential 'traits' of human being are not'so many bricks with which Da-sein 
is put together'. These traits are inseparable and all equally primary. Together they make up the 
structure of human being-in-the-world. Whenever one trait is disturbed, all the others are affected, 
and conversely, no matter how serious the illness, as long as the human being is alive, these traits 
continue to exist, even if in potential only. He lists these fundamental traits, or Existentials, as .- 
"the spatio-temporal character of Da-sein, its attunement, its bodyhood, its 
coexistence or being together with other people in a shared world, its openness 
and finally, the unfolding of inherent potentialities into existential freedom"(Boss, 
1979, p. 199). 
There is also the 'ultimate existential trait of mortality'. These traits are what make human life 
human. Together they constitute Dasein as a 'clearing' in which the world comes to light. Illness 
involves impairment to one or more of these traits. Because of the presence of illness the human 
being is unable to fully actualise itself As noted above, this does not mean that the trait is not 
present, for this would be to say that human fife is not present. Rather, in illness the particular trait 
is seen to exist as blocked potential. For example a child born without the use of its arms, either 
because through prenatal thalidon-lide damage the arms have not grown, or because of perinatal 
injury the nerve fibres are severed, has had its ability to 'body forth' in a greeting relationship 
reduced. In this way we see that it is because a specifically human being is present that a specific 
forrn of bodyhood impairment can come into being. Thus, human illness is dependent on human 
existence for its reality. The potential given to Dasein by its constitution in terms of the traits 
outlined above is what determines the nature of human illness. If we were not beings for whom 
communication is a part of our very make-up, then there would be no human illnesses 
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characterised by a loss, or breakdown, of communication'. This is what Boss means when he says 
that 'bodyhood is phenomenologically secondary'. We can only build up a picture of bodily 
function and impairment fi7om a prior understanding of what meaningful human reality is like. We 
cannot move in the other direction. Let us think of a painting by Picasso, and imagine that it has 
been damaged in a move from one gallery to another. The impact of the damage can only be 
judged by way of reference to the meaning of the painting as a whole. Loss of a certain amount 
of material from one comer of the painting might not render the painting as damaged as a loss 
from some other point on the canvass. The damage is defined by how the painting works as a 
meaningful whole. Boss uses the example of colour blindness. He makes the point that this 
condition is supposed to be clearly and primarily 'hereditary-organic'. However: 
"If we want to understand what it really is, we will have to find out from the 
afflicted person exactly how his ability to relate himself through perception to 
what reveals itself to him in his world has been impaired. We will discover that he 
cannot respond to the meanings "red" and "green". Yet the potentiality in 
understanding "red" for what it is cannot be understood on the basis of any 
molecular structure. Like color blindness, all of the other so-called primarily 
organic -hereditary illnesses are by nature nothing more than deficiencies in the 
ability to carry out potential ways of being which are usually there for people" 
(Boss, 1979, p. 201). 
This discussion of bodyhood echoes the discussion of significance in the last chapter. We 
experience our world as, first and foremost, a world involving relationships of significance. We 
produce a scientific (in terms of physics and chemistry) account of that world only by stripping 
it of these relationships. The positivist and reductionist approach to the human world tries to 
move in the reverse direction, claiming along the way that the scientific world-view is actually 
5 There are strong resonances between this approach to the notion of illness and that 
developed (from within a different philosophical tradition) by Fulford in his Moral 7-heory and 
Medical practice (19 8 9). 
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pnmary. When it comes to the world of medicine, traditional approaches attempt to explain illness 
by 'working up' to 'subj ective' human reality fi7om the 'objective' descriptions of physics, chemistry 
biology and (more recently) computer science. The 'phenomenological' account of illness, 
developed by Heidegger and Boss, attempts to reverse the direction of understanding, moving 
from lived human 'bodyhood' and being-in-the-world to an understanding of how certain 
phenomena limit the potential of this world. 
In the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger also developed a critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. He 
accused Freud of trying to force human being into a causal framework whose phenomena could 
be explained in terms of unconscious instincts and forces. Such unconscious elements were 
theoretical constructs, of which we could have no direct experience. The enterprise of 
phenomenology was very much to move in the opposite direction : to stick with, and never 
abandon,, the phenomenon one sought to understand. He says- 
"In the entire construct of Freud's libido theory ... 
is there ever any room for'man' 
(or human existence)?.... Instinct ý[Trieb] ... 
is always an attempt at explanation. 
However, the primary issue is never to provide an explanation, but rather to 
remain attentive to the phenomenon one seeks to explain - to what it is and how 
it is" (Heidegger, quoted in Dallmayr, 1991, p. 214). 
Attempts to explain human reality and behaviour through theories of instinct are always 
misconceived, because the human world can never be grasped through such a causal idiom. 
Heidegger also criticises Freud's theory of repression. In this it is postulated that certain wishes, 
and other experiences, are so potentiaRy distressing that they are banished from consciousness and 
stored instead in the unconscious. This theory is one of the fundamental cornerstones of 
psychoanalysis and reckoned by Freud and his followers to be one of his greatest 'discoveries'. The 
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theory of repression has been widely used to explain such things as neurotic symptoms, the 
parapraxes, jokes and dreams. For Heidegger, this approach is mechanical and treats human 
reality on an ontic level, i. e. treats it as an object, among others in the world. If we accept that 
human being is ontological, according to Heidegger, then we need an approach which does justice 
to this fact. In the Zollikon Seminars he attempted to develop such an approach. in the last 
chapter we saw how Heidegger discussed human reality as a Lichtung, a clearing in which the 
world is brought to fight. In place of repression, he proposed the 'intertwining of concealment and 
unconcealment, of clearing and veiling'. Dallmayr quotes him as follows: 
""Freud's notion of repression, " we read, "has to do with the hiding or stashing 
away of an idea or representation [Vorstellung]. " By contrast, concealment 
(Verbergung) is "not the antithesis to consciousness, but rather belongs to the 
clearing -a clearing which Freud did not grasp" (Dallmayr, 1991, p. 215). 
Boss uses an example of aparapraxis'to, illustrate the difference between the Freudian notion of 
repression and what is involved in the Heideggarian approach. A parapraxis involves some error 
in our everyday functioning. While most people regard such things as slips of the tongue and the 
forgetting of names as insignificant, for Freud these constituted the 'psychopathology of everyday 
life'. They come about because repressed desires seek to 'escape' from the unconscious mind, or 
because an unconscious wish blocks a consciously planned course of action. For example if 
someone makes a slip of the tongue, this is interpreted by the psychoanalyst as meaning that 
he/she was unconsciously resisting what he/she consciously intended to say. (Fenichel, 1946, p. 
312). Boss says that if, after spending an evening with a friend, he does not remember to take his 
umbrella, most people would say that he forgot it. However a psychoanalyst might interpret this 
as being caused by an unconscious wish to return to see the friend again, soon. The opportunity 
to do so has been created by the excuse to return for the umbrella. Boss says that this explanation 
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is unconvincing as it makes no effort at understanding the forgetting of the umbrella as 
'forgetting'. Instead it has made use of a hypothetical assumption which has nothing to do with 
the'phenomenon under investigation'. A better account would involve staying with the notion of 
forgetting. Boss says that if this is taken to mean that the object is 'lost to the collection of objects 
in my world' then this is obviously not true. Boss still knows that he has an umbrella and knows 
what it looks like. The umbrella is still present in his world, although because he is engrossed in 
conversation with his fiiend, its presence becomes 'unthematic'. He says: 
"My forgetting cannot be caused by the repression into an unconscious of my 
conception of the umbrella. In order to force something inward, I would need to 
have it in my grasp. Yet it is clear that while I am taking leave of my friend, I am 
with him, not with my umbrella. Thus I cannot possibly be occupied with a desire 
to forget it so I may visit him again. Such desire cannot be operating at that 
moment,, consciously or unconsciously, because my whole being is occupied with 
my friend and with the topic of the evening's conversation. Here, forgetting is 
nothing more than the changing of a phenomenon's immediate, thematically 
considered presence in a human realm of openness to its nonimmediate and 
unthematic presence somewhere in the world" (Boss, 1979, p. 117). 
Inthisway, ideas, thoughts and desires maybe 'neglected' or'concealed' (Heidegger's term) or 
'unthemematically present' (Boss's term) but they are never 'put somewhere else'. There is, for the 
phenomenologist, an inherent contradiction in the very notion of a conscious-unconscious split. 
Boss quotes Kohli-Kunz on this subject. She argues that the concept of repression is really about 
self-deception. This is analogous to my deception of someone else. When I tell someone else a 
lieý I am aware of the truth, they remain unaware. When deceiver and deceived are, in fact, two 
different people there is no problem. When this is applied to one person there is a logical 
difficulty: 
"In order to create the duality that was logically necessary to accommodate 
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repression as self-deception, Freud took the integral selfhood of human existence, 
objectified it as a psychic apparatus, and split it into two pieces, the consciousness 
and the unconscious" 
Freud himself wrote : 
"The term 'unconscious' refers to any psychic process whose existence we are 
forced to assume on the evidence of its outward effects but of which we know 
nothing directly. We stand in the same relation to this as to some psychic process 
in another person, except that here it is one of our own" 
If this is the case, and conscious and unconscious are as one person is to another, then there must 
be some 'agent' acting to decide which repressed material will be allowed to become conscious. 
Freud calls this agent the'censor'. But this must have the ability to review, deliberate and decide. 
In other words , it must be conscious, in some way. We end up with a censor which is an 
'unconscious consciousness'. Kohli-Kunz argues that the only way out is to reject Freud's 
Teification of human being-in-the-world' and his 'compartmentalization' of the psyche. While she 
SO opts to use the word 'repression', this is clearly not Freudian repression but something very 
similar to the Heidegger/Boss approach. She says that, in the phenomenological outlook, Dasein 
is'integral, indivisible being-in-the-world', and in this 'repression' becomes a. 
11 
... very specific mode of 
human conduct towards something that is encountered, 
i. e., a refusal to admit the address and urgent appeal of encountered beings, a 
looking away from them, a fleeing from them. This is flight from the concrete 
beings actually perceived in a world. ... Repression, then, 
is anything but a 
mechanical shuttling of representation between compartments of a psyche. In 
repression, what is repressed is not set aside. Rather, it becomes increasingly 
obtrusive. The urgency of the appeal of what the closed and narrowed being-in- 
the-world cannot admit becomes more and more intense" (KoWi-Kunz, quoted in 
Boss, 1979, pgs 246-247). 
Thus for Heidegger, and those phenomenologically-orientated psychiatrists who followed him, 
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Freud's work represented a continuation of the Cartesian project. Mental substance, split off from 
bodily substance, was to be investigated in the same mechanical idiom used by physical science, 
Heidegger spoke about the'fatal distinction between conscious and unconscious' (see Richardson, 
1993, p. 54). However Freud was not the only psychiatrist criticised in the course of the Zollikon 
Seminars. Heidegger also made a number of negative assertions about the form of 
phenomenology and 'psychiatric daseinanalysis' being developed by Ludwig Binswanger. 
Like Boss, Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist who had studied with Eugen Bleuler and Carl 
Jung, who introduced him to Freud in 1907. In 1911, Binswanger became the chief medical 
director at Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen. Although he remained a friend of Freud's until 
the latter's death in 1939, in the 1920s and 30s he gradually moved away from a Freudian 
perspective and, under the influence of Husserl and Heidegger, developed an existentialist 
approach. Although Binswanger called his work 'daseinanalysis' and cited Heidegger as his main 
philosophical influence, in the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger claimed that Binswanger had 
sefiously nusunderstood much of his work. Heidegger accuses Binswanger of paying insufficient 
regard to the ontological-ontic difference. Because of this there is a tendency for him to 
tnisunderstand the fundamental nature of Dasein as a'clearing'. Instead Dasein becomes a'subject', 
or an 'ego', in either case a'thing' amongst other things. For Heidegger, this is Cartesianism. Any 
analysis of Dasein, worthy of the name, must start with Dasein's ontological dimension, its relation 
to being-ness as a whole'. This does not happen in Binswanger's "psychiatric daseinanalysis". 
Heidegger says: 
Binswanger, himself, called this a'productive n-ýisunderstandingl. 
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"So little can this relation to being-ness be omitted from the leading and all- 
important determination of Dasein that by overlooking precisely tl-ýs relation [as 
happens in the "psychiatric daseinanalysis"] we are prevented from ever thinking 
adequately of Dasein as Dasein. The understanding-of-Being is not a 
determination relevant only to the thematic of fundamental ontology but is the 
fundamental determination of Dasein as such. An Analysis of Dasein therefore that 
omits this relation to Being-ness as such which is essential in the understanding-of- 
Being is not an Analysis of Dasein " (Heidegger, 1988, p. 85). 
Heidegger argues that Binswanger completely misunderstands the notion of care (Sorge) as 
developed in Being and Time. For Heidegger, Dasein is always in a relationship of care with its 
world. It is only because such care is a fundamental part of the existential make-up of Dasein, that 
we five in a world which has significance for us. Care thus refers, in Being and Time, to the way 
that Dasein is actually structured. It should not be regarded as just one psychological disposition 
among others. Heidegger remarks that Binswanger had selected the notion of 'being-in-the- 
world' but had interpreted it in an empirical-contextual sense. This is an important observation 
because Binswanger says that his whole approach is based on the notion of being-in-the-world. 
In the next chapter I shall present Heidegger's approach to anxiety and attempt to highlight an 
ontological dimension to the question of trauma. I will conclude this section by mentioning 
Heidegger's brief remarks about 'stress' in the Zollikon Seminars. These are of interest, given our 
concern with trauma and posttraurnatic stress disorder (PTSD) in this thesis. Commenting on a 
psychiatric report dealing with the subject, he contrasts his approach to that of behaviourism 
which conceptualises stress as a stimulus, impacting upon the human being from outside. Instead 
Heidegger conceives of stress as something which "lays claim" to Dasein's care (Beanspruchung). 
This claim cannot be understood in terms of a stimulus-response but only in terms of a situated 
being-in-the-world. Demands on Dasein come about because of its basic 'thrownness' in the world. 
He says: 
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"Only on the basis of the correlation of throwness and understanding via language 
can Dasein be addressed by beings; the possibility of such an address, in turn, is 
the condition of the possibility of a demand or claim - whether this takes the form 
of stress or of relief from stress" (Heidegger, quoted in Dallmayr, 199 1, p. 222). 
Boss also writes about stress and notes the ambiguity involved in any event or experience. One 
circumstance wifl be a source of stress for one person, not for another. This, he notes, is a cause 
of some frustration for those using a natural science approach. Science tries to render every 
'object' of study into a form whereby it can be 'calculated' in some way. He says : 
If 
... not out of regard for the object of study itself, immense effort is expended in 
the natural sciences, including medicine, to get rid of the inherent ambiguity of 
phenomena and reduce them to a condition of unambiguous calculability" (Boss, 
1979, p. 207). 
However, he observes, that there is simply no such thing as an unambiguous or 'self-contained' 
stimulus. Thus for the phenomenologist, stress exists for human beings because human being is 
'openness' to the world and thus can be the object of demands from that world. Many of these 
demands are experienced as ambiguous. This analysis resonates with the analysis of case material 
presented at the end of chapter five. We saw there that, in reality, no event can be objectively 
described as traumatic. The way in which any event is experienced will always depend on the 
context and the individual history of the person involved. We noted that the DSM III of 1980 had 
assumed that certain events could be inherently traumatic, Clinical experience led to the 
abandonment of this assumption in later versions of the DSM (see also chapter three). 
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7.3 DASEINANALYSIS 
We have noted, above, the gap between Heidegger and Binswanger. In this section I shall briefly 
describe the essential aspects of the fonn of daseinanalysis developed by Boss and his colleagues. 
Boss maintains that there are two aspects to daseinanalysis. First there is daseinanalysis as 
ontology. This incorporates a way of understanding human reality which challenges traditional 
medical, psychiatric and philosophical accounts of human being. This aspect is closely based on 
the writings of Heidegger, and in particular on Being and Time. I have introduced some of the 
major themes of this understanding in the last chapter and in the section above. In this section I 
wish to concentrate on the second aspect : daseinanalysis as a specific form of psychotherapy. 
Boss says that it involves an approach to therapy : 
" which is concerned with freeing individuals to fulfill their own-most possibilities 
for being with things and with other human beings. Although all serious 
psychotherapies are concerned with this very thing, with liberating individuals 
from the suffering and constriction which prevents them from being themselves, 
only daseinanalysis has a philosophical understanding which comprehends this as 
the goal and purpose in the first place" (Boss, 1988, b, p. 62). 
While Boss and his followers were quite clear that their approach was very different to other 
forms of psychotherapy, they have not sought to establish an 'official' account of what this 
approach involves in practice. Their assumption seems to be that if the therapist can properly 
grasp the philosophy involved, then the therapeutic techniques follow on from this. Indeed, while 
Boss was deeply critical of Freud's theory, there is no evidence that he had any great misgivings 
about his (Freud's) therapeutic techniques. In his book Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis 
(published originaffY in 1957), Boss wrote that he remained impressed with the power of "Freud's 
unsurpassed practical recommendations" (Boss, 1963, p. 285). Indeed, Boss saw his project as 
involving an attempt to : 
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"restore the original meaning of Freud's actual, immediate, concrete and most 
brilliant observations" (Boss, 1963, p. 59). 
One of Boss's followers was Gion Condrau. He became Director of the training institution 
founded by Boss in Zu6ch -. the Daseinanalytic Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics. 
In a seminar published in 1988, Condrau indicated that in daseinanalysis patients lie on a couch, 
as in conventional psychoanalysis. They are also invited to 'free associate'. This is 'the basic 
ground rule' of psychoanalysis, introduced by Freud. The patient is instructed to say anything 
which comes into his/her mind. Condrau says that whereas in Freudian analysis this technique is 
used in order to allow repressed wishes and other material to emerge from the patient's 
unconscious , in 
daseinanalysis it is used in order 'to give the patient as much freedom as possible' 
(Condrau, 198 8, p. 118). Similarly, daseinanalysis makes use of the other Freudian therapeutic 
technique - dream interpretation. Boss actuafly wrote two books on dream interpretation. The first 
was published in 1953. This was translated into English and published in 1958 as The Analysis 
ofDreams. In this Boss set out to : 
"pave the way for the direct study of the dream phenomenon itself, by removing 
all the disguises and schemata of mental constructs of contemporary dream 
theories" (Boss, 1958, p. 10). 
While he again gives credit to Freud for drawing attention to the meaningful nature of dreams he 
goes on to criticise him for his 'scientific' and 'objective' account. He is particularly critical of 
Freud's positing of the manifest dream as a secondary phenomenon and his turn instead to the 
latent, or hidden., meaning of the dream as the primary target of interpretation. For Boss, the 
manifest dream is what should be approached in therapy. In addition it should not be presumed 
that the elements of the manifest dream 'stand' for or symbolise something else. f1is approach is 
181 
to'StaY with the phenomena! which are presented in the reported dream. In the seminar mentioned 
above, Gion Condrau gives an example of a dream which was discussed at a meeting of analysts 
from different schools. The dream was one which had been reported by a young woman, to one 
of the participants. The woman had dreamt that, while sleeping one night, the window in her room 
flew open and a piece of wood was hurled into the room. She dreamt that she 'woke up' and found 
the wood on the floor. This then became a snake which proceeded to slide underneath the 
woman's bed clothes. At this point she 'actually' awoke in a state of fear. Condrau reports that for 
the Freudians the snake represented "Phallic anxiety", whereas for the Jungians the snake was a 
symbol of unconscious spiritual forces. For Jung, himself, the snake was always a symbol of 
individuation. In the Jungian framework this would be interpreted as an 'archtypical' dream 
indicating that the dreamer was in an important phase of personal growth. Condrau says: 
"Well, as daseinanalysts, we would first argue that this dream snake is not a 
symbol at all. A snake is a snake, even in the dream". 
However this does not mean that nothing further can be said about the dream: 
"A snake is an animal, an instinct-bound living creature; and we would say that the 
person who dreamt this sees something, recognizes something, is related to 
something about this kind of creaturefiness. Also, we see that something opens up 
to this dreamer in the dream, not only did the window open, but the dreamer 
"opened, " that is, she woke up, she opened up into waking while still dreaming. 
Just the fact that she sleeps and then wakes up in the dream, means that she is 
seeing something, opening up to something, perhaps for the first time" (Condrau, 
1988, p. 121). 
Nineteen years after his first book on dream analysis, Boss published another work on the subject: 
I dreamt last night.. In this he gives 115 pages of dream analyses and again exhorts the reader 
to stay with the manifest dream and not postulate unconscious forces which give rise to the 
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content. Rather, the dream is understood an an experience of concentrated attention and emotion. 
In this experience, one's relationships to other people and to the things of the world are laid open, 
sometimes in 'uncomfortable closeness'. 
A very good example of the daseinanalytic approach to dream interpretation is provided by the 
American therapist Erik Craig (1988, b). He takes Freud's famous'dream of Irma's injection'which 
is the central dream in The Interpretation of Dreams, and subjects it to the daseinanalytic 
approach. By concentrating on the actual elements of the reported dream Craig is able to develop 
an interesting (and for me convincing! ) account of Freud's 'existential' situation at the time of the 
dream (the summer of 1895). However, I do not wish to focus on Craig's reading of the Irma 
dream as such. Instead I want to point to his account of 'anticipatory care' which is said to be 
characteristic of the daseinanalytic approach to therapy. To grasp the meaning of this concept will 
require a return to the text of Being and Time. 
In Being and Time Heidegger spoke about the nature of Dasein's 'Being-with' others as 
Ffirsorge. The translators of the work note that there is no good English language translation but 
they opt for the word 'solicitude'. They remark that although this is more literally translated as 
'caring-for' 
, this : 
"... has the connotation of 'being fond of, which we do not want here; 'personal 
care' suggests personal hygiene; 'personal concern' suggests one's personal 
business or affairs. Tiirsorge' is rather the kind of care which we find in 'prenatal 
care' or taking care of the children' or even the kind of care which is administered 
by welfare agencies" (Macquarrie and Robinson, footnote in Heidegger, 1962, p. 
157). 
Heidegger goes on to point out that, in a negative direction, solicitude can mean something 
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approaching, but never in fact fully equating, indifference. However, it can also be a 'positive' 
encountering of others. There are two 'extreme possibilities' of such positive solicitude. On the 
one hand we can 'intervene' in someone's life ( einspringende Ffirsorge). Solicitude can, as it 
were: 
"... take away'care'from the Other and put itself in his position in concern : it can 
leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which 
he is to concern himself The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he 
steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either 
take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it 
completely. In such solicitude the Other can become dominated and dependent, 
even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 158). 
The Gen-nan word einspringen is often used in situations where one person 'steps in' for another. 
It has the connotation of taking over responsibility for the other person's life and actions. Craig 
suggests that it is the form of care often seen in medicine and even in therapy. On the other hand, 
solicitude can mean a way of relating to the other in which one : 
does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him [ihm 
vorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away 
his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. 
This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the 
existence of the Other, not to a "what" with which he is concerned; it helps the 
Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become ftee for it" 
(Heidegger, 1962, pgs 158-159). 
Heidegger says that, for the most part in everyday-life, we relate to one another in a way that is 
a mixture of these two extremes: 
"Everyday Being-with-another maintains itself between the two extremes of 
positive solicitude - that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth 
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and liberates [vorspringend-befreiend]. It brings numerous mixed forms to 
maturity... " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 159). 
Craig (following Boss) argues that this second type of solicitude, this form of "anticipatory care" 
was exactly what Freud was seeking to achieve in the practice of psychoanalysis. However his 
orientation towards medical science often pulled him in the other direction, and undermined this. 
Craig maintains that the manifest content of the dream of Irma's injection is centred on a tension 
between these two forms of care. Initially, in the 'dream plot', the Freud character is in a mood 
of openness and receptivity, later, with the appearance of Irma, his persona becomes medical, 
analytic and intrusive, more concerned about the views of his peers than about Irma's own account 
of herself. Craig gives the following interpretation, based on his phenomenological interpretation 
of the dream- 
"First we must remember that Freud's sudden "retreat" to medicine and biology 
was in part an act of professional conscientiousness, a shouldering of the models 
and attitudes of physicianly care which he had been taught and in which he so 
deeply believed. We must also remember, however, that at this very juncture of 
his life, Freud was in the midst of a revolutionary paradigmatic change and 
consequently was on his way to seeing that there was more to this physicianly care 
than the giving and receiving of "solutions" and "injections". Increasingly he was 
becoming aware of the significance of the uniquely human and "meaning-full" 
dimensions of psychological care including especially the significance of the human 
relationship between doctors and patients" (Craig, 1988, b, p. 213). 
At numerous points in his work Boss argues that Heidegger's description of a non-donlInating 
form of solicitude is actually the ideal mode of care for the psychotherapist. He suggests that this 
is, in fact, what Freud recommended as "the best possible therapeutic attitude" (Boss, 1963, p. 
74). 
7.4. THE LIMITATIONS OF DASEINANALYSIS 
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While my presentation of the literature on daseinanalysis has been far from comprehensive, it does 
emerge that this form of therapy does not present or develop any new techniques of its own. 
Daseinanalysis is revealed, in the writings of Boss and his followers, to be a sort of 
'philosophically sophisticated psychoanalysis'. Patients come, on an individual basis, to see a 
therapist. They he on the couch, free associate and offer dreams for interpretation. The therapist 
adopts a position of'anticipatory care' and helps the patient face the challenges of his/her life. As 
mentioned above, its goal is an expansion of individual freedom. In a number of places, Boss 
ar, glu-es that the most important question that the therapist can ask his/her patient is not "why? ", 
but "why not? ". While theoretically, Boss, with the help of Heidegger, put considerable 'distance' 
between himself and Freud, practically, in the therapeutic arena there is not a great deal of 
difference between the two. Eric Craig, himself, says: 
"Beyond the radical phenomenological rethinking of the essentials of 
psychotherapy, including its unique structure and meaning as well as its most 
ubiquitous and characteristic phenomena, daseinanalysis has added little that is 
novel to the actual conduct and practice of the craft" (Craig, 1988a, p. 16). 
One has the sense of being promised much more. The Heideggarian understanding of human 
reality is so profoundly different to the philosophical tradition which underscores Freudian 
psychoanalysis that one expects the implications for psychiatry to be equally profound. Instead 
we are guided down a path which leads into the familar territory of individual psychtherapy. It 
must be said of Boss that in an afterword. to his major work Existential Foundations ofMedicine 
andPsychology he spoke briefly about the "Foundations of a Da-sein-based Social Psychology 
and Social Preventive Medicine in Modern Industrial Society". In this piece he echoes 
Heidegger's reflections about the nature of technological civilization (which I shall examine in a 
leter chapter). However, Boss's thoughts are very sketchy and his proposals are weak. Essentially 
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he seems to argue that in modern industrial society there is more time for recreation than ever 
before, and because this is the only time in which human beings have the potential to relate to one 
another outside the world of capitalist alienation, recreation is an area worthy of the interest of 
daseinanalytical psychologists and psychiatrists. More guidance than this we simply do not get. 
Technological rationality is so pervasive that there appears to be little hope that we can take steps 
to move beyond. In fact, those of us who live in the Western world can really only'wait': 
"We may assume that the break through the technological framework of modern 
industrial society into a genuine freedom in relation to this technology will not be 




is shaped always, continually, and decisively by 
a traditional relationship with the world that is astonishingly close to the vision of 
European phenomenology just now unfolding" (Boss, 1979, p. 296). 
It would appear that Boss's background as a psychiatrist influenced strongly by psychoanalysis 
led him to adapt Heidegger's thought to the type of human encounter set up by psychoanalysis. 
Daseinanalysis involves a rethinking of psychoanalysis rather than an opening up of a genuinely 
alternative approach within psychiatry. 
Given the Heideggarian insights about the nature of Dasein's being-in-the-world and about the 
importance of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of its world one could have expected that 
a psychiatry based on Heidegger's thought would have moved in a direction away from individual 
psychotherapeutics and more towards a focus on the relationship between mental illness and the 
social and cultural world. While I have great sympathy with Boss's striking respect for the 
cultures of India, China and Japan, the above comments are obviously inadequate in terms of 
helping the development of a form of social psychiatry which is not ultimately grounded in a 
Cartesian phflosophy. As mentioned in a footnote at the beginning of this chapter, one of my aims 
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in this thesis is to explore how Heideggerian ideas can help us to substantially rethink the whole 
world of distress, madness, psychiatry and healing. We discussed the emergence of a'new cross- 
cultural psychiatry'in a previous chapter. One could imagine a fruitful encounter of this approach 
in psychiatry and the philosophy of Heidegger. My work on trauma will hopefully stand as an 
example of this. 
7.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter I reviewed the coflaboration between Heidegger and the psychiatrist Medard Boss 
in the years after World War Two. I discussed their approach to 'bodyhood', the phenomenology 
of illness and their critique of Freudian theory. I noted Heidegger's objections to the form of 
'daseinanalysis' developed by Binswanger. I gave an account of Boss's form of daseinanalysis 
which is essentially a form of psychoanalysis influenced by Heideggerian thought. At the end of 
the chapter I expressed my 'dissappointment' with this work. 
In the next chapter I shall examine Heidegger's understanding of anxiety and connect this with 
the current discourse on trauma. This will then allow me to present an alternative to current 
cognitivist accounts of the 'loss of meaning' often described after trauma. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ONTOLOGY. ANXIETY AND TRAUNM 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter siX I discussed Heidegger's approach to the reality of human being. I attempted to 
show how this approach differed from the traditional framework of psychology and in particular 
from the cognitivist orientation which, we have seen, dominates current thinking in the area of 
trauma. Heidegger offers us an approach which insists on the embedded nature of human reality, 
a reality in which the cultural and temporal are not merely additional factors which can be added 
to an independent psychology but are in fact a priori dimensions of that reality. I argued that 
Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy offers substantial support for a move towards a framework 
which gives due regard to questions of context. 
In this chapter I wish to use Heidegger's thought to explore another dimension of the issue of 
trauma. This concerns the way in which trauma is said to destabilise the meaningfulness of the 
individual's world. Guided by the ontological/ontic difference explored in chapter six, I want to 
suggest that there is an ontological dimension to trauma which has only received an ontic type 
of exploration up to now. Before addressing the issue directly I will need to introduce 
Heideggees account of anxiety as a loss of meaningfulness. I shall begin by examining Heidegger's 
approach to the domain of human moods in general. I will then look specifically at his 
understanding of anxiety. Following this, I will discuss the work of the American psychologist 
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and what she calls a "new psychology of trauma". I will suggest that there 
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are strong resonances between Janoff-Bulman's description of "shattered assumptions" after 
trauma and Heidegger's description of anxiety. I will then compare and contrast the cognitive and 
the hermeneutic approach to the question of loss of meaning. 
8.2 BEIDEGGER'S ENVESTIGATION OF AFFECT AND MOOD 
8.2.1 The structure of Being-in 
Being and Time is essentially an analysis of the nature of Dasein's being-in-the-world. As Dasein, 
as an entity, is always ontological, he calls his exploration of Dasein a "fundamental ontology" 
(p. 170). Because this exploration does not take for granted the usual starting point of 
psychology, i. e. a subjective realm relating to an outside objective world, his account of human 
experience is radically different fi7om traditional accounts. Thus his examination of such things as 
our sense of self, moods, cognitions and death is of a very different nature from those found in 
mainstream psychology. 
TT- 
He says that while being-in-the-world is a "unitary phenomenon" (p. 78) this does not prevent it 
from being analysed in terms of the "several constitutive items in its structure" (p. 78). First, he 
analyses what it is to be "in-the-world" and defines his notion of "worldhood". Secondly he looks 
at the. 
"entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. Here 
we are seeking that which one inquires into when one asks the question "Who? " 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 79). 
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Thirdly, in chapter five, he analyses the notion of being-in (In-sein). Heidegger points out that 
Dasein's being-in cannot be thought of as one entity being in another, as is the case when we say, 
for example, the water is in the glass. Being-in is more in the nature of a "clearing", what 
Heidegger terms a Lichtung (see chapter sixf 
Thus Dasein is always orientated in one way or another. Being-in is never a neutral, unaffected, 
uninvolved illumination, but is, as it were, focused in a particular way. The two constitutive 
ways of Being-in, of being the "there", are understanding (Verstehen) and "state-of-mind" 
(Befindlichkeit). These are not present as two distinct elements but are always experienced in 
a unitary way and together become manifest in speech (Rede). Thus, according to Heidegger, 
human being is always situated, and as such always already has a position of understanding and 
is always in some way in a "state-of-mind". These constitutive aspects of being-in are 
equiprimordial. As we are concerned with Heidegger's concept of Angst which is a "state-of- 
nund" we shall proceed by first giving an account of his concept of Befindlichkeit. 
8.2.2 Befindlichkeit 
'Heidegger's notion of Dasein as a clearing has the sense of things in the world showing 
up through the illumination provided by Dasein. The word Lichtung usually refers to a clearing 
in the woods, according to Macquarrie and Robinson, the translators of Being and Time and the 
noun Licht also means light. Heidegger says: 
" Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is 
present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very 
nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not 
factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. 
Dasein is its disclosedness. " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 171). 
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There is considerable dispute with regard to the translation of the term Befindlichkeit into English. 
Macquarrie and Robinson indicate that the literal translation would be something like: "the state 
in which one may be found". They point out the connection with the common German expression 
"Wie befinden Sie sich? " which literally means, "How are you? " or, "How are you feeling? ". They 
reluctantly use the expression "state-of-mind", while pointing out its limitations. However 
Dreyfus argues that this is completely unacceptable. He says: 
"To translate this term we certainly cannot use the translators' term, "state-of- 
mind", which suggests, at least to philosophers, a mental state, a determinate 
condition of an isolable,, occurrent subject. Heidegger is at pains to show that 
the sense we have of how things are going is precisely not a private mental state" 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 168). 
What we need., according to Dreyfus, is an English word which conveys a sense of "being found 
in a situation where things and options already matter". He opts for the word "affectedness". 
McCall also condemns Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, suggesting that we use something 
like "the sense of one's actual situation". Befindlichkeit refers, he says, to an "orienting attitude 
of the individual toward his actual situation" (McCall, 1983, pgs 77-78). This seems too 
personalistic and open to the same objection raised by Dreyfus. Gendlin discusses the term 
Befindlichkeit at some length and argues that in grappling with this concept we go to the "core" 
of Heidegger's philosophy. According to Gendlin : 
" "Sich befinden" (finding oneselo ... 
has three allusions: The reflexivity of finding 
oneself, feeling; and being situated. All three are caught in the ordinary phrase, 
"How are you? ". That refers to how you feel but also to how things are going for 
you and what sort of situation you find yourself' (Gendlin, 1988 , p. 44). 
He says that Heidegger's coinage of the term Befindlichkeit is "clumsy" and there is simply no 
English language equivalent which transrnits the sense of "how-you-are-ness". I intend to use the 
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translator's term, "state-of-mind" or the original "Befindlichkeit" in the following discussion but 
I am aware of the limitations of this approach. In introducing this concept Heidegger is clearly 
referring to something like the familiar concept of "mood" or "feeling" or even the term used in 
clinical psychiatry: "affect". However, his point is that behind these everyday notions there also 
lies an ontological dimension: 
"What we indicate ontologically by the term "state-of-n-ýnd" is ontically the most 
familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 172)2. 
Being in a state-of-mind is one of the fundamental ways that Dasein is aware of its being-in-the- 
world. Thus state-of-mind is one of the ways in which Dasein discloses being. The implication 
is that state-of-mind, or its everyday mode, 'mood', should not be thought of as something internal 
and mentalistic. There is always a background or public dimension- 
"A mood assails us. It comes neither from "outside" nor from "inside", but arises 
out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being... 
Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not in 
itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts 
its mark on Things and persons" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 176). 
Gendlin argues: 
"Whereas feeling is usually thought of as something inward, Heidegger's concept 
refers to something both inward and outward, but before a split between inside 
and outside has been made. 
2 While I am of the opinion that the term 'attunement' come closest to giving the sort of 
connotation meant by the original German word, for the sake of simplicity I shall continue to use 
the translators' -- 'state-of-mind'. 
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We are always situated, in situations, in the world, in a context, living in a certain 
way with others, trying to achieve this and that. " (Gendlin, 1988, p. 44). 
The point is that our usual understanding of mood or feeling as something private and internal is 
false to the true nature of our experience. Our moods have a social dimension and, as we shall 
see in the next chapter., are always culturally embedded, just as our understandings of the world 
are. Only in the context of our background cultural orientation to feeling can we have individual 
feeling and mood'. 
8.3 ANXIETY 
Heidegger follows his discussion of Befindlichkeit by presenting an analysis of fear as a "mode 
of state-of-mind". He says that there are three ways in which we can consider the phenomenon 
of fear- 
That in the face of which we are afraid. the "fearsome" 
threatens us and brings about the state of fear. 
This is the thing in the world which 
2) Fearing as such. This is the actual mood which allows something to show up as being a 
threat. Fear is thus something which discloses the world to us. It is a good example of a mode 
of state-of-mind which is one of the equiprimordial aspects of being-in , one way 
in which Dasein 
This conclusion has also emerged from an empirical, anthropological literature which has 
been alluded to above in chapter five, section 5.3. 
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as being-in Nllun-ýinates" the world: 
"We do not first ascertain a future evil (malum futurum) and then fear it. But 
neither does fearing first take note of what is drawing close; it discovers it 
beforehand in its fearsomeness. And in fearing, fear can then look at the fearsome 
explicitly, and "make it clear" to itself Circumspection sees the fearsome because 
it has fear as its state-of-mind. Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in- 
the-world in a state-of-mind (we call this possibility "fearfulness" 
("Furchtsamkeit")), has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something 
like the fearsome may come close. " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 180). 
3) That which fear fears about, Dasein itself, is what is threatened in situations of fear. This can 
relate to things other than simply parts of one's body. Dasein can be threatened by attacks on its 
projects. Fear can be with regard to the things that Dasein is concerned with and fear can be in 
the form of "fearing for" when one is afraid on another's behalf 
Based on this analysis of fear we can say that, according to Heidegger's account, the structure of 
moods consists of a) the before-what of moods, b) the mood itself and c) the about-what of 
moods (Smith, 1981, p. 221). Armed with this structure Heidegger is able to approach the 
question of anxiety'. 
Heidegger discusses anxiety at some length in Being and Time. This makes sense if we remember 
that the overall aim of this work is to do "fundamental ontology", to use an analysis of Dasein to 
open up the question of being in a new way. In writing about anxiety Heidegger is not just 
presenting us with an example of a particular state-of-mind. I have already noted Heidegger's use 
'Like many other terms used by Heidegger there has been dispute about the proper 
translation of the German word "Angst" into English. The translators of Being and Time use the 
word anxiety and this appears to be used by most commentators. However the word "dread" is 
also used commonly. This was the word used to translate "Angst" in the work of Kierkegaard. 
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of the terrn Sorge (care). This represents the ontological structure of Daseln. This term should not 
be taken to have the English language connotations of love or affection. In Being and Time it 
indicates the fact that Dasein is always occupied, in some way, with the entities it encounters in 
the world. It is concerned about the ready-to-hand and the present-at -hand entities in its world 
and is solicitous (see last chapter) about the other human beings it meets. As being-in-the-world, 
Dasem sunply cannot avoid being involved with and dealing with that world. Heidegger explores 
the existential phenomenon of anxiety because it reveals, as nothing else can, this 'care- structure' 
of Dasem. Just as a breakdown in the workings of a piece of equipment can reveal the nature of 
the equipment and how it actually functions, in analysing anxiety Heidegger is attempting to reveal 
the nature of Dasein and its world. While anxiety should not be regarded as any kind of 
breakdown (see below), it is the case that in the state-of-mind of anxiety Dasein is brought to a 
halt and forced to examine its true situation as being-in-the-world. For the most part Dasein 
exists not as a free entity facing its own destiny and its own possibilities but rather as one in the 
midst of the many, in the nudst of the "They" (Das Man), taking its directions from the crowd. 
The experience of anxiety, however, causes Dasein to feel dislocated with regard to Das Man 
and thus precipitates a fundamental examination of its own predicament. Thus in Being and Time 
and in the essay, What is Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1993), anxiety is presented not simply as an 
unpleasant mood but as state-of-mind which can serve the function of revealing to Dasein its true 
predicament. 
Heidegger begins by contrasting anxiety and fear and makes the point that the two are often 
thought of as referring to the same thing: 
11 We are not entirely unprepared for the analysis of anxiety. Of course it still 
196 
remains obscure how this is connected ontologically with fear. Obviously these are 
kindred phenomena. This is betokened by the fact that for the most part they have 
not been distinguished from one another : that which is fear, gets designated as 
"anxiety" 
, while that which has the character of anxiety, gets called "fear" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 230). 
However, on the basis of his analysis of fear Heidegger is able convincingly to assert a difference. 
Most crucially is the question of what it is that anxiety is anxious about. As fear relates to the 
fearsome, what is it that anxiety is about? 
"What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious (sich dngstet) and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face 
of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. " (Heidegger, 1962, 
pgs. 23 0-23 1). 
"That in theface of which one has anxiety (das Wovor der Angst) is Being-in-the- 
world as such" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 23 0) 
In fear Dasein is threatened by some entity in the world. In anxiety it is the question of being itself 
which has become threaterung. It is the question of how anything makes sense at all. For what 
happens in anxiety is that Dasein comes face to face with a terrifying feeling that the background 
connections which make sense of and order the entities of the world have receded. Anxiety is 
anxious because of an absence, not a presence. 
"That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what 
threatens is nowhere. 
... 
The world has the character of completely lacking significance" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 23 1). 
Heidegger's separation of the mood of anxiety from that of fear is uncontentious and echoed by 
many writers on the subject. For example, Kurt Goldstein speaks about anxiety as attacking us 
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'from the rear'. Writing in the late 1930s Goldstein says that while in the situation of fear we are 
aware of ourselves and well aware of the object of our fear- 
"Does not anxiety consist intrinsically of that inability to know from whence the 
danger threatens? " (Goldstein, 1939, p. 292). 
What Heidegger describes as anxiety is a profound sense of the constructed nature of the world 
and the connections of the entities within it. In anxiety we look at the order of the world as if 
from outside. The meanings, values, roles of our lives appear as devoid of any ultimate grounding, 
as if the playing board in a game of chess was taken away : the pieces are still there but their 
relatedness has disappeared. Their positions in relation to one another become arbitrary and lack 
significance; moving them becomes meaningless. In anxiety, the world,, in the sense of a 
structured whole, withdraws from us. The entities within the world -. the people, the places, the 
things, the projects are still there in situ as before, but their sense has vanished and with it any 
orientation towards a future or any sense of purpose. Everything appears strange and 
disconnected. Heidegger uses the term " Unheimlich" which is usually translated as "uncanny" 
but means more literally, "unhomelike": 
" AlLso we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest "how one is". In anxiety 
one feels "uncanny"'. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds 
itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression . The 
"nothing and 
nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means "not-being-at-home" (das Nicht- 
zuhause-sein)" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233). 
It is this experience of " Unheimlichkeit" which is at the heart of the mood of anxiety. In Being 
and Time anxiety is the mood which reveals the groundlessness of the world and Dasein's being- 
in-the-world. Dreyfus says: 
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"Anxiety is thus the disclosure accompanying a Dasein's preontological sense that 
it is not the source of the meanings it uses to understand itself, that the public 
world makes no intrinsic sense for it and would go on whether that particular 
Dasein existed or not. In anxiety Dasein discovers that it has no meaning or 
content of its own; nothing individualizes it but its empty throwness" (Dreyfus, 
1991, p. 180). 
In What is Metaphysics? this disclosive function of anxiety is also discussed. Anxiety is seen as 
revealing the nothingness at the heart of Being. Metaphysics is, in essence, concerned with the 
question of being and nothingness. In Heidegger's fi7amework neither of these terms has a concrete 
empirical reference. Thus we cannot approach an understanding of nothingness by way of a simple 
definition. Nothingness is neither a positive entity nor is it simply the negation of such an entity, 
it is in fact "more original than the 'not' and negation". In other words nothingness "is the source 
of (logical) negation, not the other way around". Thus negation depends on Dasein having a prior 
access to an experience of nothingness. In anxiety, according to Heidegger, Dasein has such 
access- 
"We cannot say what it is before which one feels ill at ease. As a whole it is so for 
one. All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not In the 
sense of mere disappearance. Rather, in this very receding things turn toward us. 
The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses us. We 
can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this "no hold on 
things" comes over us and remains. 
Anxiety reveals the nothing" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 101). 
Thus the question of anxiety becomes a central focus of metaphysics. In this essay anxiety is 
presented as something ever present but out of view. It is a most fundamental mood but 
ordinarily we live our lives oblivious to its presence because we are absorbed in the everyday 
world. However, we need to cease our flight from anxiety, according to Heidegger, if we are to 
engage in any real metaphysical enquiry. In anxiety there is disclosure of the lack of any 
foundational grounding for the meaningfulness of the world. We realise that the world has no 
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meaning outside of Dasein and thus Dasein itself is the ground. Dasein is the "groundless ground" 
and has to provide a meaning which will not otherwise be given. As well as disclosing something 
essential about the nature of Dasein, anxiety also discloses something about the nature of the 
world. As Joseph Fell surnmarises- 
"The blanking out of everyday significance does not leave us with nothing at all; 
beings remain, but now as strange, stripped of their ordinary familiarity. Abruptly, 
they stand out like sore thumbs, all by themselves, independent of any grounding 
context. Not nothing, they are - but for no evident reason or purpose, without 
"whence or whither". This is the routinely concealed human experience of the 
disclosure of sheer givenness, sheer contingency, the disclosure of naked "that- 
being". 
... 
Anxiety is thus the beginning and a basis of all specifically human ontic 
experience and ontological understanding" (Fell, 1992, p. 69). 
Thus the anxiety discussed in Being and Time and in What is Metaphysics? cannot be conceived 
as a symptom, a sign of breakdown. It is clearly something built into the nature of Dasein and its 
being-m-the-world. It is, in fact, an originary experience out of which various other human 
experiences flow. Even though it is a profoundly uncomfortable experience and we usually are 
at pains to avoid it, it is never really absent from our lives. Heidegger says: 
11-original anxiety in existence is usually repressed. Anxiety is there. It is only 
sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 
106). 
8.4 ANXIETY AND DEATH. DIVISION 11 OF BEING AND TIME 
In the first section of Division II of Being and Time Heidegger reiterates the aim of the entire 
work : it is to investigate the meaning of being in general, and since the meaning of being is 
disclosed by Dasein the ultimate clarification of the meaning of being demands an equally ultimate 
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(or primordial) interpretation of Dasein. What is required is an approach to Dasein which can 
grasp it as a "whole". He goes on to point out that his analysis in Division I is less than complete 
because it has failed to reveal both the totality and the authenticity of Dasein. He says: 
"One thing has become unmistakeable : our existential analysis ofDasein up till 
now cannot* claim toprimordiality. Its fore-having never included more than 
the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and of Dasein as less than a whole (als 
unganzes). If the Interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial, as a 
foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first have 
brought to fight existentially the being of Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity 
and totality" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 276). 
Division II is an attempt to move the analysis in this direction. It is through an analysis of death 
that Heidegger proceeds, as it is only in its being-toward-death that Dasein is revealed in its 
totality and it is only through the lucid acceptance of one's death that Dasein moves towards 
authenticity. Death both totalises and individualises Dasein. As long as Dasein is still alive it 
continues to choose its possibilities,, it is always "ahead-of-itself': 
"It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly 
something still to be settled " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 236). 
There is, he says, always a" lack of totality". Death provides this sense of totality to Dasein's 
existence. At the same tirne death provides each one of us with the one and only experience which 
is uniquely ours and in facing death we have the opportunity to define ourselves as somehow 
distinct from the "They" (Das Man), to define for ourselves the meaning of our lives and to 
achieve a sense of authenticity which otherwise would be always only partial. 
While death allows Dasein its possibilities of totality and authenticity, the cost is the ever present 
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reality of anxiety: 
"But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itsetf 
arisingftom Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this state-of- 
mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible 
impossibility of its existence" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 10). 
In anxiety we are brought into a relationship with our own death. As death is something which 
cannot be confined to a particular moment or period of time, and yet can materialize at any 
moment , it 
is essentially and profoundly indefinite. The indefiniteness of the threat of death 
undermines our connections with the public world, for it demonstrates, as nothing else can, the 
fragility and unreliability of this world. None of the meanings, the connections, the narratives 
given to us by our social world can protect us from death. As discussed above, the essential 
quality of the mood of anxiety is this sense of disconnection, of groundlessness. Thus in Division 
II of Being and Time Heidegger links together anxiety and death in a very clear way: 
"B eing-towards- death is essentially anxiety" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 3 10). 
In summary, in the early work of Heidegger anxiety is presented in the following ways; 
1. Anxiety is not a symptom of illness or disease but a mood available and present to all. On the 
other hand what Heidegger is describing is not just an unease which emerges in the course of 
philosophical reflection. He presents us with a phenomenological understanding of a state-of- 
nund which is extremely painful. This is why, for the most part, we attempt to avoid it. However, 
anxiety never completely disappears from a human life and is always present, even if only as a 
potentiality. In certain situations anxiety can become part of a person's daily life and can be a 
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reason for a presentation to psychiatry. 
2. Unlike fear, anxiety is not "about" any entity in the world. Anxiety is experienced in relation 
to being as a whole. It is an experience of the nothingness at the heart of being. Fear is actually 
the mood most often encountered in those conditions labelled by psychiatry as 'anxiety disorders. 
However moods such as fear, depression and alienation are sometimes accompanied by anxiety 
as defined by Heidegger. 
Anxiety can be a privileged revealing experience of our essential nullity and rootlessness. 
In facing anxiety we have the potential to move to an 'authentic' mode of being. 
4. There is an intimate relationship between anxiety and death. Anxiety is the state-of-mind in 
which we have an experience of our own mortality. 
5. Anxiety is best characterised as a sense of being "ill at ease". In it the world is experienced 
as profoundly strange. We feel "not at home" (Unheimlich) in the world. 
In the next section I move away from Heidegger and back to the discourse on trauma. I want to 
return to the cognitivist, approach to trauma. In particular I wish to discuss the cognitivist 
understanding of how a person suffers aloss of meaning' after trauma. Janoff-Bulman's writing 
provides a very good example of this approach. I will relate this to Heidegger's account of anxiety 
and then comment upon the relationship between the two. 
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8.5 JANOFF-BULMAN'S "NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF TRAUMA" 
As we saw in chapter three a number of clinicians and researchers have attempted to conceptualise 
the ways in which traumatic events have their impact. I drew attention to the fact that at the heart 
the concept of PTSD lies the symptom complex of intrusion-avoidance phenomena. These 
symptoms appear to be associated with the victim's search for meaning and cognitive theories 
which aim to grasp this search for meaning have come to dominate current theoretical work on 
PTSD. A recurrent theme in this context is the idea that extremely frightening events have the 
effect of shattering the background assumptions of the individual with regard to him/herself and 
with the regard to the order of the outside world. As we saw in chapter four, cognitive 
psychology involves an account of human reality in which each of us is said to develop a set of 
assumptions (also called schemas or scripts) about ourselves and our worlds. In the cognitive 
approach the meaningfulness of our lives is dependent on these assumptions. Like most other 
psychological theories, cognitivism does not recognise the sort of ontological/ontic difference 
described by Heidegger. Cognitivism encounters the issue of meaning on an ontic level. It 
assumes that, Re other aspects of psychology, it can be investigated by an empirical, fact-seeking 
apProach. We shaff return to the difference between hermeneutics and cognitivism on the question 
of meaning below. 
In her book Shattered Assumptions. Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (1992) Janoff- 
Bulman, following the cognitivist tradition, argues that there is a universal and definable structure 
to human psychology. She argues that at the 'core of internal world' we all have a set of basic 
assumptions which guide us in our day-to-day thought and actions. She calls these 'our 
fundamental assumptions'. She argues that although different psychologists have used different 
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terminology 
, it is generally accepted within psychology that such a set of assumptions exists in 
us all: 
"Although different terms are used, there is clearly congruence in these 
descriptions of a single underlying phenomenon. The reference is to a conceptual 
system, developed over time, that provided us with expectations about the world 
and ourselves. This conceptual system is best represented by a set of assumptions 
or internal representations that reflect and guide our interactions in the world and 
generally enable us to function effectively" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 5). 
She argues that the core assumptions which operate universally concern the nature of the world 
around us and the value we attach to ourselves. On the one hand we appear to assume that the 
world is meaningful and generally benevolent, on the other we assume that we are, ourselves, 
worthy human beings. The world, in this case, is our own individual world, made up of our 
environment and our relationships. Although people may not be fully aware of these assumptions 
she claims that there is empirical evidence that infact most people operate on the basis of some 
version or another of these. According to Janoff-Bulman there is evidence, for example, that 
most people are optimistic about their own future, even when they are more generally pessimistic 
about the world at large. With regard to the orderliness and meaningfulness of the world, she 
suggests that* 
"We generally believe in an action-outcome contingency, that we can control what 
happens to us, and such a belief provides us with one means of maintaining a view 
of the world as a meaningful place. In fact, we tend to perceive a contingency 
between what we do and what happens to us, even in situations when this is 
clearly inappropriate" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 10). 
She suggests that a belief in a God who rewards a moral existence also reflects this deeper belief 
in the orderliness of the world. With regard to the self, Janoff-Bulman maintains that most people 
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evaluate themselves as good and worthy. She says: 
"In study after study, people report themselves as better than others and certainly 
better than average in terms of their own abilities and personal qualities, and 
scores on self-esteem scales tend to be highly skewed towards the positive end of 
the scale" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 12). 
These basic assumptions about ourselves and our worlds are said to be laid down early in life and 
are generally resistant to change. However, such positive orientations are dependent on an early 
environment characterised by love and trust. She quotes Erik Erikson's notion of the 'task' of the 
very first year of life being the establishment of a 'sense of basic trust' in the world. According 
to Erikson this is dependant on a positive relationship between mother and child. She also quotes 
the attachment theories of John Bowlby in which the children are understood to form 'working 
models' of the world and themselves through their early relationships with 'attachment figures. 
Janoff-Bulman believes that our assumptions about the world are held in our minds in the form 
of 'schemas'. As we have already seen this concept is widely used by psychologists with a 
cognitiVist orientation. A schema is a mental theory or map concerning the outside world. It 
involves not just information about the world but also our own generalisations and abstractions 
concerning stimuli and concepts of various kinds. Research on schemas tends to show that people 
are inclined to preserve schemas and do not change them easily. They tend towards 'cognitive 
conservatism' and, in relation to their mental schemas, are generally resistant to change. 
Traumatic experiences, however, can have the effect of shattering our deepest schemas, our most 
fundamental assumptions: 
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"Over the past fifteen years my students and I have studied a number of victimized 
populations, including individuals who have experienced rape, battering, and other 
crimes; life-threatening illnesses, particularly cancer, severe accidents resulting in 
paralysis; and premature unexpected deaths of parents and spouses. We have 
attempted to understand the responses of trauma survivors through both intensive 
interviewing and through quantitative measures of their reactions. For some 
survivors, the trauma is relatively short-lived, for others it lasts years. Yet 
regardless of population, and regardless of research approach, we have found 
remarkable similarities across different victim populations. The basis for these 
similarities is apparent in the words and responses of survivors : The traumatic 
event has had a profound impact on their fundamental assumptions about the 
world" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 5 1). 
Janoff -Bulman argues that the immediate effect of a traumatic experience is the confrontation 
with one's own fragility. She writes: 
"The confrontation with real or potential injury or death breaks the barrier of 
complacency and resistance in our assumptive worlds, and a profound 
psychological crisis is induced" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 61). 
This "psychological crisis" is experienced as a sense of inner turmoil. The assumptions about the 
self and about the meaning of the world which had provided the background frame work for the 
victim are shattered: 
"Suddenly, the self- and worldviews they had taken for granted are unreliable. 
They can no longer assume that the world is a good place or that other people are 
kind and trustworthy. They can no longer assume that the world is mearlingful or 
what happens makes sense. They can no longer assume that they have control 
over negative outcomes or will reap benefits because they are good people. The 
very nature of the world and self seems to have changed; neither can be trusted, 
neither guarantees security" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 62) 
For Janoff-Bulman the essence of trauma is in the way the inner world of the victim is abruptly 
ruptured and starts to disintegrate. They move from feeling safe in their world to feeling 
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vulnerable. This brings about a 'double dose of anxiety' (her words). On the one hand the victim 
is overwhelmed with feelings of fear. Their world becomes intensely frightening. Their very 
survival may be in question. On the other hand their 'conceptual system' is broken and in a state 
of upheaval. Their fundamental assumptions which provided security, coherence and order are 
shattered. Janoff-Bulman calls these two aspects of anxiety -. terror and disillusionment. She 
proposes that the symptoms of PTSD are best understood as being produced as part of the 
individual's innate attempts to cope with these feelings of terror and disillusionment. Cognitive 
processes which are not My conscious, such as those described by Horowitz (see chapter three), 
come into action and give rise to the intrusive-avoidance symptoms of PTSD. However, Janoff- 
Bulman also suggests that there are more conscious activities that victims characteristically pursue 
in order to rebuild their shattered assumptions: 
"Cognitive strategies represent one extremely important means by which survivors 
facilitate this demanding reconstruction process. These are motivated cognitive 
strategies, not in the sense of conscious manipulation, but rather in the sense that 
effect is strategic; they facilitate the coping process by better enabling victims to 
reformulate a view of reality that can account for the victimization and yet not be 
wholly threatening" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 117). 
In addition, she calls attention to the importance of 'social support' in aiding the recovery from 
trauma. As with the other approaches to trauma, discussed in part one, the social world is 
understood to be something external to the individual victims. For Janoff-Bulman the social 
world is mainly important because it enables individuals to receive 'feedback' about their own 
behaviours and about the nature of the world. This feedback is then internalised and enters a 
I cognitive-emotional' equation which becomes the basis for a new assumptive framework. 
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8.6 POST-TRAUMATIC ANXIETY 
There are obvious incompatibilities between Janoff-Bulman's account of human reality and that 
of Heidegger. We shall examine these below. However there are strong resonances between her 
account of post-traumatic sequelae and Heidegger's account of fear and anxiety. Janoff-Bulman's 
distinction between terror and disiflusionment is similar, in many ways, to Heidegger's distinction 
between fear and anxiety, even though at times she uses the term anxiety as being synonymous 
wit ar 5. Terror, which she equates with fear and anxiety, relates to external threats, whereas 
disillusionment relates to the "inner world". This clearly echoes Heidegger's proposal that fear 
is produced by a threat fi7orn some entity in the world whereas anxiety is generated from a concern 
with the background meaningfulness of the world. Janoff-Bulman says- 
"Fear and anxiety are dominant early responses to overwhelming life events, 
represented physiologically as arousal and cognitively as the perception of threat, 
these emotions can persist months or even years after the traumatic event. Yet a 
very different psychological reaction typically co-exists with the fear and anxiety, 
and this is the experience of profound disillusionment, a response that often 
outlasts a victim's fear and anxiety. Victim's inner worlds are shattered, and they 
see their prior assumptions for what they are - illusions" (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, 
p. 70) 
Just as Heidegger described anxiety as a profound sense of disconnection, many people who have 
been through something very frightening describe being " cut-off ' in some way from the world. 
The experience of very frightening events can have the effect of shattering any sense of living in 
an orderly world which has inherent structures of meaning and order. A patient of mine, a fireman 
51 propose to use the term "post traumatic anxiety" as being similar to Janoff-Bulman's 
"disillusionment", and to distinguish this fi7om post traumatic fear in relation to an outside threat. 
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who suffered a psychological breakdown after a complex series of distressing events at work, 
said- 
I feel so alone. I know that everything is as it was before but it has all changed 
for me. There doesn't seem to be any point any more. I feel distant from my wife, 
I can't explain to her what it's like. " 
People describe a feeling of being set adrift from the rest of the world, of being completely on 
their own in a way which is beyond ordinary loneliness. The feeling of trust in the world, both 
human and natural, which is essential to ordinary life has been broken apart and people describe 
living in a meaningless void, desperately seeking their old sense of order and meaning. The 
combat veteran Tim O'Brien describes how for the common soldier in the midst of war - 
"There is no clarity. Everything swirls. The old rules are no longer binding, the 
old truths are no longer true. ... 
The vapours suck you in. You can't tell where 
you are, or why you're there, and the only certainty is overwhelming ambiguity. 
In war you lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of the truth itself, and 
therefore it's safe to say that in a true war story nothing is ever absolutely true" 
(O'Brien, 1990, p. 88) 
Post traumatic anxiety also involves a profound realisation of the self s fragility. Just as Heidegger 
related anxiety and death, the literature on post traumatic reactions provides numerous accounts 
of how post traumatic anxiety is connected to a sense of one's imminent death. Robert Lifton, 
after interviewing 75 survivors of the atomic bomb in I-Eroshima, 17 years after the event, 
described them as exhibiting what he called a "death imprint". This reaction was also reported 
in other groups such as survivors of the concentration camps and survivors of natural disasters. 
Lifton argued that the "death imprint" is the key to understanding post traumatic reactions- 
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"what needs (also) to be emphasized is the survivor's having experienced ajarring 
awareness of thefact of death... he has been disturbingly confronted with his own 
mortality" (Lifton, 1967, p. 48 1). 
The encounter with death serves to emphasise the fragility of the self. we can no longer operate 
with any sense of invulnerability There is nothing we can do to avoid death. A traumatic event 
brings this realisation home with considerable force. Thus post traumatic anxiety combines a 
penetrating sense of the ultimate meaninglessness of the world and a paralysing sense of the self s 
fi7agifity in the face of death. As we have already seen Heidegger's account of anxiety emphasises 
very similar themes. 
Thus Janoff-Bulman's description of post-traumatic disillusionment resonates strongly with 
Heidegger's account of anxiety. Both accounts are of a phenomenon which is to be distinguished 
from fear of an outside threat. Both accounts describe a phenomenon which is essentially a mood 
of dislocation associated with a profound sense of a lack of meaning and order. Both accounts 
stress the relationship between this phenomenon and the apprehension of death. My suggestion 
is that traumatic experiences can have the effect of awakening the mood of anxiety in individuals. 
According to the Heidegger of Being and Time, however, this mood is 'already there' in every 
human being and not something brought about de novo by the trauma. Rather trauma can have 
the effect of revealing the anxiety which is a built-in dimension of human being. 
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)KEN ME 8.7 BROK N ANINGS, BROKEN WORLDS 
Janoff-Bulman's position is important because she systematically highlights how the question of 
meaning stands behind the syndrome of PTSD. She concurs with a number of other researchers 
at the sort of intrusive-avoidance symptoms, which are now generally regarded as being 
the typical sequelae of traumatic experiences, lies the shattering of people's structures of 
meanings. In other words intrusive-avoidance symptoms signal the presence of a major 
disturbance in the person's sense that his/her world is ordered in some way. As we have seen 
above, in descriptive terms, Heideggerian anxiety is sin-filar to the mood state described by Janoff- 
Bulman after trauma. How does this contribute to a hermeneutic account of trauma? 
8.7.1 An ontological approach to post-traumatic anxiety 
As we saw in chapter six, Heidegger makes a fundamental distinction between the ontological 
and the ontic. The fon-ner refers to that which allows anything at all to show up as existing -. being 
in general. The latter refers to entities within the world. Ontological understanding does not 
involve any sort of naming or explanation. It is a completely different enterprise to science, 
including scientific psychology. If I am correct, and the mood-state described by Heidegger in 
terms of anxiety is of a similar nature, in descriptive and experiential terms at least, to the mood- 
state described by Western psychology as occurring after trauma, then it follows that an 
ontological approach to post-traumatic anxiety is a path worth exploring. Current ways of 
approaching trauma, and particularly cognitive approaches, clearly operate on an ontic level and 
treat the question of meaningfulness in the same way that they treat other aspects of psychology, 
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i. e. as'something'to be analysed. My suggestion is that this approach is inadequate because the 
meaningfulness of the world, or in Heideggarian terms the meaning of being, cannot be grasped 
by this type of analysis. This issue demands ontological understanding. Hermeneutic enquiry, not 
reductive science, is alone able to provide this. 
We saw in the last chapter how Medard Boss approached an understanding of illness. He argued 
that we cannot build up a picture of illness from a description of a particular lesion in itself Illness 
involves a lirnitation of the Dasein's ability to be itself, to be fully open to the world as only Dasein 
can be. To understand this, we need, as a first step, a full understanding of the meaningful nature 
of this human world. The phenomenological approach to illness moves from a description of 
'non-nal'human reality to lesion in order to understand fully the limitations imposed on that reality 
by the lesion in question. If post-traumatic anxiety is characterised by a withdrawal of meaning, 
then we need to understand how a meaningful world is presentfor us in thefirstplace. What is 
it that withdraws from us in this state? 
If Heidegger's account of Dasein, as discussed in chapter six, is accepted, then science (whether 
biological or psychological), will never be able to account for this meaningfulness. This is an 
ontological issue. Following the Heideggerian analysis of human reality developed in chapter six, 
and examples of the phenomenological approach 'in action' in the last chapter, we are now in a 
position to explore the question of meaning from a phenomenological position. Following 
Heidegger, to do this properly we must avoid any of the starting assumptions of traditional 
psychology. In particular we must deal with experience as we find it before it has been shaped by 
any sort of theory. We begin with the fact that we find ourselves, first and foremost, in the world 
and with the world in us. We are not separate, and cannot be separated from, our worlds. They 
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are fundamental dimensions of ourselves. As we have already seen, Heidegger goes to great pains 
to overcome the Cartesian assumptions which have become built in to our understandings of 
ourselves, indeed have become built into the language we commonly use to describe ourselves. 
These are assumptions to the effect that mind stands outside world and is related to it by means 
of representations. The central Cartesian problematic concerned the question of how we can ever 
know the world 'outside' us. Heidegger does not answer this because his starting point is not a 
situation where subject and world are separate in the first place, and the one stands in a position 
of 'knowing' the other, As Stephen Mulhall puts it : 
"(knowing) is therefore doubly inapplicable as a model for the ontological relation 
between subject and world. First, because knowing is a possible mode of Dasein's 
Being, which is Being-in-the-world, knowing therefore must be understood in 
terms of, and cannot found, Being-in-the-world. Second, because knowing is a 
relation in which Dasein can stand towards a given state of affairs, not towards the 
world as such; Dasein can know (or doubt) that a given chair is comfortable or 
that a particular lake is deep, but it cannot know that the world exists. As 
Wittgenstein might have put it, we are not of the opinion that there is a world: this 
is not a hypothesis based on evidence that might turn out to be strong, weak or 
non-existent" (Mulhall, 1996, p. 96). 
For Heidegger, for the most part, we do not relate to our world by having sets of schemas stored 
in our minds concerning the world. Likewise the meaning of the world is not something located, 
or 'encoded' in Bolton and Hills' account, inside individual minds. Rather the meaning of the 
world, and of ourselves as part of that world, lies in the background intelligibility generated by 
the everyday shared beliefs, rituals and practices through which we live out our lives. While our 
conscious beliefs are important, Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, puts his emphasis on the social 
context as the ultimate foundation of intelligibility. This background context is essentially complex 
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and cannot be grasped in the terms of a causal science6. 
While Heidegger is involved in an attempt to characterise the commonsense background and 
illuminate its structure, he is firmly against the idea that it can be grasped as any sort of set of 
concepts or schemas. According to Heidegger we have a 'pre-understanding' of the world which 
is neither conscious, nor unconscious. Dreyfus uses a number of examples to illustrate what could 
be involved in such a'pre-understanding'. One example is 'di stance- standing practices': 
"People in different cultures stand different distances from an intimate, a friend, 
a stranger. Furthermore, the distances vary when these people are chatting, doing 
business,, or engaging in courtship. Each culture, including our own, embodies an 
incredibly subtle shared pattern of social distancing. Yet no one explicitly taught 
this pattern to each of us. Our parents could not possibly have consciously 
instructed us in it since they do not know the pattern any more than we do. We 
do not even know we have such know-how until we go to another culture and 
find, for example that in North Africa strangers seem to be oppressively close 
while in Scandinavia friends seem to stand too far away". 
We become uneasy in such situations and try different stances until we feel more comfortable. As 
Dreyfus remarks, it is presumably through some responses like this in early life that we learned 
about distance in the first place. However for the vast majority of us, this learning was not 
through the acquisition of concepts concerning standing and relationships. 
"Aas a skill or savoirfaire it is not something like a set of rules that could be made 
61n f Ct a, according to Wittgenstein, the practices which are the basic elements of our forms 
of fife are overwhelmingly complicated and he warns against attempts to systematize the 'bustle 
of life'. in his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II he says - 
"The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within 
this bustle. 
And it is the very concept 'bustle' that brings about this indefiniteness. For a bustle 
comes about only through constant repetition. And there is no definite starting 
point for'constant repetition'. " (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 108). 
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explicit. Yet it embodies rudiments of an understanding of what it is to be a human 
being- hints of how important body contact is, and the relative importance of 
intimacy and independence" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 294-295). 
As Dreyfus points out human practices like di stance- standing involve particular orientations 
towards the world. in this way our deepest values are actually embodied in our practices. Another 
source of exwnples of how an understanding, and a way of life, can be contained non-cognitively 
in our practices is the work of Erving Goffman. In his book Relations in Public (197 1) Goffman 
analyses the phenomenon of 'civil indifference'. This occurs in modern societies when strangers 
pass each other on the street. It involves an implicit understanding about the correct way to 
encounter one another. One person acknowledges the other through a controlled glance. This 
indicates a degree of respect but is non-intrusive. The person then averts their gaze to show that 
there is no threat intended. The other person does the same. This encounter incorporates a tacit 
understanding of the nature of human reality and the relationship between individuals, It is a ritual 
embedded in the urban world of modernity and involves 'modem' ways of understanding the world 
and other people. In many traditional societies where there is a more clear-cut difference between 
who is a 'familiar' and who is a 'stranger' people generally do not encounter each other through 
such rituals of 'civil indifference'. They may completely avoid one another or else stare in a way 
which would be perceived as threatening in a modern context. Giddens (1991) notes that such 
rituals of everyday life, involving trust and tact, are more than merely ways of protecting one's 
self-esteem and that of others. Rather, in so far as they involve the very substance of everyday 
encounters with one another, 'they touch on the most basic aspects of ontological security' (P. 47). 
The intelligibility of our worlds, their meaningfulness, is thus not something held as a set of 
schemas in an individual mind. The sense and order of our worlds are aspects which simply cannot 
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be grasped, or formalised as a set of beliefs or rules or programmes. Dreyfus says that : 
" Sense is precisely what is left out in all formalization. Sense, for Heidegger, in 
opposition to Husserl, is the structure of the general background that can never 
be fully objectified but can only be gradually and incompletely revealed by circular 
hermeneutic inquiry" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 222), 
For the cognitivists : ruptured meanings occur inside individual minds. For Heidegger, because 
the inside-outside distinction is false and because meaning resides in our background practices, 
the breakdown of meaning involves this background. From a phenomenological point of view, 
loss of meaning occurs in a broken world, not a broken mind. Trauma has an ontological 
dimension because it can have the effect of bringing the intelligibility of the world into question. 
Post-traumatic anxiety is thus a state of Dasein in which the meaningfulness of life itself, and the 
situation of Dasein within life has been rendered fragile. 
Because intelligibility and meaningfulness are social phenomena, derived from the practices of our 
everyday lives, the social world is seen as not something impacting on the post-traumatic state 
from 'outside'. Conceiving the social dimension of trauma in terms of 'social factors' acting as 
'buffers' of one sort or another simply does not do justice to the lived reality of the survivor. If 
trauma is about broken meanings, then it is a social phenomenon through and through. In his 
writing, the psychiatrist Derek Summerfield, whose work was quoted in chapter five, draws 
attention to the importance of a socio-cultural dimension in modern conflicts. For example: 
"Guatemalan Indians, hunted by 'low intensity' warfare, felt that their collective 
body had been wounded, one which included the ants, trees, earth, domestic 
animals and human beings gathered across generations. Mayan origin myths are 
linked to land and maize. To them the burning of crops by the army was not just 
an attack on their physical resources, but on the symbol which most fully 
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represented the Mayan collective identity, the people of the maize. When they 
talked about 'sadness' they meant something experienced not just by humans but 
also by these other interconnected elements which had been violated. When you 
touched the earth you could feel its sadness, and you could taste it in the water. 
To them all this was genocide" (Summerfield, 1998, in press). 
In building their models of post-traumatic reactions, cognitivist researchers begin by positing 
some psychological process which is presented as the essential element of the reaction. They work 
with a model of an individual mind reacting to a specific event or series of events. They add to 
this ideas about preexisting personality traits and cognitive schemas. To this, is added ideas about 
the social environment. In other words they theorize 'from the inside out. In contrast, the 
hermeneutic approach 'moves in the other direction'. In this, the first step in understanding the 
impact of an event or series of events, on an individual or community, is the generation of an 
account of the social world which existed before and after the events. From this one moves to 
understand the meaningful world of any particular individual. Hermeneutic enquiry thus begins 
at the level of anthropology and thereafter moves towards psychology. My context-centred 
approach to understanding the effects of trauma, presented in chapter five, incorporates this sort 
of movement. 
8.7.2 A Heideggerian contribution to our understanding of trauma : benefits and limitations 
Benefits: 1) The (Heideggerian) phenomenological account of meaning and intelligibility is able 
to account for the importance of social and cultural environment in relation to trauma as outlined 
above (see chapters five and six). The way in which one's world is meaningful and ordered will 
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determine the way in which one experiences and reacts to any particular event. It will also 
determine what forms of help will be appropriate. 
2) Heidegger's approach to time and causality, discussed in chapter six, presents a fundamentally 
different picture of how individuals experience the events of their lives,, compared to the 
traditional understanding embodied in the concept of PTSD. We have seen how this question of 
causality has brought about certain problems for the traditional framework. These problems 
simply do not arise within a Heideggerian phenomenology because all experiences are understood 
to occur within a horizon which encompasses past, present and future together. In this, my 
reaction to a terrifying event always happens in these three dimensions. Debates about whether 
my reaction was caused by the traumatic event or instead caused the event to be retrospectively 
highlighted (and thus the 'target' of my intrusive-avoidance symptoms) are seen in the light of the 
Heideggarian account of human temporality to be misconceived and not open to clear resolution. 
Limitations : 3) In spite of these positive 'gains' from a phenomenological account of trauma, in 
the rest of this thesis I shall point to certain difficulties which emerge from this account. At the 
centre of my concerns is Heidegger's own account of his project in Being and Time. In this work 
he operated with the assumption that there could be a'fundamental ontology'. In other words 
he appears to have believed that it would be possible to give an account of Dasein in universal 
terms. While he was opposed to any 'psychological universalism' (the positing of mental processes 
which were universal and which could be investigated scientifically), nevertheless he appears to 
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have assumed that he was, in fact, exploring the structures of all human experience'. In his 
account of human reality in Being and Time anxiety plays a key role. I shall discuss, in the next 
chapter, how according to the Heidegger of Division Two of this work, it was only through the 
experience of anxiety that Dasein could become authentic. In Being and Time anxiety is always 
close at hand and, as we have seen above, is related to the fact of human mortality. While loss of 
meaning and intelligibility may well be universal human reactions, I shall argue in the next part of 
this thesis against this assumption that anxiety plays the same role in every culture. I shall argue 
that in some cultures anxiety (as a state-of-mind characterised by a sense of dislocation and 
'homelessness') is more'close at hand'than in others. This will have important implications for the 
cross-cultural understanding of trauma. 
1 also noted at the end of the last chapter my 'disappointment' with the limited therapeutic 
horizon opened up by dasemanalysis, as developed by Boss and Heidegger. If post-traumatic 
anxiety involves the withdrawal of meaningfulness and order, and if these are given by the 
background practical way of fife in which we five, then helping people who have been traumatised 
requires an effort to rebuild this way of life. Individual psychotherapy will make little sense to 
people, like the Mayan Indians, described by Summerfield above, who have lost a way of life. 
7 Dreyfus (1993) notes this tension. He says : "Heidegger seems to imply (at the end of 
Division 1) that his fundamental ontology in Being and Time will be afull clarification of the 
understanding of being, and even a science of being as such. This idea conflicts with the 
presuppositions of hermeneutics" (p. 39). 
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S. 8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has moved between philosophy and psychology, between hermeneutics and 
cognitivism. I have attempted to develop an understanding of 'loss of meaning' from a hermeneutic 
point of view. This required an outlining of Heidegger's account of anxiety as presented in Being 
and Time. I then used Janoff-Bulman's account of 'shattered assumptions' as an example of a 
cognitivist approach to the same issue. Using Heidegger, I argued that there is an ontological 
dimension to post-traumatic anxiety which cannot be grasped through the framework of an 'ontic' 
science such as cognitive psychology. This ontological dimension can only be 'illuminated' through 
hermeneutic enquiry and I suggested that such enquiry would involve anthropological 
understanding as a key element. This was linked to the particular kind of context-centred 
approach to trauma developed in chapter five. 
Having presented the case for a hermeneutic approach to the issue of trauma, at the end of this 
chapter I pointed to some questions concerning the universal validity of Heidegger's account of 
anxiety. This is to raise some of the tensions which were identified in the introduction. In the next 
part of the thesis these tensions will be explored further. 
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PART THREE 
THE LIMITATIONS OF A HEIDEGGERIAN APPROACH 
In the last section I developed what I called a hermeneutic approach to the understanding of 
trauma. I contrasted this with the currently dominant approach which involves a cognitivist 
understanding of the issue of meaning. I argued that the hermeneutic approach had certain 
advantages. It was able to avoid the problems associated with causality which are currently 
undermining the whole concept of PTSD. It was also able to give a more convincing and 
satisfactory account of the way in which contextual issues determine the experience of trauma. 
In addition I argued that current approaches to post-traumatic anxiety which deal with the subject 
on an lontic' level are inadequate. I argued instead that trauma has an 'ontological' dimension to 
the extent that it can involve an undermining of the background intelligibility through which 
anything in the world shows up, as such. I suggested that this ontological dimension called for a 
very different form of enquiry than is currently available within the discourse on trauma. I 
suggested that the sort of enquiry which I have called hermeneutic, in this thesis, is more 
appropriate. 
However, at the end of the last chapter I pointed to certain theoretical and practical limitations 
to a hermeneutics which is uncritically based on the ideas of Being and Time. In the next two 
chapters I will explore these further. In this chapter I argue against the idea presented in Being 
222 
and Time that anxiety plays the same role and has the same ontological position, in every culture. 
Instead I argue that anxiety is a state-of-mind which is particularly prominent in modern Western 
societies. In chapter ten, I will explore some ideas about therapy which hopefully will move us 
beyond the daseinanalytic framework. In both of these chapters I will use ideas from the later 
work of Heidegger in conjunction with the work of a number of other philosophers. My basic 
argument shall be that although trauma can involve an ontological dimension, certain cultures are 
more predisposed to ontological difficulties than others. In particular the culture of 
modemity/postmodernity has rendered Western peoples vulnerable to a level of ontological 
insecurity which is not universal. I shall use this insight to argue against the export of Western 
concepts of trauma and their associated therapies to non-Western communities. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ANXIETY AND MODERNITY 
In this chapter I will argue that anxiety (as discussed in the last chapter) is something which has 
a particular association with features of modern Western society, of modernity. I will begin by 
making the case for a'hermeneutic' appropriation of the insights of Being and Time in which we 
drop the 'universalist' understanding of anxiety as a revelatory mood at the heart of every Dasein. 
I shall then present Heidegger's critique of modernity and move to discuss the work of Charles 
Taylor and other philosophers and sociologists who make the case for a specific connection 
between anxiety and modernity. In the last part of the chapter I discuss the move to post- 
modernity and discuss the implications of this for our theoretical work relating to trauma'. 
9.1 RETHENTKING THE PLACE OF ANXIETY 
A number of commentators have drawn attention to a change in direction in Heidegger's thought 
in the 1930s. This has been compared with the substantial change in the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein which occurred after the Tractatus. The change in Heidegger's philosophy has been 
called his Kehre, or 'turning. In this chapter, I will not dwell at length on the nature of 
IT-* 
-Heidegger's Kehre, 
but will focus on the relationships between technology and nihilism in the 
'I will be using the term anxiety to signify the sort of 'state-of-mind' described by 
Heidegger and presented in the last chapter. It should be noted that psychiatry often conflates the 
concepts of anxiety and fear and that conditions such as phobic states, which psychiatry labels as 
anxiety disorders, are (in the account presented here) not necessarily characterised by anxiety at 
all. 
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later works. Indeed most commentators are now agreed that this Kehre was more apparent than 
real. Essentially it would appear that Heidegger moved on to explore different themes and away 
from the central focus on Dasein which characterised Being and Time 2. Heidegger, himself, was 
willing to speak about aHeidegger I'who preceded this turning and a'Heidegger 11'who came 
after, but rejected any strong sense of a separation in the end. He says: 
It 
... only 
by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what 
is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] 11. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes 
possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] 11" (Heidegger's preface in 
Richardson, 1963, p. xxii). 
AR of Heidegger's thought has focused on the question of being. In Being and Time and other 
works from the same period he sought being through an analysis of Dasein : the being for whom 
being is an issue. Existentialist interpretations of Being and Time have tended to equate the 
question of being with questions about the projects of individualised Dasein. From the Letter on 
Humanism (Heidegger, 1993, pgs 217-265) onwards, we find Heidegger at pains to distance 
3 himself from subjectivist approaches to phenomenology such as those of Sartre . 
However, a number of commentators have pointed to a tension within Being and Time, a tension 
between, what I will loosely call, above, the 'existentialist' and the 'hermeneutic' aspects of the 
work. This becomes most apparent in relation to the role of anxiety and the question of authentic 
and inauthentic ways of being. In Being and Time Heidegger is centrally concerned to investigate 
Dasein's way of being. However: 
2 In spite of this I have pointed to the fact that he returned to this focus in the Zollikon 
Seminars which took place well into the 'later period', see chapter seven, above. 
We noted in chapter seven his criticism of Binswanger on this issue. 
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"Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us - even that which is closest : 
we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, 
it is ontologically that which is farthest" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 36). 
In other words there are aspects of our being which are so 'close to us' that we cannot 'see' them 
in our non-nal gaze. These aspects involve the 'foundations' of our lives and actions. In our daily 
lives we do not have to pay attention to these foundations, we simply take them for granted. In 
fact, we usually forget about them altogether. Heidegger argues that all our actions and 
behaviours, are premised upon an 'already existing' interpretation of the world, what he calls our 
'preontological understanding of being'. This is given to us by the culture in which we emerge as 
any particular human being. Thus the culture in which we find ourselves provides us with a 
preconscious orientation towards the world. As we saw in the last chapter this is not something 
we can stand apart from and examine because it structures our very ways of examining in the first 
place. As we saw In chapter five, Heidegger uses the term being-in-the-world in an attempt to get 
beyond a notion of the human being as something separate from its world. He says: 
"Dasein is never 'primarily' a being which is, so to speak, free from being-in, but 
which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' toward the world. 
Taking up relationships toward the world is possible only because Dasein, as 
being-in-the-world 
, is as 
it is" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 84). 
Our worlds are always in us, as we are in our worlds. Thus our understanding of ourselves is 
always already structured for us. We cannot hope to develop an understanding of ourselves which 
is free fron-ý or outside, the various possibilities thrown up by the culture in which we live, or by 
the cultures we have access to. This is most clearly seen in relation to language. The words we 
use to understand ourselves are always 'common words', in the sense that they are always shared 
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by the community in which we live'. In Being and Time, Heidegger uses the term Das Allan to 
indicate the world of our everyday social involvement. This is the they-world. Dreyfus (1991) 
translates the term Das Man simply as "the one". It refers to the social world in which we 
normaUy five our fives. Dreyfus argues that there is a major internal contradiction in Heidegger's 
approach to this everyday social world. He says: 
"Heidegger is influenced by Kierkegaard and Dilthey, both of whom had a great 
deal to say about the importance of the social world. But, whereas Dilthey 
emphasized the positive function of social phenomena, which he called the 
"objectifications of life, " Kierkegaard focused on the negative effects of 
conformism and banality of what he called "the public". Heidegger takes up and 
extends the Diltheyan insight that intelligibility and truth arise only in the context 
of public, historical practices, but he is also deeply influenced by the 
Kierkegaardian view that "the truth is never in the crowd"" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 
143). 
Although Dasein is always being-in-the-world (including the social world), Heidegger (perhaps 
following Kierkegaard) describes Dasein's everyday involvement in Das Man as Tallenness'. He 
describes Dasein's 'fallen' involvement with the world as indicating a 'Weeing of Dasein in the face 
of itself' (p. 229). The result is that Dasein's existence, as existence in the mode of Das Man, is 
inauthentic. There is thus a normative element to Heidegger's account of Dasein as being-in-the- 
world. It would appear that while Dasein always exists with apreontological understanding' of 
the world, something which Dasein receives from the world of Das Man, nevertheless Dasein 
possesses the possibility of moving beyond this. This possibility is given, as we saw in chapter 
six, in the state of anxiety. In anxiety, Dasein experiences the world and all its meanings as 
41n spite of this, as we noted in previous chapters, Heidegger's own project in Being and 
Time, is an effort to get beyond our ordinary culture and language and generate an account of 
human reality in its universal essence. 
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contingent, without any ultimate grounding. In this state it is brought before itself as being, itself, 
the only ground. This is a painful and desperate moment and Dasein, normally, attempts to flee. 
In anxiety, Dasein is, so to speak, truly alone. He says: 
"Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it 
falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. 
Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about - its authentic 
potentia]4-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost 
Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially 
upon possibilities" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 232). 
There would thus appear to be a contradiction in Heidegger's account, two incompatible accounts 
of inauthenticity. Dreyfus calls these the structural and motivational accounts. On the one hand 
Dasein is involved M* the everyday social world because of structural necessity. It simply is being- 
in-the-world. On the other hand, Dasein 'actively' flees into this world to escape from the pain of 
anxiety. The latter account contains the implication that Dasein could potentially change its 
position and move away fi7om its inauthentic participation in the world of Das Man. By contrast 
the former account seems to undermine the very possibility of such authenticity. The motivational 
account of inauthenticity is developed, at length, in Division 11 of Being and Time. Heidegger 
further extends the idea that it is Dasein's response to anxiety which determines whether it 
becomes authentic or not. Dreyfus argues that Heidegger was involved in an unsuccessful attempt 
to 'secularize' Kierkegaard's interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the fall. For Kierkegaard, 
our distraction by the practices of the everyday world constituted sinfulness. In Heidegger's work 
this becomes falleness. However, according to Dreyfus: 
"Heidegger's attempted secularization runs into a double contradiction, 
inauthenticity becomes both inevitable and incomprehensible. On the one hand, if 
one holds that falling as absorption is motivated by fleeing, i. e., that absorption is 
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a way of covering up Dasein's nuflity, then, since absorption is essential to Dasein 
as being-in-the-world, Dasein becomes essentially inauthentic. On the other hand ) if facing the truth about itself leads Dasein to equanimity, appropriate action, and 
unshakable joy, resoluteness is so rewarding that, once one is authentic, falling 
back into inauthenticity becomes incomprehensible" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 334). 
At the heart of this contradiction lies Heidegger's indebtedness to both the hermeneutic philosophy 
of Dilthey and the existentialist philosophy of Kierkegaard. Dreyfus makes a case in favour of the 
former approach and argues for a 'Wittgensteinian interpretation of being-in-the-world in terms 
of shared background practices' (p. 144). However existentialists can find in Being and Time 
strong support for a philosophy of fife which emphasises the importance of individual freedom and 
choice. In the later works Heidegger left these tensions behind. The important point for our 
discussion is that this analysis has clarified, to some extent at least, the problematic position of 
anxiety, in Being and Time. As I wish to use Heidegger's thought to help orientate an approach 
to trauma and, in particular, cultural aspects of this, I want to shed the universalist existentialist 
dimension while holding on to the hermeneutic insights'. If Dreyfus is correct, and Heidegger's 
universalist presentation of anxiety and inauthenticity, is a secularised version of a 
I'V. 
ýMerkegaardian) Christian narrative then I feel justified in doing this. The Christian orientation 
to the world carries its own ontology and cannot be used to account for the realities of other, non- 
Christian, cultures. In essence, I wish to 'hold on to' Heidegger's depiction of anxiety as a state-of- 
mind in which the meaningfullness of the world withdraws from us, but 'leave behind' his idea that 
this arises in the same way, and serves the same function, in all cultures. 
I believe that this move is supported by textual evidence from Heidegger, himself Being and 
'However, as argued in the last chapter, I want to retain an understanding of the 
ontological dimension of trauma, but as aparticular problematic of certain cultures. 
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Time was published in 1927. In a lecture course given in 1929-30, and published first in an English 
translation in 1995 as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, 
Heidegger moved away fi7om a focus on the centrality of anxiety and instead presented boredom 
as a Grundstimmung, or'fundamental. attunement 
6. Most importantly this attunement of boredom 
was presented by Heidegger, in this lecture series, as historically situated Heidegger begins his 
analysis of boredom (Langeweile, literally meaning 'long while') by stressing that any attunement 
has a public dimension. It is something which is not simply inside or outside. It rather. 
11... imposes itself on everything. It is not at all 'inside'in some interiority, only to 
appear in the flash of an eye; but for this reason it is not at all outside either. ... Attunement is not some being that appears in the soul as an experience, but the 
way of our being there with one another" (Heidegger, 1995, p. 66). 
In addition, he stresses that attunement should not be regarded as a 'side effect' of some other 
phenomenon. Indeed, attunement itself is the fundamental basis upon Dasein can begin to have 
any experience at all - 
"Attunements are the fundamental ways in which wefind ourselves disposed in 
such and such a way. Attunements are the 'how'[ Wie] according to which one is 
in such and such a way. Certainly we often take this 'one in such and such a way' 
... as something 
indifferent, in contrast to what we intend to do, what we are 
occupied with, or what will happen to us. And yet this 'one is in such and such a 
way'is not - is never - simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, 
acting. It is - to put it crudely - the presupposition for such things, the'medium' 
within which they first happen" (Heidegger, 1995, pgs 67-68). 
Heidegger goes on to examine different 'interpretations of our contemporary situation' and asks 
6 The translators of this lecture series use the term 'attunement' for Heidegger's word 
Shmmung. This is usually translated by the word'mood'. Our moods are perhaps the most familiar 
ways in which we are in a'state-of-mind'. 
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why it is that we feel a need for an interpretation of our situation in the first place?, why is it that 
we seek a 'role' for ourselves? He suggests that perhaps we find ourselves in need of making 
'ourselves interesting to ourselves again'. This leads to a question concerning boredom. Have we, 
he asks, become bored with ourselves. In attempting an answer to this question Heidegger 
distinguishes a 'profound boredom' from more everyday forms. He suggests that this profound 
form of boredom is something particularly associated with 'our Dasein', our contemporary human 
reality. Ironically it is actually a lack of oppressiveness, a lack of mystery and terror, which most 
'oppresses' us. 
"This being left empty ultimately resonates in our Dasein, its emptiness is the 
absence of any essential oppressiveness. The mystery [Geheimnis] is lacking in our 
Dasein, and thereby the inner terror that every mystery carries with it and that 
gives Dasein its greatness remains absent. The absence of oppressiveness is what 
fundamentally oppresses and leaves us most profoundly empty, i. e. the 
fundamental emptiness that bores us" (Heidegger, 1995, pgs. 163-164). 
Thus, even in the late 1920s, Heidegger was moving towards the idea that different periods of 
history have been associated with different attunements. Different attunements open up different 
epochs. In On the Essence of Truth he writes: 
"Every mode of historical man's comportment - whether accentuated or not, 
whether understood or not - is attuned, and by this attunment is drawn up into 
beings as a whole" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 129). 
It would appear that even shortly after Being and Time Heidegger had abandoned the idea that 
anxiety was the fundamental human mood which defined the (universal) human predicament. 
Instead other moods are introduced. Furthermore these other moods can come to define different 
historical epochs. In the lectures of 1929-30 he presents 'profound boredom' as the attunement 
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of contemporary Dasein. However a number of commentators make a case that in the course of 
his writing on technology and nihilism (see below) anxiety again emerges, this time not as a 
universal state-of-mind of every individual Dasein, but as the epochal mood of modernity. For 
example, Dreyfus writes that : 
"Later Heidegger 
... gives up 
his existential account of anxiety, and of falling as 
a motivated cover-up of Dasein's essential nullity and unsettledness. ... 
Heidegger 
the thinker (not the hermeneutic phenomenologist with a preontological 
understanding of the sense of being) interprets anxiety as a specific response to the 
rootlessness of the contemporary technological world" (Dreyfus, 1993, pgs 336- 
337). 
Tj- 
FLowever, there is little textual elaboration of this connection between anxiety and modernity in 
the later works of Heidegger, himself'. Nfichel Haar (1992) makes the point that Heidegger 
speaks more about a mood of'terror'in relation to the nihilism of modernity, but whether this can 
be directly equated with anxiety in the work of Heidegger remains unclear. I will not dwell on 
the issue here. My purpose in introducing Heidegger's concept of 'epochal attunements' is meant 
merely to support my use of the insights of Being and Time, minus the concept of existential 
anxiety as a universal. My argument is that the connection between anxiety, death and authenticity 
presented in Being and Time as a fundamental aspect of human life is, in fact, something which 
is particularly associated with modernity and thus not universal. I will turn to the work of 
philosophers other than Heidegger to make my case for a specific connection between anxiety and 
modernity. However I will use Heidegger's critique of modernity as a way into this issue. This 
critique is also relevant to the themes of the next chapter. 
7 Dreyfus Points to the essay 7-he Way Back into the Ground ofMetaphysics and I quote 
from this below. 
232 
9.2 T JE LATER WOR S OF HEIDEGGER 
WHe Heidegger makes it clear at the beginning ofBeing and Time that his exploration of Dasein 
is only a path into the exploration of being itself, this path was the only one opened in the work. 
In his writings after the mid-thirties, Heidegger spoke less about exploring being through an 
exploration of Dasein and more about exploring being in a more direct way. In this vision human 
existence and temporality arise within a wider, more encompassing, "openness" which cannot be 
grasped in ten-ns of human reality alone. Heidegger began to attempt a "thinking" of being in its 
own terms. As Zinimen-nan remarks this was a move away fi7om the "remaining anthropocentrism" 
(Zimmerman, 1993) discernible in the earlier works. 
The later works increasingly focused on language as having a direct relationship to being outside 
the confmes of ordinary human life. Heidegger also increasingly turned his attention to the 
history of being. In a series of deconstructive readings of the great thinkers of the Western 
metaphysical tradition he sought to disclose the underlying and unthought presuppositions of this 
tradition. For Heidegger the history of metaphysics was about the way in which being has been 
"forgotten". In the 1949 essay The Way Back into the Ground ofMetaphysics he draws on a 
metaphor from Descartes in which the whole of philosophy is likened to a tree. In this metaphor 
the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics while the other disciplines emerge from these 
central structures as do the branches of a tree. Heidegger seizes upon this image and asks : 
"in what soil do the roots of the tree of philosophy have their hold? Out of what 
ground do the roots - and through them the whole tree- receive their nourishing 
juices and strengths? 
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In other words: 
"What is the basis and element of metaphysics? What is metaphysics, viewed from 
its ground? What is metaphysics itself, at bottom? " (Heidegger, 1956, p. 207). 
His point is that philosophy systematically forgets the ground, even though the ground always 
enters and lives in the roots themselves and indeed in the tree as a whole. Whenever metaphysics 
thinks about beings as beings, then such beings are "already in sight". What shows them up as 
beings in the first place is ignored by philosophy. Heidegger's complaint is that metaphysics, far 
from revealing the ground from which our thinking has sprung, actually works to conceal this 
ground- 
"Due to the manner in which it thinks of beings, metaphysics almost seems to be, 
without knowing it, the barrier which keeps man from the original involvement of 
Being in human nature" (Heidegger, 1956, p. 211). 
Heidegger's histoncal works attempt to show how the ground, i. e. being itself, has been 
"revealed" in its "concealment" by metaphysics. He moves away from a vision of Dasein as some 
sort of fixed opening to being. Instead he histoficizes the notion of Dasein's clearing. Thus Dasein 
is seen to be historically the recipient of a succession of different clearings. 
My presentation of Heidegger's later philosophy will not attempt to be, in any way, 
comprehensive. However, as these ideas have substantially influenced the other philosophers 
whose works are discussed below is, it is important to provide an introduction, at least, to this 
philosophy. In addition, in the next chapter I will make use of his concept of Gelassenheit 
(Releasement) which emerges from his writing on technology. 
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9.3 ! TORY OF BEING AND THE CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 
In his 1938 essay The Age of the WorldPicture Heidegger asks the question, "What is the essence 
of the modem age? ". He answers that modem times can be characterised as the era of the "world 
picture" (Weltbild). He uses the word "picture" as it is used in the expression "we get the 
picture". This phrase indicates that what ever is, or whatever is happening, is somehow set out 
before us and we are equipped and prepared for it. Heidegger says: 
"Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirety, is juxtaposed as that 
for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to 
bring before himself and have before himself, and consequently intends in a 
decisive sense to set in place before himself' (Heidegger, 1977, p. 129). 
In the modem era, the Age of the World Picture, everything that is, including ourselves, shows 
up for us as resources to be utifised, enhanced, transfonned or ordered for the sake of greater and 
greater efficiency. In contrast, in the medieval era the world was not experienced in the form of 
a picture standing before us and to which we had ready access. Instead in the Middle Ages: 
"that which is , is the ens creatum, that which is created 
by the personal Creator- 
God as the highest cause. Here, to be in being means to belong within a specific 
rank of the order of what has been created" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 130). 
For medieval Christians reality was the presence of created entities, beings which were "finished 
products" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 338). Human beings stood in a position of acceptance with regard 
to the world, and knowledge was about understanding the order of creation. Heidegger also 
contrasts the modem age with that of the ancient Greeks. For the Greeks the world was not there 
as a "picture" for human beings to order for their purposes. In contrast it was the world, 
being 
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itself, which looked upon human beings and which opened itself to them. Humanity was: 
11 
... gathered towards presencing, by that which opens itself To be beheld by 
what is, to be included and maintained within its openness and in that way to be 
borne along by it, to be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its discord 
- that is the essence of man in the great age of the Greeks" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
131). 
In these different ages there were different understandings of being and thus different conceptions 
of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that Heidegger finds echoes of the modern approach to 
reality in works of Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle, he argues that they all remain within the 
general framework of the "Greek fundamental experience of what is". It is only because their 
thought has been presented to us through a "modem humanistic interpretation" that we have failed 
to realise how different their approach to being really is. He says it has been denied to us to - 
II 
... ponder the 
Being that opened itself to Greek antiquity in such a way as to 
leave to it its uniqueness and strangeness" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 144). 
For modem humanity the possibility of experiencing being in this way has disappeared. Because 
our understanding of being is that of the world picture, beings show up for us simply as objects 
to be controlled and organised according to our agendas. Ours is the age of technology. 
9.3.1 Technology and nihilism 
In the essay, 1he Question Conceming Technology Heidegger argues that to grasp the 
importance of modern technology fully we should understand it not merely as a "means" to an 
end but rather we need an ontological understanding in which technology 
becomes a mode of 
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"revealing" being. He traces the origins of the word "technology" to the Greek technikon which 
in turn means that which belongs to techne. This term refers to the activities and skills of the 
craftsman on the one hand and also to "the arts of the mind and the fine arts" on the other. 
Furthermore: 
"From the earliest times until Plato the word techne is linked with the word 
episteme. Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to 
be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing 
provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing. " (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
13). 
Technology is the modem cultural paradigm. It is the context in which the world as "world 
picturell comes into view. This understanding of the concept of technology is extremely 
important, because, as Dreyfus points out, Heidegger is sometimes presented as a latter day 
Luddite who simply wishes to turn the clock back (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 304). Heidegger does not 
ask the question, "How can we control technology? " In fact responding to modem technology 
in this way is part of the problem. It is a response set by the nature of technology itself 
Understanding our predicament as something to be solved by more appropriate action is itself a 
technological response- 
"The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man 
into the right relation to technology. .... The will to mastery 
becomes all the more 
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control" (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 5). 
Heidegger's concern is not with the destructive effects of specific technologies but with the larger 
human implications of living in an age whose metaphysics is brought into being by technology. 
In 7-he Question Concerning Technology, echoing his earlier reflections on the concept of the 
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World-picture', Heidegger also introduces the term Gestell. Lovitt translates this as 'Enfran-ýing' 
and adds in a footnote that he uses the prefix 'en-' to give a sense of the active meaning 
Heidegger gives to the German word. Lovitt says: 
the reader should be careful not to interpret the word as though it simply 
meant a framework of some sort. Instead he should constantly remember that 
Enframing is fundamentally a calling forth. It is a "challenging claim", a demanding 
summons, that "gathers" so as to reveal. This claim enframes in that it assembles 
and orders. It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons 
forth, through an ordering for use that it is forever restructuring anew" (Lovitt, 
footnote in Heidegger, 1977, p. 19). 
Heidegger introduces the word Gestell "as the name for the essence of modern technology". Thus 
Heidegger uses the term with a specific sense *. it refers to the sort of ordering of the worldfor 
human purposes which is characteristic of the modem era. Previous epochs of Westem history 
were not characterised by this type of Enframing. He argues that Enframing as a way of human 
beings relating to their world actually predates the rise of technology itself Thus Enframing is 
not the result of actual technologies, rather it would appear that the former gives rise to the latter. 
Enfi7aming involves both 'attitude and behaviour' and can be seen first in European society in the 
rise of the scientific approach to nature, 
It An ord L V%IIc ingly, man's ordering attitude and behaviour display themselves first in the 
rise of modem physics as an exact science. Modern science's way of representing 
pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modem physics 
is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the questioning of 
nature. Rather the reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory 
sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it 
therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and 
how nature reports itself when set up in this way" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 21). 
In other words, modem physics does not simply encounter the natural world and then develop 
ways of investigating it. The notion that it would be appropriate to 'investigate' nature happens 
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first and on the basis of this particular understanding of the natural world it then becomes 
possible to think in terms of scientific investigation. Enfi-aming involves, in a profound way, the 
domination of a certain type of thought. In this, Dasein comes to have a particular relationship 
with the entities of the world in which they become resources for it. These entities include fellow 
human beings. Olafson wntes, 
"Technological thought treats everything as being an object of one kind or 
another, and it does so because it is in this form that the world corresponds to the 
disposition to manipulate and control it. This disposition is observable in spheres 
of fife as apparently remote from one another as philosophy and the technologies 
of management. What is common to these very different domains is a growing 
determination to decide in terms of a pragmatic a priori what kinds of entities are 
to be recognised as existing for the purposes of a given activity" (Olafson, 1987, 
pgs 215-216). 
Heidegger warns about this ever increasing expansion of calculative and objectifying thought in 
in the Discourse on Thinking and suggests that the "greatest danger" facing humanity in the 
modem epoch is that: 
"the approaching tide of technological revolution in the aton-& age could so 
captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday 
come to be accepted and practised as the only way of thinking" (Heidegger, 1966, 
p. 5 6). 
What is at stake is not a problem to be solved but an ontological question concerning our modem 
understanding of being. 
In the essay, The Word ofNietzsche : "God is Dead" Heidegger, following on from Nietzsche 
and Kierkegaard, further characterises the modern era as the age of nihilism. In the modern age, 
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the technological age, the era of the "world picture", being is experienced as nothing but a 
manifestation of the will to power. Being is thus denied its dimensionality . Unlike Nietzsche, 
however, Heidegger does not regard the "death of God" as the cause of nihilism, but sees it 
rather the other way around. Nihilism is the "world-historical movement of the peoples of the 
earth who have been drawn into the power realm of the modem age" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 63) and 
is, in its essence, the negation of being. For Heidegger, when human beings understand the world 
as being composed of resources which can be used in more or less interchangeable ways, choices 
and decisions emerge about alternative ways of using these resources. These choices depend on 
what we wish to use the resources for. This can only be determined by further calculative 
reasoning. To do this we have to articulate what is at issue for us in any given situation. In this 
process we generate the 'values' which will guide our calculations and decisions. As Joseph Rouse 
wntes: 
"This is the significance of the concept of "value" : it transforms the configuration 
of practices within which thought and action are intelligible to us into something 
we can reckon with and wilfully implement. When this happens, however, the 
values chosen do not govern our choice, for they are what is chosen. That for the 
sake of which our choice of values is made always withdraws from calculative 
awareness. This complication calls for further reckoning, in a futile attempt to 
disclose our "ultimate" values" (Rouse, 1987, p. 261). 
For Heidegger this leads to an endless expansion of calculative thought. What is at stake is a will 
towards mastery and control, not just of the world around us, but of ourselves. This is similar to 
Nietzsche's 'will to power'. We have entered an era of nihilism and within modernity there is no 
longer any stable structure to what is at stake for us. Power, as expressed in the calculative 
thought of our times, robs us of any coherent and generally accepted meaning for our lives. In 
a section which will be echoed later by Foucault, Heidegger writes in Nietzsche IV: Nihilism: 
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"The new valuation ... supplants all earlier values with power, the uppermost value, but first and foremost because power and only power posits values, 
validates them, and makes decisions about the possible justifications of a 
valuation. ... To the extent that 
it is truly power, alone determining all beings, 
power does not recognize the worth or value of anything outside of itself' 
(Heidegger, 1982, p. 7). 
9.3.2. Subjectivity and modernity 
Heidegger argues that Descartes stands at the beginning of the modern era in metaphysics. In his 
demand for certainty Descartes set the basis for our modern experience of subjectivity : 
"The metaphysics of the modem age begins with and has its essence in the fact 
that it seeks the unconditionally indubitable, the certain and assured (das Gewisse), 
certainty. It is a matter, according to the words of Descartes, of firmum et 
mansurum quid stabilire, of bringing to a stand something that is firn-dy fixed and 
that remains. This standing established as object is adequate to the essence, ruling 
from of old, of what is as the constantly presencing, which everywhere lies before 
(hypokeimenon, subiectum) ... In as much as Descartes seeks this subiectum 
along the path previously marked out by metaphysics, he, thinking truth as 
certainty, finds the ego cogito to be that which presences as fixed and constant. 
In this way, the ego sum is transformed into the subiectum, i. e., the subject 
becomes self-consciousness. The subjectness of the subject is determined out of 
the sureness, the certainty, of that consciousness" (Heidegger, 1977, pgs. 82-83). 
In this metaphysics the self becomes anego-logical self and enters a relationship of representation 
with that which it has positioned before itself Thus the strong sense of objectivity brought into 
being in the modern era is linked to a strong sense of the subjective. Olafson contrasts the later 
Heidegger's engagement with Descartes with the arguments developed in Being and Time. In the 
earlier work Heidegger criticised Descartes' separation of the inner mind from an exterior world. 
He argued that this actually passed over how the world is actually experienced by Dasein. As we 
have seen in chapter six, Heidegger was of the opinion that Descartes's move 
in this was a major 
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source of difficulties for subsequent Western philosophy. When Heidegger returned to Descartes, 
in the context of his writing about Nietzsche, he was more concerned by the latter's positioning 
of the self as the preeminent entity: 
"Heidegger emphasizes instead what he takes to be the characteristic effort of 
modem thought to elevate the thinking self to the status of the preeminent and 
ultimately exclusive self for which all other entities that in medieval parlance were 
"subjects" on an equal footing with it become "objects" (Olafson, 1987, p. 212). 
The era of the "world picture" is also the era of the glorified self It is the age of humanism. For 
Heidegger, humanism: 
"designates that philosophical interpretation of man which explains and evaluates 
whatever is, in its entirety, from the standpoint of man and in relation to man" 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 133). 
This has brought into being a self which can best be described as "pathologically hypertrophied"' 
Its exaltation as the source of everything also renders it fragile and precarious. In a situation 
where human being has become the sole source of meaning and order in the world and at the 
same time has become increasingly self conscious and separate from the world, there is a 
continuous tendency for humanity to feel disconnected and for the meaning of the world to 
appear arbitrary and unconvincing. Heidegger speaks about the 'oblivion of Being' and in the 
1949 essay, referred to above, The Way Back into the Ground ofMetaphysics, appears to make 
'Hypertrophy is a medical term which refers to an increase in the size of an organ or tissue 
due to an increase in the size of its constituent specialised cells. Physiological forms of 
hypertrophy occur in skeletal muscle due to hard work and in the muscle of the uterus (the 
myometrium) due to pregnancy. In pathological forms of hypertrophy the organ or tissue is 
affected by a disease process. While it is enlarged, it is also rendered weak. This happens in some 
forms of muscular dystrophy. 
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a specific connection between this 'oblivion' and the state of anxiety (anxiety is here translated 
as 'dread') - 
"If the oblivion of Being which has been described here should be real, would 
there not be occasion enough for a thinker who recalls Being to experience a 
genuine horror? What more can his thinking do than to endure in dread this fateful 
withdrawal while first of all facing up to the oblivion of Being? " (Heidegger, 
1956, pgs. 211-212). 
Furthermore this oblivion is ever increasing. As our involvement with technology increases and 
ever more aspects of our lives are structured and ordered according to an ethic of efficiency our 
thinking becomes almost exclusively calculative. Heidegger asks : 
"What if the absence of this involvement (of Being in human nature) and the 
oblivion of this absence determined the entire modern age? What if the absence 
of Being abandoned man more and more exclusively to beings, leaving him 
forsaken and far from any involvement of Being in his nature, while this 
forsakenness itself remained veiled? What if this were the case - and had been the 
case for a long time now? What if there were signs that this oblivion will become 
still more decisive in the future? (Heidegger, 1977, p. 211). 
9.4 OTHER PH[LOSOPHERS ON ANXIETY AND MODERNITY 
I will now discuss the work of other writers (pHosophers and social theorists) who have written 
on this subject. I have already discussed the work of Charles Taylor with regard to the emergence 
of the 'modern self - 
We saw in, chapter three (section 3.5), how Taylor drew attention to the 
ways in which modem perspectives in areas of ethical concern have been in a position of mutual 
support to post-Enlightenment ideas about the importance and centrality of reason in human 
affairs. In his book Sources of the Setf- The Making of the Modern Identity Taylor aims to 
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articulate some of the background assumptions implicit in our moral beliefs. He is engaged in 
what he calls a'moral ontology'. He argues that in every culture there are basically three axes 
along which one can examine assumptions about morality. However there are great differences 
in how these axes and issues are conceived, how they relate to one another and their relative 
importance to different cultures. These axes are-- 
1) respect for human life 
2) what constitutes a good and meaningful life 
3) the notion of personal dignity 
The first of these concerns the moral beliefs around our sense that human life is to be respected. 
Every culture has a different notion of what this involves and there are different prohibitions and 
obligations in this respect. For some cultures the definition of who is part of the 'human race' may 
not correspond with current Western universalism, but nevertheless it would appear that every 
society has rules which involve prohibitions against killing and harming fellow humans. In the 
Western world the issues surrounding this particular moral axis have recently been formulated in 
terms of rights. The second concerns the issue of what kind of life is worth living, of what 
constitutes a rich meaningful life as opposed to one concerned with merely secondary matters or 
trivia. The third issue of dignity refers to our sense of ourselves as commanding attitudinal 
respect from others. 
Taylor argues that this third axis was the most important in the morality of ancient Greece. He 
suggests that for us this is difficult to conceive as it seems obvious that the first axis is paramount, 
followed by the second. However what is important to our discussion here is his observation 
that: 
244 
"one of the most important ways in which our age stands out from earlier ones 
concerns the second axis. A set of questions makes sense to us which turn around 
the meaning of life and which would not have been fully understandable in earlier 
epochs. Modems can anxiously doubt whether life has meaning, or wonder what 
its meaning is. However philosophers maybe inclined to attack these formulations 
as vague or confused, the fact remains that we all have an immediate sense of what 
kind of worry is being articulated in these words" (Taylor, 1989, page 16). 
While questions along the second axis can arise for different people in different cultures, for 
people living in modern society they have a particular depth and a particular set of implications. 
Taylor points out that someone living in a warrior society might well ask whether his tale of 
courageous deeds fives up to the promise of his lineage or the demands of his station in life. On 
the other hand people living in a very strongly religious community will often ask whether the 
demand for piety means that they should change their life or follow a call to some purer more 
dedicated vocation. The point is, however, that in each of these scenarios some framework 
stands in the background unquestioned. This fi7amework helps define the demands by which such 
people measure their lives with regards to its fullness or its emptiness. To us, living in the 
contemporary Western world, however, there are no such shared frameworks which might serve 
as a background for the articulation of such questions. Taylor says. - 
"the problem of the meaning of fife is therefore on our agenda, however much we 
may jibe at this phrase,, either in the form of a threatened loss of meaning or 
because making sense of our life is the object of a quest. And those whose 
spiritual agenda is mainly defined in this way are in a fundamentally different 
existential predicament from that which dominated most previous cultures and still 
defines the lives of people today. " (Taylor, 1989, page 18). 
Taylor then makes a point which is very relevant to our discussion about anxiety. He points out 
that the anxiety which is experienced in a strongly religious community where the unchallenged 
framework makes demands which we fear being unable to meet is something very different from 
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an anxiety associated with a sense of meaninglessness. He points to the anguish experienced by 
Luther with regard to questions of faith. Luther's struggle, and his sense of inescapable 
condemnation were quite clearly profoundly painful. But however one might want to describe 
Luther's crisis it was not a crisis of meaning. Taylor makes the point that: - 
"the existential predicament in which one fears condemnation is quite different 
fi7om the one where one fears, above all, meaninglessness. The dominance of the 
later perhaps defines our age. 
In a way which we cannot yet properly understand, the shift between these two 
existential predicaments seems to be matched by a recent change in the dominant 
patterns of psychopathology. " (Taylor, 1989, pages 18 - 19). 
Taylor's arguments about the moral ontology of the modern self are I believe quite close to those 
developed by Heidegger and are overtly in support of the connections I am making here. The 
descriptions of anxiety in Paul Tillich's book The Courage to Be are also consonant with what I 
am suggesting and his historical framework is shared with both Heidegger and Taylor. Writing 
about courage, which he says is usually described as the power of the mind to overcome fear, 
Tillich says that in the 20th century fear itself has undergone close scrutiny. In particular, he notes 
the distinction, made by Heidegger and others (and discussed in chapter six), between fear and 
anxiety. Fear is held to be in relation to something tangible in the world, whereas anxiety is in 
relation to a threat to the coherence of the world, as a whole. Tillich suggests that anxiety tends 
to hide itself in fear, as in fear, the tangible object can at least be faced by courage. As our time 
has become known as the'age of anxiety', according to Tillich, courage has become the ability to 
overcome anxiety. With this in mind, Tillich develops, what he terms, an 'ontology of anxiety'. 
Echoing Heidegger, he defines anxiety as "the state in which a being is aware of its possible 
nonbein " u. also says: "anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing" (Tillich, 1952, p. 35). mg . lic, 
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Tillich's approach to the existential dimension of anxiety is quite close to that of Heidegger in 
Being and Time. Thus, for Tillich, anxiety is an inevitable part of being a human being. Anxiety 
is an existential universal, it belongs to existence as such, and not to any particular pathological 
state of mind. Likewise, and unlike the later Heidegger, anxiety occurs transhistorically and in 
different cultures. However, according to Tiffich's analysis, because anxiety is, in effect, the threat 
of nonbeing and nombeing has different qualities, it is possible to think of existential anxiety as 
having different dimensions. He argues that there are three 'directions' from which nonbeing 
threatens being. The first of these involves threats to man's 'ontic self-affirmation'. These can be 
of a relative nature, involving issues of fate, or an absolute nature, in the form of death. Secondly, 
nonbeing can threaten man's 'spiritual self-affirmation' which again can be relative, in terms of 
emptiness, or absolute, in terms of meaninglessness. Lastly, nonbeing can pose a threat to man's 
'moral self-affirmation'. Relatively, this can take the form of guilt and absolutely it can appear as 
condemnation. Corresponding to this threefold threat, anxiety can appear as - 
"... that of fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), that of emptiness and loss 
of meaning (briefly, the anxiety of meaninglessness), that of guilt and 
condemnation (briefly, the anxiety of condemnation)" (Tillich, 1952, p. 41). 
While these three forms of existential anxiety are not mutually exclusive and can appear together, 
according to Tillich, in different historical epochs it is usual for one form to be dominant. The 
anxiety of fate and death is the most universal and the most basic. Human beings are always, and 
everywhere, anxiously aware of the threat of nonbeing and need courage to endure. While this 
threat is absolute in the threat of death and only relative in the threat of fate, in reality fate can 
only threaten us because death is in the background. Again, echoing Heidegger, Tillich writes that 
the threat of death pervades our lives as human beings. It is what gives power and impact to the 
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other fateful contingencies of our lives. This fon-n of anxiety ýdominated Western civilization in the 
'ancient' period. Tillich provides an account of this in relation to the courage displayed by the 
Stoics and notes that although the anxiety of fate and death was dominant in this period, the other 
forms of anxiety were also present. At the end of the Middle Ages anxiety of guilt and 
condemnation became most prominent. The threat of condemnation is very visible in the works 
of art of the pre-Reformation and Reformation periods. Images of hell and purgatory abound. 
Christian Europe witnessed a proliferation of various ways of alleviating this anxiety. Pilgrimages 
to holy places, devotion to shrines and relics, rituals of confession and penitence all became very 
common. In this time the anxiety surrounding death was embraced by an extreme concern about 
sin and its effects. Tiffich remarks that - "death and the devil were allied in the anxious imagination 
of the period" (p. 59). Whfle questions of spiritual doubt did emerge at times , in particular 
during 
the course of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the anxiety of condemnation remained 
dominant throughout this epoch and it is only with the Enlightenment and the rise of humanism 
that concern about spiritual nonbeing became prominent. Tillich writes: 
"the breakdown of absolutisn-ý the development of Liberalism and Democracy, the 
rise of a technical civilisation ..... its victory over all enemies and its own beginning disintegration- these are the sociological presupposition for the third main period 
of anxiety. In this the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness is dominant. We 
are under the threat of spiritual non being". (Tillich, 1952, pages 61 - 62). 
Concern about emptiness and meaninglessness are the central anxieties of our time. As noted 
1-111 avove Tillich relates these forms of anxiety directly to questions of 'spiritual self-affirmation'. 
Meaninglessness is the absolute threat of nonbeing to human spirituality, and emptiness is the 
relative version of this. The former is anxiety about the 'loss of an ultimate concern', the loss of 
a Ispiritual centre' which gives an ultimate sense of coherence, order and purpose to the world. 
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In this, there is the loss of any answer to the question of life's meaning. The anxiety of emptiness 
... is aroused by the threat of nonbeing to the special contents of the spiritual lif A belief breaks down through external events or inner processes : one is cut off 
from creative participation in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated about 
something which one had passionately affirmed, one is driven from devotion to 
one object to devotion to another and again on to another, because the meaning 
of each of them vanishes and the creative eros is transformed into indifference or 
aversion" (Tillich, 1952, p. 47-48). 
However a 'spiritual centre' cannot simply be created. They cannot be produced 'intentionally'. 
Indeed, attempts to do so produce deeper anxiety: "the anxiety of emptiness drives us to the abyss 
of meaninglessness" (p. 48). 
Thus Heidegger's discussion of how anxiety, characterised by dislocation and loss of meaning, 
is particularly associated with modem times is supported by a number of other philosophers. The 
psychotherapist Rollo May, who was substantially influenced by the work of Tillich, in his book 
7'he Meaning ofAnxiety also talks about the loss of a meaningful world and the connection of this 
with the problem of anxiety. We shall examine May's existentialist response to this predicament 
m the next chapter when we contrast this response to that of Heidegger and other philosophers. 
May argues that the- 
"quantity of anxiety prevalent in the presentperiodarisesftom thefact that the 
values and standards underlying modern culture are themselves threatened ... 
The threats involved in the present social changes are not threats which can be 
met on the basis of the assumptions of the culture but rather are threats to those 
underlying assumptions themselves" (May, 1977, p. 23 8). 
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9.5 TBE MOVE TO POSTMODERNITY 
Before finishing this chapter, I wish to discuss the cultural aspects of the move from modernity 
to postmodernity. I am aware that the latter term is contended in its references and somewhat 
nebulous in its actual usage. However it has been used now for many years and appears to be 'here 
to stay'. However, at this point it is important to make the following distinction. The term 
"postmodernity" is often used to refer to a contemporary social, cultural and political condition, 
something we simply find ourselves in the midst of The term postmodern is also used, in a more 
positive way, to refer to a way of reflecting upon the world and our place within it. In other 
words this is a concept of postmodernity as. 
II 
... a 
form of reflection upon and a response to the accumulating signs of the 
limits and limitations of modernity. Postmodernity as a way of living with the 
doubts, uncertainties and anxieties which seem increasingly to be a corollary of 
modernity, the inescapable price to be paid for the gains, the benefits and the 
pleasures, associated with modernity" (Smart, 1993, p. 12). 
In the next chapter I shall explore this second meaning of the term. Here, I wish to focus on the 
postmodern condition as a cultural epoch, as a way of life. I will suggest that in this way of life 
whatever systems of order and coherence came in the wake of modernity, have now begun to 
disappear. 
Just as the past two decades have witnessed an enormous growth in the literature pertaining to 
91 will not enter the debate about whether the term 'late modernity' would be a more 
accurate description of our current times (this term is used by Anthony Giddens). This 
does not 
have direct relevance to the argument to be developed here, as we shall see below. 
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trauma and PTSD, so too in the same period we have seen 'postmodernity' emerge as a central 
preoccupation of cultural studies and the various branches of social theory". In the sections 
above I pointed to major cultural developments within modernity. These were the move to an 
ontology which was characterised by Heidegger as involving 'the oblivion of being'. The second, 
and intimately related, development was the emergence of, what I called, pathologically 
hypertrophied subjectivity'. In Heidegger's analysis, both of these developments have given rise 
to the nihilism of modernity. In turn, this nihilism has been related to the mood of anxiety by a 
number of philosophers and sociologists. This (Heideggarian) anxiety, which we'equated'with 
posttraumatic anxiety in chapter six, is thus something particularly associated with the culture of 
modernity. By showing how these developments have become even more acute within 
postmodernity I hope to develop a'convincing' account of how posttraurnatic anxiety has become 
a preoccupation of our times. I will examine the implications of this account in the next chapter 
and in the conclusion. In this section,, I will turn to the work of a number of sociologists whose 
works often resonate with the more philosophical literature discussed above. 
9.5.1 The decline of 'meaning' within postmodernity 
One of the central goals of what I termed the Enlightenment project in chapter two was to use 
reason in the pursuit of an efficient and orderly society. Modernity was to incorporate a social 
life established according to the dictates of science and rational planning. An orderly society was 
to be a goal in itself In the utilitarian calculations of modern times the best society would be one 
"Jean-Francois Lyotard's book La Condition Postmoderne was published in 1979, the 
year before PTSD was established in DSM 111. 
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that was predictable and orderly. However as Zygmunt Bauman says: 
"Among the multitude of impossible tasks that modernity set itself and that made 
modernity into what it is, the task of order (more precisely and most importantly, 
of order as a task) stands out - as the least possible among the impossible and the least disposable among the indispensable, indeed, as the archetype for all other 
tasks, one that renders all other tasks mere metaphors of itself' (Bauman, 1991, 
p. 4). 
Thus even within modernity order was an impossible dream. Disorder always seems to follow in 
its wake. Indeed order and disorder appear as twin concepts and the idea of an orderly society, 
free from chaos and conflict was,, surely, one of the greatest illusions of modernity. As we pass 
into the state of postmodernity disorder becomes integral to our very ways of life. Indeed in the 
postmodern cultural arena 'meaning' itself is systematically undermined. In writing 'a political 
economy of postmodernism, Scott Lash talks about'the decline of meaning'in economic terms: 
"Meaning is only achieved by the connection of signifieds to signifiers. If there is 
an oversupply of such signifiers - as there appears to be in today's constant 
bombardment of images and sounds - and only a finite number of signifieds to go 
round, then large numbers of signifiers will persist with no meanings attached, and 
be literally experienced as such" (Lash, 1990. p. 43). 
Within postmodernity we experience reality as fleeting and unstable. The meaningful connections 
of our social world are rendered fragile. Elements of the everyday culture itself seem to work to 
destroy predictability and meaning. This is a theme Anthony Giddens returns to in a number of 
works. In his book Modernity and Seýf-Identity: Seýf and Society in the Late Modern Age he 
writes specifically about the position of the self in aTunaway world'. One of the key features of 
modernity which makes it different to, what Giddens refers to as 'traditional society, is its 
extreme dynamism. Not only is the pace of social change more rapid than at any other time but 
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the scope of this change and its profound nature mean that modernity contrasts markedly with 
other cultural systems. Giddens describes three elements involved in this dynamism. The first of 
these involves the separation of time and space. In the global world of post, or late, modernity 
telecommunications technology means that time is increasingly set apart from geography. Media 
events, such as rock concerts and sporting events, are experienced according to an international, 
rather than a local periodization. This separation of time and space is central to the second 
element of modernity's dynamism - the disembedding of social institutions. In this, our social 
institutions such as medicine, education, culture become separate from local contexts and stripped 
of specific local orientations. Giddens argues that there are basically two types of 'disembedding 
mechanisms'. On the one hand are 'symbolic tokens', media of exchange which are of standard 
value universally. The prime example is money and its circulation through international financial 
markets. On the other hand are 'expert systems' of technical knowledge. These systems are held 
to have international and universal validity. They are of many types, but Giddens make the point 
that, in our time, the medical doctor and the therapist are as 'central to the expert systems of 
modernity' as are other more obvious figures such as the scientist and the engineer. 
Both these elements of modernity move societies away from systems of social order based on 
tradition and spiritual authority. In turn this gives rise to the third element of modernity's 
dynamism. This involves the profound reflexivity involved in modern culture and modem social 
organisations. Never before have the members of a society written and spoken so much about 
themselves as in the modem West. Social scientists of many types provide descriptive and 
analytical accounts of society which feed into patterns of social change. Giddens makes the point 
that this reflexl"ty has had the effect of continuously undermining systems of meaning and order. 
He writes: 
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"In respect both of social and natural scientific knowledge, the reflexivity of 
modernity turns out to confound the expectations of Enlightenment thought - although it is the very product of that thought. The original progenitors of modern 
science and philosophy believed themselves to be preparing the way for securely founded knowledge of the social and natural worlds : the claims of reason were due to overcome the dogmas of tradition, offering a sense of certitude in place of 
the arbitrary character of habit and custom. But the reflexivity of modernity 
actually undermines the certainty of knowledge, even in the core domains of 
natural science". 
IronicaRy, science as the heir of Descartes' method of doubt, has come to destroy the very sense 
of certainty which he sought to establish. The absence of a 'non-deceiving' God in the late modern 
era has meant that self-reflexivity has not led to certitude but to disorder: 
"Science depends, not on the inductive accumulation of proofs, but on the 
methodological principle of doubt. No matter how cherished'. and apparently well 
established,, a given scientific tenet may be, it is open to revision - or might have 
to be discarded altogether - in the light of new ideas or findings. The integral 
relation between modernity and radical doubt is an issue which, once exposed to 
view , is not only disturbing to philosophers but is existentially troubling for 
ordinary individuals" (Giddens, 1991, p. 21). 
Whether we characterise the past twenty to thirty years of Western culture as 'late' or 'high' 
modernity or as 'postmodernity' there are signs that during this period the trend towards 
meaninglessness which originated in the time of modernity has been ever more powerful and 
pervasive. Thus, the central themes of Enlightenment - the veneration of reason and reflexivity 
are seen to have a 'downside, bringing in their wake a lack of any ground or stable order upon 
which a secure 'way of life' could be based. 
9.5.2 Postmodem subjectivity 
We noted above that with the advent of modernity human subjectivity had become 'pathologically 
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hypertrophied'. On the one hand it appeared to be the 'source of everything', while on the other 
it was experienced as 'weak and fragile'. The move from modernity to postmodernity has been 
explained in terms of a shift from an economic order based on the priority of production to one 
based, instead, on consumption. In a culture don-finated by consumption there is an ever expanding 
need to create more desires and needs within individuals. The logic of the current economic 
system involves an increasing exhortation to consume and to experience our lives in terms of 
needs to be fiRed by new products, new services or some new expert discourse. Never before 
has the realm of internal subjectivity been so well explored. We have books and magazines 
dedicated to every form of human desire. And, yet, we experience an even greater emptiness than 
ever before. Nickolas Rose has written about this paradox: 
"Consumption requires each individual to choose from among a variety of 
products in response to a repertoire of wants that may be shaped and legitimated 
by advertising and promotion but must be experienced and justified as personal 
desires. 
.... the modern self is institutionally required to construct a life through the exercise of choice from among alternatives" (Rose, 1989, p. 227). 
We are, according to Rose, 'obliged to be free'. Not only do we have to choose items to feed our 
desires however,, but we also have to choose our values from a range with an ever decreasing 
'shelf-life'. The nihilism of modernity, as described by Heidegger, becomes an economic necessity 
in the age of postmodernity. It is not hidden 'deepwithin the culture but instead is proclaimed 
loudly from every T. V- set and billboard. As mentioned above, Giddens draws attention to the 
importance of reflexivity in the time of late modernity. He talks about the 'reflexive project of the 
self, which he defines as: 
"the process whereby self-identity is constituted by the reflexive ordering of self- 
narratives" (Giddens, 199 1, p. 244). 
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tic argues, in a fortnulation that echoes the philosophical analysis of modernity discussed above, 
that this process directly leads to an undermining of 'ontological security. We briefly discussed 
the writing of Rollo May in the last section. In his book The Meaning of Anxiety, although 
pointing to the problem of anxiety as a problem of modernity, May also notes the powerful 
'anxiety-dispelling' effects of the Enlightenment and the advent of modernity. He notes that - 
"The confidence that physical nature and the human body were mathematically and 
mechanically controllable had vast anxiety-dispelling effects. This was true not 
only in meeting man's material needs and overcoming the actual threats of physical 
nature but also in freeing the human being from "irrational" fears and anxiety. A 
way was opened for dissolving the multitude of fears of devils, sorcerers, and 
forms of magic which had been the foci of pervasive anxiety in the last two 
centuries of the Middle Ages as well as in the Renaissance itself "(May, 1977, 
p. 24). 
In other words, the order promised by modernity had the effect of ridding Western society of 
many of the fears and worries associated with a world dominated by spirits and immaterial forces. 
We have noted the anxiety associated with the nihilism of modernity above, however the 
Enlightenment promises of reason and individual fi7eedom also held out a promise of security and 
of a world under the control of human beings. Postmodernity robs us of even this promise. The 
terrors of cultural chaos and disorder return to haunt us and combine with the ontological anxiety 
which is the ongoing legacy of modernity to render postmodernity the true age of anxiety. 
Uhich Beck characterised, modernity as a'risk society'. By this he meant that there had been a real 
increase in the number of threats posed to individuals by science and technology (Beck, 1992). 
However there has also been an increased focus on risk, associated with the rise of calculative 
rationality and reflexivity. In the absence of the moral authority and direction provided by religion, 
human beings are led to live their lives according to a utilitarian agenda which involves the 
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everyday calculation of opportunity and risk. In a language which echoes Heidegger, Berger et 
al (1974) speak about modernity in terms of humanity's 'homelessness' in the absence of'religious 
theodicies'. They note that although modernity has achieved many impressive transformations, it 
has not : 
'fundamentally changed the finitude, fragility and mortality of the human condition. 
What it has accomplished is to seriously weaken those definitions of reality that 
previously made the human condition easier to bear" (p. 166). 
It must be said that although the message of modernity seriously undermined any unquestioning 
approach to religious faith , it actually gave rise to a number of 
ideologies which provided 
alternative frameworks for many people, particularly in the 20th century. In a number of ways, 
science, socialism and discourses such as psychoanalysis provided meaningful systems of 
knowledge, through which people could find a moral order and guidance about appropriate ways 
to lead their fives. These systems offered a vision of reality in which human progress was a reality. 
People put their'faith' in such accounts of our situation and through this achieved some relief from 
the burden of calculative reflexivity. In the past twenty years anti-foundationalism and post- 
structuralism have subverted these ideologies and robbed us of 'secure' systems of knowledge 
about the world and our place within it. In a recent book, the sociologist Frank Furedi speaks 
I'll aDOUtour times in terms of a 'culture of fear'. Furedi notes that in the past twenty years Western 
societies have not only been concerned about risk but preoccupied by it. He points to the paradox 
whereby the healthier we are, the more, it seems, we are obsessed about health. He quotes the 
study by Skolbekken (1993) of the 'risk epidemic in medical journals'. In this review of medical 
journals in the U. K., Scandinavia and the U. S. A, between 1967 and 199 1, a phenomenal increase 
was noted in the number of articles dealing with issues of 'risk'. In the first five years of this period 
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there was just 1000 'risk' articles published, whereas during the last five years there were over 
80,000. Furedi wfites: 
"There may be different interpretations concerning the intensity and quality of 
different threats to our safety, but there is a definite, anxious consensus that we 
must all be at risk in one way or another. Being at risk is treated as if it has 
become a pen-nanent condition that exists separately from any particular problem. 
Risks hover over human beings. They seem to have an independent existence. 
That is why we can talk in such sweeping terms about the risk of being in school 
or at work or at home. By turning risk into an autonomous, omnipresent force in 
this way, we transform every human experience into a safety situation (Furedi, 
1997, p. 4). 
Postmodernity is thus a time when the established routes through life have been destroyed and we 
are left individually to set a course for ourselves. We are left with fragments of maps, in which 
we can have little faith. In this situation the self itself has become the route and while sometimes 
this is experienced as liberation, more often, according to the sociologists, it is felt to be a heavy 
burden. Our sense of living in a meaningful world is more fragile than ever and, perhaps, more 
easily shattered. 
My suggestion is that, in so far as PTSD is a disorder which has an ontological dimension, a 
concern with the meaningfullness of life itself, then it is a disorder which we could expect to be 
associated with the postmodern era. We saw earlier in this thesis that the intrusive-avoidance 
symptoms, at the heart of PTSD, are generally understood to result fi7om the individual's desperate 
attempts to make sense of what has happened to him/her. If my analysis is correct, then PTSD, 
as disorder of meaning, is something which we could reasonably expect to be more prevalent in 
the postmodern era and to be an object of concern for the society and its 'healers. This might 
explain the increased interest in trauma, discussed in the Introduction. Before finishing this 
chapter I would like to point to other work which has sought to connect other forms of 
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psychopathology with the culture of modernity/postmodernity. This discussion will not aim to 
be comprehensive, but will seek to show how other commentators have sought to establish the 
sort of connection under discussion in this work. 
9.6 THE POSSEBELITY OF A POSTMODERN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
Psychiatry has long recognised 'culture-bound' syndromes, but these have usually been patterns 
of distress located in certain non-Western cultures. Littlewood and Lip sedge (19 8 6) examine what 
they call 'the culture-bound syndromes of the dominant culture'. These are patterns of dislocation 
and distress, named and analysed by Western psychiatry as part of its general nosology but which 
appear to be particularly associated with modern Western societies. Traditional culture-bound 
syndromes are usually understood to occur in individuals who are relatively powerless and the 
culturally 'prescribed' syndrome allows the individual to communicate their distress in a way which 
will be recognIsed and understood. There is often a triphasic pattern consisting of initial 
dislocation of the individual, followed by an exaggeration of this dislocation (this phase involves 
development of the characteristic 'symptoms' of the syndrome), which is followed in turn by a 
restitution of the individual back into the everyday world (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1989). 
Examples of traditional culture-bound syndromes are : Koro', which has been described, in men, 
in Malaysia, China and other countries in the 'Far East'. This involves an intense fear that one's 
penis is retracting into onels -abdomen. The individual takes steps to stop this happening, 
in the 
belief that if his penis retracts he wifl die. Negi Negi', described in young men in the New Guinea 
Highlands, involves the public destruction of property and the threat of violence. It often occurs 
in men who are faced with enormous 
bride-price debts. 
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Littlewood and Lipsedge make the point that these syndromes do not simply involve the 
expression of individual distress but articulate 'core structural oppositions' in the society between 
different groups such as men and women, young and old. They possess a'public shared meaning' 
and appeal to beliefs and values which are held in common by members of the society. In their 
display of distress the 'victim' articulates the fundamental (and often unconscious) cultural 
concerns of his/her community. 
When it comes to the'dominant culture'(by which they mean Western modernity), Littlewood and 
Lipsedge make the case that syndromes such as anorexia nervosa, hysteria, overdoses and 
agoraphobia (in the main conditions suffered by women), could be regarded as culture-bound. C 
They are infi7equently found in traditional, non-Western cultures. They involve the 'inversion' of 
everyday roles prescribed by Western culture for women. For example, they discuss agoraphobia 
as 'the housewife's disease' and make the point this syndrome involves an exaggeration of the 
usual woman's social position which is 'in the home' and 'dependent'. In the case of anorexia 
nervosa, which is now taking on epidenuc proportions in industrialised countries, there is an 
obvious exaggeration of 'normal' slimming and dieting. There is clearly enormous pressure on 
young women and girls in such countries to control their weight. Attractiveness is often equated 
in the media with'a slim figure'. Littlewood and Lipsedge make the point that women are'more 
harshly penallsed for failure to achieve slenderness as they are more often denied or granted 
access to social privilege on the basis of physical appearance' (1986, p. 264). 
Giddens also examines the case of anorexia nervosa and argues that a central aspect of this 
syndrome is the profound degrees of 'self-monitoring' involved. As I noted above a number of 
writers have drawn attention to the way in which modernity has promoted rational control of the 
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self as an ideal. This control is achieved through regular monitoring and analysis of our thoughts, 
our moods and our bodies. Giddens argues that modernity has championed the 'cultivation of 
bodily regimes as a means of reflexively influencing the project of the self. Anorexia nervosa is 
a disorder of modernity and can be understood as: 
11 a pathology of reflexive self-control, operating around an axis of self-identity and 
bodily appearance, in which shame anxiety plays a preponderant role" (Giddens, 
199 1, p. 105). 
Anorexia nervosa appears in the 20th century and reaches an alarming prevalence in the past 
twenty years because our culture has, as a central preoccupation, reflexive self-control. Giddens 
quotes from the therapist Susie Orbach: 
"The anorectic woman encompasses in her symptom a way of being entirely at 
odds with the phlegmatic response of her nineteenth-century hysterical sister. Not 
for her the fainting, falling, or flailing fists; her protest is marked by the 
achievement of a serious and successful transformation of her body... " (Orbach, 
1986, p. 27. My italics). 
While the epidemiology of anorexia nervosa is clear-cut, and there is little disagreement that it is 
a syndrome of modernity and postmodernity, the same cannot be said of schizophrenia. However, 
the case that schizophrenia, the central clinical conundrum of the psychiatric enterprise, involves 
an exaggerated form of self-reflexivity has been persuasively made by the psychologist Louis Sass. 
In his book Madness and Modernism. Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and 
r"- 
-1hought 
(1992, b), Sass argues that most 20th century accounts of schizophrenia have either 
presented the condition as some sort of 'deficit state' with a breakdown of 'higher cognitive 
abilities', or as a state of 'wild' abandon, a state of 'Dionysian madness'. The first of these two 
images is best captured in Emil Kraepelin's original formulation of the condition as dementia 
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praecox. This image, allied to the Freudian notion of 'regression' in the work of Eugen Bleuler, 
has come to shape the dominant approach towards understanding schizophrenia within 
psychiatry. The condition is held to be caused by some sort of breakdown in mental functioning 
and the patient is understood to be operating at a 'lower level' or even to have returned to a 
'primitive'form of psychological functioning. The second image of madness is more often found 
in art and literature and even philosophy. This is the image of the 'madman' as wild and free, 
someone whose desire is not bound by the non-nal constraints of society. This image can be found 
in radical psychiatric accounts of madness such as those of R. D. Laing in the Politics of 
Experience and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Sass points 
out that* 
"The avant-gardists and antipsychiatrists have emphasised the positive side - 
excesses of passion, vitality, and imagination - yet they, no less than the traditional 
analysts, assume that the schizophrenic lacks the self-control, awareness of social 
convention, and reflexivity of "civilised" consciousness" (Sass, 1992, b, p. 22). 
Sass presents a very different interpretation of the schizophrenic experience. He finds strong 
resonances between the ways in which modern artists and writers have grappled with the 
contradictions of modernity and the symptoms described by patients who have been diagnosed 
as schizophrenic. Modern art, according to Sass, struggles with the cultural presence of both 
alienation and intensified, exaggerated forms of self-consciousness. He says: 
"Instead of a spontaneous and naive involvement - an unquestioning acceptance 
of the external world, the aesthetic tradition, other human beings, and one's own 
feelings - both modernism and postmodernism are imbued with hesitation and 
detachment, a division or doubling in which the ego disengages from normal forms 
of involvement with nature and society, often taking itself, or its own experiences, 
as its own object" (Sass, 1992, b, p. 37). 
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He suggests, in effect, that similar things happen in schizophrenia and explores a great deal of case 
material in support of this. Sass does not make an argument for a causal connection between 
modernity and schizophrenia. His work is aimed at helping increase our 'understanding' of the 
experience of madness, not at producing a scientific 'explanation'. However, he is very much 
aware of potential objections to his link between modern culture and schizophrenia. Most 
psychiatrists would object to his work by citing the usual interpretation of the findings of the 
intemational WHO studies on the prevalence of schizophrenia. This interpretation points to the 
similarity in prevalence found in developed and developing societies. Sass takes up this issue in 
an Epilogue to his book and argues that, by paying attention to the findings relating to onset, 
course and subtype diagnosis, a very different interpretation of the results of these studies can be 
made. He makes the case that what these studies do suggest is that the more persistent, and 
perhaps more prototypical, forms of the illness may well be more common in developed societies. 
He musters similar support from historical studies of madness in Western countries. While there 
are obviously no epidemiological studies that one can use to compare prevalence historically, 
there is evidence that schizophrenia did not appear, to any significant degree at least, until the end 
of the 18th century. Tl-ýs would connect schizophrenia with the birth of the 'modern episteme' 
which Sass (following Foucault) identifies with the Kantian revolution. 
David Levin, in the opening chapter of a multi-authored book edited by himself, entitled 
Pathologies of the Modern Seýf Postmodern Studies on Narcissism, Schizophrenia, and 
Depression (1987), argues that clinical conditions such as narcissism, schizophrenia and 
depression are particularly associated with modern culture. FEs analysis of this culture and its 
psychopathological effects draws heavily on the critique of nihilism developed in the work of 
Nietzsche, Adomo and Heidegger. He says: 
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I want to draw a clearer, more deeply ontological understanding of the way in 
which the epidemic psychopathology distinctive of our time is a historical 
manifestation of a cancerous nihilism : the "negation" of Being working its slow 
destruction through the agency of the human will, the human ego. The pathology 
is pervasive and not limited to a few unfortunates. This understanding of our 
pathology is what I call my "ontological hypothesis". (Levin, 1987, p. 22-23). 
Levin makes a direct connection between the rise of the 'modern self and the emergence of 
specific forms of psychopathology. I-Es interpretation of nihilism is not only ontological, he says, 
but epidemiological. He attempts to demonstrate that some of the 'postures of narcissistic 
disorders, schizophrenias, and depressions' are 'symptomatically implicit' in the thought of 
Descartes, with its strong focus on subjectivism. However these specific forms of 
psychopathology are merely the 'tip of the iceberg', according to Levin. There are, he says: 
It 
... merely the most extreme cases of a collective and archetypal madness - 
nihilism - at work in all of us. Nihilism is a cultural epidemic that defines the spirit 
of our epoch. Thus, our cases of psychopathology cannot be understood outside 
of an ontological field of interpretation in which we acknowledge our present 
historical experience of Being: our debilitating loss of conviction in the 
meaningfulness of living; our dreadful encounter with the possibility of 
nothingness" (Levin, 1987, p. 26). 
These are just some examples of the different idioms -. clinical, sociological, cultural and 
philosophical, in which different forms of psychopathology have been associated with modernity. 
Most of these accounts identify a particular form of alienation, involving meaninglessness and 
dislocation, alongside an exaggerated form of self-reflectivity as being involved in the 
psychological suffering of our times. 
We saw in part one of the thesis and again through the work of Janoff-Bulman in chapter seven, 
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that PTSD, as defined by contemporary psychiatry, is a syndrome which involves meaningfullness 
and assumptions about the self as central concerns. The intrusive-avoidance symptom complex, 
which is understood to lie at the heart of PTSD, is conceptualised by most workers as arising 
directly from a disturbance in the meaningfullness of the patient's world. We have seen above how 
modern/postmodern culture has been characterised by many thinkers as involving both a 
fundamental breakdown in the meaningfullness of the world and a particular form of 
'pathologically hypertrophied' subjectivity which renders the self disconnected and fragile. In 
bringing these two discourses together my aim is not to develop a new 'causal model' of PTSD. 
Like Louis Sass, I am not trying to explain the causes of PTSD. Rather I am attempting to 
develop an understanding of why our concern with this disorder has risen so dramatically (and to 
draw further implications in the next two chapters). If PTSD is conceived as a 'disorder of 
postmoden-fity' then this could go someway to account for this rise: both in the number of cases 
diagnosed and the cultural preoccupation with the disorder. I shall return to this issue in the 
conclusion. 
9.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have made the case that anxiety (as described by Heidegger in Being and Time) 
is not something which is present in all cultures to the same extent. Instead I have argued that 
this form of anxiety is something particularly associated with the culture of modernity. 
Furthermore its presence has become even more apparent as we have moved from modernity to 
postmodernity. The postmodern condition is one wherein meaning and order are systematically 
undermined. As PTSD is conceptualised as a disorder in which the victim experiences a profound 
sense of meaninglessness and dislocation, I have made a connection between the recent rise in 
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interest in (and possible prevalence of ) PTSD and the advent of postmodern culture. My aim has 
been to support the evidence presented in part one of this thesis that the discourse on trauma is 
not universally valid. My point is that this discourse is itself the product of a particular cultural 
preoccupation with trauma and the sequaelae of meaninglessness and dislocation. It has arisen in 
Western societies at a time when Western culture has taken a postmodern turn. In the next 
chapter I will spell out what I think to be the implications of this insight. I will again turn to the 
later Heidegger to provide a philosophical 'starting point'. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
HELPING VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 
So far in this thesis I have used Heidegger's ideas in a number of ways. I have used his concepts 
of being-in-the-world, worldliness and temporality to highlight the limitations of cognitive 
approaches in psychology. I have also used these concepts and his account of the ontic- 
ontological difference to develop an approach to trauma and loss of meaning which situates these 
phenomena, not inside the individual mind of the victim, but in relation to the social and cultural 
context. In the last chapter I introduced Heidegger's approach to technology and his concept of 
Gestell, and I used this as a way of opening up the relationship between anxiety and modernity. 
On the basis of this analysis I suggested that PTSD, a disorder involving loss of meaning as a 
central issue, might be best understood as a condition which is particularly associated with the 
culture of postmodernity. In this chapter I will make some suggestions about how Heidegger's 
ideas can help us to move forward in our thoughts about helping people who have been 
traumatised. In keeping with my earlier discussion of trauma, I will focus my remarks specifically 
on cross-cultural work with victims of violence. 
I shall argue that the later Heidegger's writing about Gestell and Gelassenheit (see below) has 
served to highlight the dangers of knowledge and the fact that (at certain times) non-intervention 
and the'holding back' of knowledge can have positive results. This position has been developed 
by those, arguing for a'postmodem ethics'. In this discussion I shall return to the work of Foucault 
(touched on in the introduction) and use this to emphasise the point that deconstructive 
approaches have an important positive function. By showing that certain assumptions are built 
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into the foundations of dominant discourses deconstruction works to show that these discourses 
are limited by the limits of these assumptions. This is a move outside debates about the truth 
claims of such discourses, to focus on the ever-present mutual dependency of power and 
knowledge. Through its analysis of the underlying frameworks of disciplines such as psychiatry, 
philosophy moves these disciplines from the realm of the necessary to that of the contingent. It 
does not prove their theories false or their practices wrong but it does render them open to a 
scrutiny which they usually resist through an appeal to supposedly rock solid (necessary) 
conceptual foundations. In highlighting the contingent nature of such theories and practices 
philosophy can also serve to bring into view very different approaches which are usually hidden 
by the hegemony of dominant positions. While philosophy cannot tell us what to do clinically, this 
chapter will go some way towards demonstrating the importance of conceptual analysis for 
clinical work. In working cross-culturally we move between worlds constructed according to 
different assumptions, different priorities and different values. In helping us to face this clinical 
reality squarely philosophy has a vital role to play. 
I shall begin by discussing the cross-cultural limitations of Western psychotherapy. These 
limitations also operate in regard to previous psychiatric work based on Heidegger's thought i. e. 
daseinanalysis. I then go on to argue for a different application of Heidegger in this area. This will 
lead to a discussion of his concept of Gelassenheit and various philosophical responses to it. I use 
these as a lead into a discussion of postmodern ethics and Foucault's role in this. I will then be in 
a position to apply the insights developed to the area of trauma. 
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MIT ,L ýHTS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
I have already discussed some of Heidegger's ideas about psychiatry and psychotherapy in chapter 
seven. I noted my 'disappointment' at how little Boss's daseinanalysis had moved from the original 
therapeutic approach of Freud. Both Heidegger and Boss were critical of Freud's attempt to 
develop a causal science of the unconscious and his use of interpretations which stressed the 
'symbolic' nature of neurotic symptoms and phenomena such as dreams and parapraxes. 
Furthermore, Boss argued against the concept of transference, saying that this only served to 
devalue and obscure the actual relationship between therapist and patient. Instead he used the 
term 'therapeutic being-together' and stressed the importance of actual trust in the therapeutic 
situation (Boss, 1979, p. 269). In spite of these objections to Freud, and in spite of Boss's attempt, 
in his book Existential Foundations ofMedicine and Psychology, to bring the insights of the 
daseinanalytic approach to bear more widely on the practice of medicine, his thinking about the 
practicalities of therapy remained indebted to classical psychoanalysis. Boss saw his therapeutic 
goal as a matter of extending the 'freedom' of the patient, but this was to be achieved through a 
change occurring within the world of the individual patient. In addition to the practical aspects 
of therapy being the same as those of psychoanalysis, it would also appear that the content of 
daseinanalytic sessions is similar to those of traditional psychoanalysis, albeit with a different 
emphasis. For the most part, therapeutic daseinanalysis involves encounters between individual 
patients and therapists. Is such a framework relevant to cross-cultural work with victims of 
violence? 
There is now a considerable body of evidence from the world of medical anthropology which 
calls into question the universal relevance of individual psychotherapy as practised in Western 
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societies. For example, two prominent commentators write: 
the use of 'talk therapy' aimed at altering individual behaviour through the 
individual's 'insight' into his or her own personality is firmly rooted in a conception 
of the person as a distinct and independent individual, capable of self- 
transformation in relative isolation from particular social contexts" (White and 
Marsella, 1982, p. 23). 
Margaret Lock describes how in Japan, where a very different cultural conception of the self 
operates, there is little regard for Western style psychotherapy (Lock, 1982). In many other non- 
Western societies different conceptions of the self and its relationship to the social and the 
supernatural also mean that explorations of inner emotions and conflicts have less relevance than 
in the West. Kleinman , in a 
discussion of the Chinese in Taiwan, writes that they invest: 
"intimate relationships with more affective significance than one's own thoughts, 
fantasies,, desires and emotions. Family and other close interpersonal relations 
become a person's paramount interest; coping with them becomes a sign of adult 
competence, and problems with them are more important to him than other 
personal problems" (Kleinman, 1980, p. 134). 
Similar considerations emerge with regard to many different non-Western cultures. Although it 
is a gross over-simplification, Shweder and Bourne's classification of different societies into those 
which tend towards an'egocentric' idiom and those which are more 'sociocentric', is useful. With 
regard to the explanation of illness, in more sociocentric cultures less attention is given to 
'intrapsychic' factors and more weight attached to : 
independent somatic processes, supernatural forces and social relations as 
causal agents" (Shweder and Bourne, 1982, p. I 11). 
In such societiesý 'talk-therapy' which aims at relieving symptoms and 
distress through self- 
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exploration and self-transformation, has less validity than in societies where there is a great 
cultural concern with the individual and the intrapsychic. If this assertion is correct then there are 
obvious implications for cross-cultural work with victims of violence. As we have seen in part 
one of this thesis, the currently dominant framework for understanding reactions to traumatic 
experiences in Western psychiatry, is largely shaped by cognitive theories. Psychotherapy, aimed 
at helping the victim 'process' the 'traumatic material', is widely prescribed. As I noted in the 
Introduction, after any man-made or natural disaster, and increasingly after more 'mundane' forms 
of tragedy and loss, counselling, or therapy, is understood to be essential. Daseinanalysis shares 
the individual focus of traditional forms of psychotherapy. It therefore shares their limitations in 
this area. 
In the past twenty years Western Non-Governmental Organisations'(NGOs) and the various arms 
of the United Nations have become increasingly involved with communities in the Third World 
who have suffered war and violence. Such communities are very often extremely poor and can 
become dependent on these organisations for health and welfare programmes. We have already 
noted the increasing presence of trauma in the consciousness of Western societies. This interest 
in trauma has also emerged in the NGOs and U. N. agencies involved with victims of violence in 
Third World settings. There is evidence that these agencies are increasingly 'finding' evidence of 
'traumatisation'in individuals and communities who have suffered wartime violence. They are also 
in the business of setting up 'projects' to provide counselling and therapy for victims. While these 
agencies approach their task in somewhat different ways there is a strong tendency for them to 
use the discourse on trauma which has emerged around the diagnosis of PTSD. In using this, the 
trend is for these projects to provide therapeutic interventions which are alien to the local culture 
and way of life. Furthermore, they often involve a substantial commitment to 
'training' and 
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'education'. This involves local people reconceptuali sing their suffering in terms of 'trauma', 
'symptoms' and 'therapy'. In other words, a Western, 'technical' way of thinking about suffering 
and loss is being introduced to people at a time when they are weak and vulnerable. The effect 
is often to undermine respect for local healers and traditions and ways of coping which are 
embedded in local ways of life. 
Based on the arguments developed in this thesis I want to make a strong case against these sorts 
of interventions. I wish to argue, not against the provision of support and assistance for people 
suffering the effects of war, butfor forms of assistance which work towards an understanding of 
contextual issues as a priority, and which function from a position of respect for the cultures and 
cosmologies with which they engage. This position of respect should lead to greater caution with 
regard to the export of Western psychiatric technologies and non-intervention in certain 
circumstances. In the next sections I will explore a philosophical orientation towards this idea 
of respect. As a first step, I need to return to Heidegger and his concept of Gelassenheit. I will 
use this as an entry point into contemporary debates about ethical thinking and ethical 'sensibility'. 
10.2 GELA 
In the last chapter we encountered the Heideggarian concept of 'enframing(Gestelo. This was 
introduced in Ae Question Concerning Technology and refers to the characteristic form of 
thought associated with our technological age. Enframing involves an encounter with the world 
in which everything is experienced as a 'standing reserve', on hand for our use. We saw that for 
Heidegger this was not just one mode of thought amongst others but the defining mode in the 
time of modernity. At its heart is an orientation towards efficiency. In opposition to this, 
in a 
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number of later works Heidegger proposed another form of thinking. I will loosely refer to this 
as 'meditative thought'. He called this Gelassenheit, in an 1959 book with that title. This has been 
translated as Discourse on Thinking (Heidegger, 1966) but the word Gelassenheit is usually 
translated as 'releasement'. In this work he explicitly contrasts the two forms of thought. 
Calculative thinking is : 
"the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains 
calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or 
computer. Calculative thinking computes .... Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything 
that is" (Heidegger, 1966, p. 46). 
In contrast, meditative thinking does not attempt any sort of grasping of the world. It is a form 
of thought which allows things their place. We keep meditative thinking alive by allowing a 
Teleasement towards things' and by keeping an 'openness to the mystery'. We allow a 
'releasement' towards technology, not by fighting against it, or by denying it, but by allowing it 
its place and by finding in it its own 'mystery'. He says: 
"Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong together. They 
grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way, They 
promise us a new ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure in 
the world of technology without being imperiled by it" (Heidegger, 1966, p. 55). 
Thus, Heidegger does not oppose technology, as such. Through it, albeit in a distorted way, we 
tte to being. Indeed, in Heidegger's framework we receive our technological understanding of relin t 
being. If we can keep open this idea, of a somewhat passive form of reception, then we have 
already moved into a non-calculative mode of thought: 
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"Our technological clearing is the cause of our distress, yet if it were not given to 
us to encounter things and ourselves as resources, nothing would show up as 
anything at all, and no possibilities of action would make sense. And once we 
realize - in our practices, of course, not just as a matter of reflection - that we 
receive our technological understanding of being, we have stepped out of the 
technological understanding of being, for we then see that what is most important 
in our lives is not subject to efficient enhancement - indeed, the drive to control 
everything is precisely what we do not control" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 307). 
Thus we have the possibility of moving beyond Enframing, even though, we dwell within it. The 
difficulty is that we cannot will ourselves out of our current dwelling. This was the essential 
problem for Heidegger : how to keep meditative thinking alive, when it was not something we 
could consciously grasp at, or aim towards. The picture he paints is of humanity waiting patiently. 
He says- 
"If releasement toward things and openness to the mystery awaken within us, then 
we should arrive at a path that will lead to a new ground and foundation" 
(Heidegger, 1966, p. 56). 
Famously Heidegger remarked in his last interview that . 
"Only a god can save us now". This 
remark appears to confirm the idea that passivity is the only option for modern humanity in the 
face of technological nihilism'. When he does advocate particular practices Heidegger points away 
from any sort of active engagement with the culture or politics of our time. Rather he talks in 
terms of a different type of 'dwelling' upon the 'earth', a way of living within the world in a 'non- 
exploitative'way. We get a hint of what Heidegger is advocating in the lecture Building Dwelling 
Ainking of 195 1. He looks back to a way of life which seems to have incorporated this notion 
of dwelling. While he is clear that we cannot return there, his tone in this passage is clearly one 
ofreverence: 
'This was also seen in the writing of Boss, see chapter seven. 
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"Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some 
two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of 
the power to let earth and sky, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into 
things ordered the house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope, 
looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide 
overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, 
and that, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long 
winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it 
made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the "tree of the 
dead"-for that is what they call a coffin there: the Totenbaum- and in this way it 
designed for the different generations under one roof their j ourney through time" 
(Heidegger, 1993, pgs 361-362). 
Many commentators have argued that the thought of the later Heidegger is simply unhelpful and 
leads nowhere, or worse to authoritarian politics and even fascism. This is the accusation levelled 
by Habermas, in 7-he Philosophical Discourse ofModernity : Twelve Lectures. Habermas argues 
that in his later work Heidegger presents us with a false and restrictive dichotomy between the 
all embracing dominance of Gestefi and the passive position of Gelassenheit. This analysis of our 
situation allows no space for any sort of active politics. We are doomed to 'wait' while locked in 
the all encompassing hold of a calculative rationality. Habermas condemns Heidegger for 
collapsing : 
"all normative orientation into the power claims of a subjectivity crazed with self- 
aggrandizement" (Habermas, 1987, p. 134). 
ALCCording to Habennas, Heidegger's picture of Gestell is totalizing and allows no opening for any 
sort of normative politics. This leads Habermas, ironically perhaps, to accuse Heidegger of 
logocentrism. For Habermas this means: 
"neglecting the complexity of reason effectively in the life-world, and restricting 
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reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension" (Habermas, interview in 
Bernstein, 1985, p. 197). 
While not following the critique of Habermas, Miguel de Beistegui also points to the limitations 
inherent in Heidegger's later concepts of technology and Gestell. In an attempt to understand 
Heidegger's infamous post-war silence on the Holocaust he analyses a number of key quotations 
-n- - from his works during this period. He quotes the 1949 lecture titled Das Gestell (The En-framing) 
in which Heidegger discussed the ever increasing penetration of the technological approach to life. 
In the course of this Heidegger said the following: 
"Agriculture is now a motorized food-industry - in essence, the same as the 
manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as 
the blockading and starving of nations, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen 
bombs" (Heidegger, quoted in de Beistegui, 1998, p. 153). 
Interestingly, de Beistegui notes that these words do not appear in the published version of the 
lecture. He points out that there is an unacceptable levelling implied in this quotation. Heidegger 
seems to be saying that the horror of the Holocaust was somehow 'in the same league' as the 
problems produced by a'motorized food-industry. He appears to say that 'in essence' there is no 
difference between these happenings. These are all presented as examples of the working out of 
the logic of Gestell. This analysis is not only 'insensitive' but completely inadequate from any 
philosophical or ethical viewpoint. The totalizing nature of the Gestell allows no position to 
engage with the evil of the Holocaust as something obviously different from the problems of 
a griculture: Z: p 
"When Heidegger defines the enframing as "the supreme danger" (&e h6chste 
Gefahr) on the basis of the fact that under its reign man "himself will have to be 
taken as standing-reserve", we must wonder whether the death of the victim in the 
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extermination camp does not represent a danger that is other and perhaps greater 
than the one anticipated in the enframing. Has the victim not moved beyond the 
status of the standing reserve? Does it not fall outside that logic, outside what 
Heidegger identifies as the fundamental trait, the essence of our epoch? de 
Beistegui, 1998, p. 156). 
De Beistegui also points to the centrality of the Heim motif in Heidegger's writings which 
encounter the political. f1is discussions of thinking, language and history which remain in thrall 
to the "exigency of the return (Heimkunft) ", and his preoccupation with an image of'dwelling' 
which is "bound to a domestic economy" (p. 159) are, according to de Beistegui, likely to 
encounter difficulties in the modem reality of transnational capitalism. 
However a number of commentators have drawn a positive agenda from Heidegger's these 
writings. John Caputo (1993) points out that these writing have inspired a 'new wave' of 
Protestant theologians who found in them a much sought-after exit from the existential theology 
of the post-War years. Heidegger consistently argues the case for a vision of reality which cannot 
be articulated in material or scientific terms. His concept of meditative thought is easily 
assimilated to a spiritual quest and he overtly talks about the 'mystery' at the heart of the human 
situation. Caputo notes that* 
"Christian theologians have shown a remarkable interest in and been much 
nourished by Heidegger's later writings. These writings are marked by Heidegger's 
deeply -albeit generically -religious discourse of giving and receiving, grace and 
graciousness, saving and danger, address and response, poverty and openness, end 
time and new beginning, mystery and withdrawal and by a new thematics of the 
truly divine God" (Caputo, 1993, p. 284). 
Heidegger died in 1976. At his funeral a mass was celebrated by the Freiburg Catholic theologian 
Bernard Welte. Welte (1982) has also argued for the importance of Heidegger's thought from a 
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theological perspective. In addition, Michael Zimmerman suggests that the later thought of 
Het egger produces insights which resonate with those produced by Zen Buddhism. Zimmerman 
cites evidence that Heidegger was directly influenced by reading works of East Asian religious 
thought. While Zimmerman is able to develop a number of similarities between various elements 
of the Buddhist tradition and Heideggarian philosophy I wish to quote just one here: 
" both later Heidegger and the Soto Zen master suggest that spiritual practices 
may help put one in the position of a paradoxical "willingness not to will", thereby 
preparing one for the releasement that brings one into the world appropriately for 
the first time" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. 256). 
Zimmerman also notes how Heidegger's notion of 'letting things be' has been picked up by a 
number of thinkers from within the environmentalist tradition. These thinkers have put forward 
the notion of deep ecology. They argue for a transformation in the way human beings think 
n 
about, and encounter, their environment and share with the later Heidegger a deep opposition to 
humanist thought. For example Christopher Manes argues that deep ecology involves learning 
a 'new language'. This would involve removing human reason from its pedestal and developing 
a position from which we can 'hear' another language. 
"A language free from an obsession with human preeminence and reflecting the 
ontological humility implicit in evolutionary theory, ecological science, and 
postmodern thought, must leap away from the rhetoric of humanism we speak 
today. Perhaps it will draw on the ontological egalitarianism of native American 
or other primal cultures, with their attentiveness to place and local processes. 
Attending to ecological knowledge means metaphorically relearning "the language 
of birds" - the passions, pains, and cryptic intents of the other biological 
communities that surround us and silently interpenetrate our existence " (Manes, 
1992, p. 349). 
Thus, the later Heidegger's encounter with modernity has been both an inspiration and the subject 
of severe criticism. Given his involvement with the Nazis and his post-war silence with regard to 
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the Holocaust, any positive agenda which is seen to rest on Heidegger's work is likely to be the 
su . ect of controversy for some time. In spite of this, I believe that his distinction between the 
Gestell and Gelassenheit modes of thinking is a helpful orientation. In the next section I discuss 
how this has had an effect on certain aspects of ethical thought within the continental philosophy 
tradition. What Mows in not meant to be a comprehensive exposition of the emerging discourse 
of 'post modem ethics'. I am concerned simply to show how Heidegger's thought has opened up 
a way of thinking which is of relevance to the encounter between Western psychiatry and other 
cultures. 
10.3'RESPONSEBILLITY FOR OTHERNESS' 
Much contemporary ethical theory is, according to Zygmunt Bauman, a product of modernity - 
a search for rational, universal, foundational ways of understanding the world and determining our 
place in it. However, within the culture of postmodernity, faith in reason, order and science is 
being rapidly undermined, and postmodern, anti-foundationalist pHosophies and ideas are now 
commg to the fore. Bauman, who overtly embraces the concept of postmodernity, argues that 
the modernist search for codification, universality and foundations in the area of ethics was 
actually destructive of the moral impulse. He argues for a "morality without ethics". For Bauman 
postmodernity is not about the "dernise of the ethical" or about the "substitution of aesthetics for 
ethics" as is often assumed and sometimes proclaimed. Rather, it is about facing up to the real 
moral dilemmas which face us, without recourse to the illusion that there will always be a rational 
correct solution. For Bauman, modernity was animated by a belief in "the possibility of a non- 
ambivalent, non-aporetic ethical code" (the term aporia refers to a contradiction that cannot be 
overcome, one that results in a conflict that cannot be resolved). He says : 
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"It is the disbelief in such a possibility that is postmodern... The foolproof - 
universal and unshakably founded - ethical code will never be found; having singed 
our fingers once too often, we know now what we did not know then, when we 
embarked on this journey of exploration: that a non-aporetic, non-ambivalent 
morality, an ethics that is universal and 'objectively founded', is a practical 
impossibility; perhaps also an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms" (Bauman, 
1993, p. 10). 
In his book Political Theory and Postmodernism (199 1), Stephen White has clarified some of 
the ethical issues at stake in the modernism/postmodernism debate. White distinguishes two senses 
of the concept of responsibility, a key term in ethical discussion. The more familiar is a 
'responsibility to act' in the world in ways which are justifiable. He contrasts this with a 
'responsibility to othemesswhich involves a concern not to silence other voices and thus involves 
an element of 'withholding' as a central concern. The former is associated with an obligation to 
acquire reliable knowledge to guide one's actions and is essentially concerned with issues of 
practical effectiveness. This sense of moral responsibility is most familiar to us because it is firmly 
attached to the modernist vision. It requires ethical principles firn-fly grounded in rational analysis 
and which can be held to be universally valid, This sort of responsibility corresponds to a Gestell 
-like impulse to order and control the world, to make it,, and us, function more efficiently and 
predictably. White links these different aspects of responsibility to different understandings of the 
nature of language. He says- 
"Language can be understood in terms of its action-coordinating or its world- 
disclosing capacity. These correspond, respectively, to the responsibility to act 
and the responsibility to otherness" (White, 1991, pgs 22-23). 
A number of philosophers have put the question of 'action' at the centre of their systems. These 
include Anglo-American philosophers such as J. L. Austin and John Searle who : 
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"have followed a strategy of analysing how in normal speech, our saying certain 
things allows us to do certain things (e. g., saying "I promise" under the 
appropriate or normal conditions also constitutes the making of a promise). This 
capacity of speech acts to coordinate our interactions under normal, conventional 
conditions is what Austin called "illocutionary force" " (White, 1991, p. 23). 
In the development of his speech-act theory, Austin (1980) argued that the meaning of an 
utterance depends on the context in which the speech-act is made. 'Context', in this situation, 
primarily involves the social conventions which pertain to the act. The success, or failure, of the 
act depends on the degree of congruence between the intentions of the speaker and the actual 
circumstances or context. A successful speech-act is one where the correct meaning is conveyed. 
Derrida, following Heidegger, emphasises theworld disclosing' dimension of language. He argues 
that neither the intention of the speaker nor the context are ever fixed enough so that a speech- 
act can be judged so simply (Derrida, 198 8). In the end, there is never a straight-forward 'correct 
meaning' in any act of communication. Once an utterance has been made, or a word has been 
written, it becomes something which has a degree of independence from the intentions of the 
speaker. Communication always involves acts of 'dissemination', according to Derrida. In addition, 
he maintains that the context is never something which is objectively 'given'. Derrida. suggests that 
Austin's theory privileges a 'normal' usage of language. His arguments are an attempt to 
deconstruct this separation of normal from abnormal language and to show that the conventional 
conditions for delineating a normal use of language are hopelessly open-ended and unclear. 
In his theory of 'communicative action'Habermas draws on Austin's work in arguing the case for 
a 'normal'use of language. In Habermas's theory speech must be subject to linuts: 
"These limitations, under which illocutionary acts develop an action-coordinating 
force and release action-relevant consequences, define the sphere of normal 
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speech" (Habermas, 1987, p. 195-196). 
In White's view, this leaves Habermas open to Derrida's critique. In the approach to language 
eveloped by Austin and Habermas words are basically used by human beings to help solve 
practical problems and to coordinate the actions of groups of people. While there is validity in this 
approach, it is for White, one-sided and partial. If the meanings of speech-acts and written words 
can never be fully fixed, language is seen to be an open arena of possibilities. It has a dimension 
which cannot be accounted for in terms of action theory. This is where Heidegger's concept of 
Gelassenheit is important. Gelassenheit involves a respect for this 'world disclosive' aspect of 
language 2. The 'responsibility to otherness' emerges from both. It involves an openness to the 
world which is made manifest in a gesture of withholding. 
Possibly the clearest account of what a 'responsibility to otherness' would involve is to be found 
in the work of Foucault. We have already encountered, in the Introduction, the debate between 
Foucault and Habermas with regard to reason. Much of Foucault's work has been concerned to 
demonstrate the constructed nature of some of our most established assumptions. Our notions 
su, %r. -. 'h as selfhood, sexuality and reason are shown in his work to be historically contingent 'cultural 
products'. We do not experience them as such but rather take them as somehow given. Foucault's 
airn is to show that the order produced in our fives by such givens is not established without cost. 
As White indicates, Foucault shares with other postmoderns: 
2 This is explored in a number of the later works and is the central concern of the essays 
in On the Way to Language (197 1). 
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11 a strong sense of responsibility to expose and track the way our modern 
cognitive machinery operates to deny the ineradicability of dissonance. The 
harmony, unity, and clarity promised by this machinery have, for the postmodem, 
an inevitable cost; and that cost is couched in a language of the Other that is 
always engendered, devalued, disciplined, and so on, in the infinite search for a 
more tractable and ordered world" (White, 1991, p. 20). 
Thus emerges the'responsibility to otherness'. This involves a concern not to impose order on the 
world but instead to allow the emergence of other voices and visions even when this involves 
increasing complexity and ambivalence. In the three volumes of The History of Sexuality Foucault 
set out to examine how human beings 'problematize' themselves through ethical discourse and 
practice. f1is aim was not to put forward an ethical theory, or a new set of values, or to tell us 
how to achieve our already-exi sting values more efficiently. He said : "I am not looking for an 
alternative", rather I would like to do genealogy of problems, ofproblematiques" (Foucault, 
1983, p. 23 1). Such 'problematizations' occur in a culture or an ethos when doubts emerge about 
axiomatic principles and practices. While Foucault was not about developing an ethical system 
or theory, he was at pains to promote, what Connolly calls, a strong 'ethical sensibility'. In this, 
Foucault sought to reach beyond good and evil' to an ethical position, not accommodated within 
traditional approaches to morality. In much of his work Foucault attempted to track the ways in 
which power and knowledge were intertwined. He argued that the one always implied the other. 
In this way certain voices in society come to be heard while others are neglected and silenced. 
In addition, power not only works to silence, it also asserts itself more positively by creating 
domains of knowledge and discourse. In this process power sometimes manifests itself in a 
division of the world into good and evil. However in modem society, which is wary of blunt moral 
divisions, power more often asserts itself through divisions into true and false, normal and 
abnormal/pathological. Foucault sought to demonstrate the contingency of such divisions and to 
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deny their necessity. He says that the distinctions good/ evil and normal/ pathological 
... reinforce each other. When a judgement cannot be framed in terms of good 
and evil, it is stated in ten-ns of normal and abnormal. And when it is necessary to 
justify this last distinction, it is done in terms of what is good or bad for the 
individual. These are the expressions that signal the fundamental duality of 
Western consciousness" (Foucault, 1977, p. 226). 
The'ethical sensibility' he worked to develop was about showing the suffering brought about by 
such regimes. As Connolly puts it- 
"Foucault finds a covert problem of evil to be lodged within the conventional 
politics of good and evil. Evil not as actions by immoral agents who freely 
transgress the moral law but evil as arbitrary cruelty installed in regular 
institutional arrangements taken to embody the Law, the Good, or the Normal. 
Foucault contends ... that systematic cruelty flows regularly from the 
thoughtlessness of aggressive conventionality, the transcendentalization of 
contingent identities, and the treatment of good/evil as a duality wired into the 
intrinsic order of things" (Connolly, 1993, p. 366). 
There are, of course,, certain difficulties with this notion of an 'ethical sensibility. It seems obvious 
to us that ethics should be orientated towards action, towards the future,, towards intervention. 
A number of commentators have argued that Foucault's refusal to offer a defined set of values 
which could orientate struggles against domination leads us nowhere. Foucault calls for 
'resistance' against domination in a number of his writings, but does not offer a guide to what to 
put in its place. A typical critique is offered by Fraser, who says: 
"Foucault calls in no uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But why? Why 
is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only 
with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to 
answer such questions (Fraser, 1981, p. 283). 
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I believe that this type of comment seriously misunderstands the sort of ethics being developed 
by Foucault. It is not that Foucault has no values to offer, instead he is conscious of the dangers 
involved when philosophers and other intellectuals start to construct ethical systems. He is not 
in the business of telling us where to go, rather the project is about telling how we have got to 
where we are now. He describes his work as a'philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what 
we are saying, thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves' (Foucault, 1984, 
p. 45). What many of his critics miss is the fact that Foucault was very much aware of the power 
of his own thought In his philosophy it was not possible, and not desirable, to construct a theory 
which was universally valid. Those who accuse him of failing to do so, themselves fail to 
understand the thrust of his work. For Foucault the time of the "traditional" intellectual, i. e. the 
formulator of universalist theories of human nature and liberation, is past. We are instead in a 
period where it is important for the intellectual to reflect upon his/her own position and to adopt 
a more humble approach to their knowledge and theories. He refers to such people as "specific" 
intellectuals and counts himself among their number. For Foucault: 
"the intellectual no longer has to play the role of an adviser. The project, tactics 
and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting" (Foucault, 
1980, p. 42). 
The notion of a postmodern ethics does not resolve any of the great problems or dilemmas of 
modernity. But armed with the 'responsibility to otherness', or a Foucauldian 'ethical sensibility, ' 
we are able to see the world with a different gaze. We are able to see the downside of modernity, 
the casualties of progress, the problems hidden from the view of traditional morality. We can 
expenence with greater honesty the immense ambivalence at the heart of our ethical situation as 
human beings. Bauman says: 
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... there are problems in human and social life with no good solutions, twisted 
trajectories that cannot be straightened up, ambivalences that are more than 
linguistic blunders yelling to be corrected, doubts which cannot be legislated out 
of existence, moral agonies which no reason - dictated recipes can soothe, let 
alone cure" (Bauman, 1993,245). 
Postmodem ethics is not about a situation where "anything goes". It is rather about facing the 
world without easy recourse to guiding codes or principles. It is about an acceptance that 
ambivalence and disorder are here to stay, not just temporary difficulties which need to be 
overcome by further analysis, or the application of ever more structured ethical systems. 
Postmodern thinkers would contend that by focusing on the 'responsibility to act', traditional 
ethics, has had to - 
"fix or close down parameters of thought and to ignore or homogenize at least 
some dimensions of specificity or difference among actors. To act in this sense 
means inevitably closing, off sources of possible insight and treating people as alike 
for the purpose of making consistent and defensible decisions about alternative 
courses of action. The modem thinker associates the commitment to this sense of 
responsibility with self-justification either in the sense of moral -uprightness or 
pragmatic effectiveness. The postmodern thinker, however, sees a deeper, 
unacknowledged will to mastery at work here" (White, 199 1, p. 2 1). 
Thus, while I concur with philosophers such as Habermas that Heidegger's later work cannot, in 
itselý lead directly to a progressive political agenda, and while there are profound dangers along 
some of the paths he has opened up, I do believe that his influence, working through philosophers 
such as Foucault, has led to important insights about the ethical complexities of our world. In 
what follows in this chapter I will return to the discussion about cross-cultural work with victims 
of violence. 
10.4 kL WORK WITH VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE: TIJE. CHALLENGE FOR 
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PSYCHIATRY 
As mentioned above these thoughts are not an attempt to develop a new ethical framework for 
psychiatry. There are many difficulties in the postmodern position. However, by dwelling on 
Heidegger's distinction between the Gestell and Gelassenheit modes of thought and ways of 
encountering the world, we can begin to see certain difficulties in the arena of mental health in a 
new light. Foucault's 'ethical sensibility', which, as we have seen above, carries echoes of 
Heidegger's Gelassenheit, can also have the same effect. Thus, one can imagine these ideas 
helping to clarify debates between the emerging 'user movement' and the discipline of psychiatry. 
In addition one can envisage how the downside of the, currently very popular, 'clinical 
effectiveness' paradigm could be explored through such ideas. My interest here is to show their 
relevance to work with victims of violence in non-Western cultures. 
While philosophy cannot tell us what to do clinically, it can help to clarify what values are being 
used in the course of certain interventions. It can highlight the assumptions and orientations 
which normally he below the surface'. With this knowledge we can become sensitive to problems 
which were previously hidden. As well as attempting to diagnose, analyse, treat and control 
illness, medicine also needs to develop an awareness of its limits and a sensitivity to perspectives 
other than its own. Foucault's point is that through simply proclaiming that one has access to 'the 
truth', one can often be guilty of silencing other, less powerful, voices. The resulting arrogance 
can be very dangerous. 
In chapter five I touched on the area of cross-cultural psychiatry. The usual assumption has been 
that because psychiatry is a "scientific" discipline, its findings and techniques are, in essence, 
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universally relevant. While culture may superficially influence the ways in which psychiatric 
disorders present, their basic forms are the same throughout the world. This position has been 
and continues to be the dominant one in this area. However it is now regarded by many workers 
to be seriously flawed and for the past twenty years has been under attack from proponents of 
what has become known as the "new cross cultural psychiatry" (see chapter five). We have 
already seen that there are three major assumptions contained within the traditional approach: 
(a) a belief in the adequacy of the positivist approach to research 
(b) a belief that the individual is the appropriate focus of attention both from a 
research and clinical point of view 
(c) the assumption that certain psychological processes, because they are 
biologically determined, are universal. 
The 'old cross-cultural psychiatry' thus incorporates the essential assumptions of what I have 
called in this thesis : the individual trauma model or the current discourse on trauma. The old 
cross-cultural psychiatry has been the dominant ideology guiding the export of psychiatry from 
Western centres to hospitals and clinics in the 'developing' world. In the Introduction I briefly 
mentioned the work of I-Egginbotham. and Marsefla. In an important paper published 10 years ago 
in the journal Social Science andMedicine, they gave a good example of how a 'responsibility 
to otherness' can work in action. By stepping outside the prevailing wisdom and contemplating 
the possible destructive consequences of the export of psychiatric technology they opened up a 
different educational agenda which involved a real respect for local ways of life. In their work they 
examined the way in which psychiatric care varied little in the capital cities of Southeast Asia. This 
was in spite of large social, cultural and linguistic differences between the peoples of these cities. 
This 'homogenization of psychiatry' was brought about through the inputs of Western (largely 
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British, American and Dutch) psychiatric experts. Via the mechanisms of international mental 
health education, consultation and collaboration these inputs had created a form of psychiatric 
practice in these different cities which looked to the West for its conceptual foundations and for 
ideas about innovation and progress. This rendered Third World psychiatry homogenous with: 
"(A) Common language uniting international and local levels (deriving) from 
shared assumptions about the shared nature of psychopathology, the use of 
standardised assessment,. and the efficacy of scientifically derived bio-medical or 
bio-behavioural interventions" (p. 553) 
While the anticipated effect of these developments was a better standard of patient care, these 
authors pointed to the unanticipated and very negative consequences which meant, in practice, 
an actual deterioration in the care received by people with mental health problems. They stood 
back from the general 'celebration' associated with the export of psychiatry and presented 
evidence for serious deleterious 'after-shocks' within local cultural systems. For example 
"The inability of local centres to generate research and evaluate services, in 
combination with pervasive resource and personnel deficiencies, means that 
hospitals become custodial end-points for chronic cases. Drugs and electric shock 
treatment are overused and non-psychotic patients are drawn into hospital work 
forces" (p. 557) 
They were able to demonstrate how the diffusion of Western based knowledge had promoted 
professional elitism, institutionalised responses to distress and undermined local indigenous 
healing systems and practices. They argued that, when seen from a perspective located outside 
the dominant tradition - 
"The net result of introducing a formal treatment system for psychological 
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problems is less help for those in need" (Higginbotham and Marsella, 1988, p. 
559). 
When it comes to the discourse on trauma, which psychiatry presents as being universally valid, 
we can see very clearly the potential for the negative effects outlined by f-Egginbotham and 
Marsella. Thus, there is already a body of Western psychiatrists and psychologists involved in 
consultation and "education" in the Third World and in Eastern Europe regarding "trauma 
psychology". This promotes a uniform language centred on the concept of PTSD, treats victims 
of violence with certain counselling techniques and "educates" local people in the "recognition" 
and "measurement" of the effects of traumas. The recipients of this knowledge are rendered 
passive and in the worst situations, are in fact silenced. Derek Summerfield, who researched 
N. G. O. 'psychosocial' projects in Rwanda and Bosnia, writes: 
"With the world's spotlight on the genocide of April-July 1994 in Rwanda, 
humanitarian agencies flocked to the region. Soon after the earliest flows of 
destitute refugees away fi-om the killing, a surprising number of NGOs, some with 
little knowledge of the country, mobilised psychosocial projects to address mass 
traurnatisation. One of these was a well-known international relief agency whose 
model - known as Emergency PsychoSocial Care - sought to make an early 
psychological intervention, both to offer immediate relief and as a preventive 
measure to thwart the later development of more serious mental problems in the 
exposed population" 
With this in mind, as part of their overall strategy, this NGO included an element of 
'psychoeducation'for the Rwandan refugee community and produced 75,000 copies of a brochure 
I explaining'the symptoms of PTSD. However as there was no word in the indigenous language 
of the refugees (Kinyarwanda) for the concept of 'stress', difficulties were encountered in the 
translation process. This did not deter the efforts of the NGO in question and they proceeded to 
develop a questionnaire and carry out a piece of research: 
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"First a questionna, re was distributed to evaluate baseline knowledge on trauma 
so that, after distribution of the brochure, they could repeat the questionnaire to 
see if there had been "an increase in knowledge". The question begged here is : 
whose knowledge were they talking about, the refugees or the agency's own? The 
assumption with which they had arrived was that there was a universal trauma 
response and thus standard knowledge about it" (Summerfield, 1996, pgs 14-15). 
This agency went to Rwanda to help, to assist the refugees and help them move forward and 
beyond the genocidal violence they had suffered. However, their thinking was dominated by a 
preoccupation with quantification and measurement, and characterised by a faith in scientific 
psychology and its ability to 'render' the world of the refugees in an 'objective form'. it was 
assumed that', in this form, the reality of the refugees was available for analysis and intervention. 
The organisation was concerned to be'active', 'efficient' and orderly. Their vision, I would like to 
suggest, incorporates many of the features of Heidegger's Gestell, the world of the refugees 
'shows up' for the NGO workers as something available and 'enframed'. An alternative approach, 
one aware of the specific historical and cultural grounding of this vision, would be one more in 
tune with Gelassenheit Such an alternative approach would be able to: 
1) recognise the importance of local contextual factors in shaping peoples responses to suffering, 
2) recognise that reconstruction of meaning involves, for the most part, rebuilding a practical 
way of life, 
3) work from a position of'deep respect'for local traditions of healing, local ways of life and 
local cosmologies, 
4) work towards an understanding of its own assumptions and orientations, and 
5) learn to 'listen' to local voices and learn the skills of, what I shall call, supportive 'non- 
interventiont. 
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This would not abandon the current discourse on trauma but would use it more tentatively and 
only from a position ofdeep respect'for local situations and ways of life. It would understand 
the Iin-fitations of the PTSD discourse, both because of the particular assumptions on which it is 
based and because it has emerged from a society which itself has particular difficulties with issues 
o meaning. It would pay particular care to understand issues of context wMe planning an 
intervention and would make strenuous efforts to 'listen' to local voices and work with local 
agendas. Surnmerfield wfites: 
"The initial aim, surely, is to put ourselves as close as possible to the minds of 
those affected, to maximise our capacity for accurate empathy and enrich our 
ways of seeing. It is vital that we do not misunderstand people when they express 
themselves in their own terms. We want as many as possible of the questions we 
ask to be right in the sense that they tap what the respondents themselves see as 
important or urgent" (Summerfield, 1996, p. 28). 
With regard to the available cross cultural research on the validity of PTSD there is no consensus. 
In their review of 'ethno cultural aspects of PTSD', Marsella et al write: 
"Limitations in the cross-cultural sensitivity of much of the existing ethnocultural 
research constrains our knowledge about culture- specific aspects of PTSD.... The 
measurement of PTSD remains a serious problem because the existing instruments 
often do not include indigenous idioms of distress and causal conceptions of 
PTSD and related disorders (Marsella et al, 1996, pgs 120-121). 
On the one hand researchers working from within a strongly medical tradition have, not 
surprisingly, found PTSD in different parts of the world. However, more anthropologically 
sophisticated researchers have questioned these findings and have pointed to substantial cross 
cultural differences in this area. My philosophical arguments are I believe supportive of the later 
position. 
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My argument is not that the Western discourse on trauma is fallacious or mistaken but that it 
makes sense only in the context of a particular cultural and moral framework. Its focus upon the 
intrapsychic, and its proposals for technical solutions are at least meaningful, even if disputed, 
within a Western framework. However, when exported to Third World or non Western societies 
they become confusing and problematic. I would emphasise that I am not questioning the 
motivation of most of the people who are involved in applying such ideas and techniques. Such 
workers are confronted by the outrage of violence and suffering in situations of war and seek 
whatever knowledge is available to guide their responses. However because of the devastation 
brought by war, many countries are increasingly dependent on the support of Western NGO's and 
UN agencies to run health and social welfare programmes. Without sufficient attention being paid 
to the sort of issues raised here, much damage can be done. 
10.5 SUNIMAI Y 
In the last chapter I used Heidegger's later thought, in conjunction with the thought of a number 
of his successors, to help us think about the connection between trauma, loss of meaning and the 
culture of modernity and postmodernity. In this chapter I have again used ideas from his later 
work to help us think about our position, therapeutically, in relation to victims of violence in non- 
Western societies. I do not believe that Heidegger, or Foucault, can tell us what to do, or how 
to be active, or how to help. For this knowledge we need to look elsewhere : to psychiatry, to 
anthropology, to local history and other sources. However, by thinking with Heidegger and 
Foucault on the issues discussed above, we can begin to open our understanding to the potential 
downside of interventions which might initially appear unproblematic. Their work also leads us 
to develop a different sort of relationship with the 'objects' of our knowledge and the 'targets' of 
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our interventions. In becoming aware of the Gestell, we start to position ourselves in relation to 
it. In doing this we begin to allow ourselves an opportunity to be with other people and their 
worlds in a way which does not involve explanation, analysis or diagnosis. This, I believe, can 





IIA SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In this thesis I have discussed theoretical and empirical research from a number of disciplines. I 
have quoted sources from psychiatry, psychology, and medical anthropology. I have attempted 
to mamtam a practical focus throughout. However, most of the discussion has been philosophical 
and most of the arguments developed have taken inspiration from the thought of Martin 
Heidegger. In this conclusion I wish to draw some of the themes together and point to some of 
the implications of this work. Three major arguments have been developed, These correspond to 
the three parts of the thesis. However the arguments of the thesis are not discrete or separate and 
overlap to a considerable degree in the text. In this section I will clarify these lines of argument 
by way of summarising the main findings of the work. 
1. In part one of the thesis I developed a critical analysis of what I called the 'current discourse 
on trauma'. This discourse,, which has developed around the diagnosis of PTSD, has matured 
rapidly and now occupies an important and influential position within both psychiatry and clinical 
psychology. The discourse on trauma had been very successful in directing therapeutic attention 
to a number of suffering individuals who had been largely neglected by both psychiatry and society 
at large, before its advent. Victims of torture and rape, soldiers affected by their experiences in 
wartime, children who suffer physical and sexual abuse were all virtually invisible to the gaze of 
professionals prior to the rise of trauma studies. To this extent, the emergence of a discourse on 
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trauma is to be welcomed. However, in my opinion, discussion of trauma has been seriously 
limited by the conceptual foundations upon which it has developed. I suggest that information- 
processing and cognitive models have become dominant, both theoretically and clinically, in this 
area and our thinking about trauma has been limited by the limits of these models. 
The cognitivist approach to human reality is premised upon a functionalist philosophy of mind and 
I argue that this represents a modem day version of Cartesianism. Current thinking about trauma 
is guided by an individualist and positivist agenda. It is based upon a separation of an 'inner' mind 
from an 'outside' world which is reflected in the mind in the form of representations. It assumes 
that the mind is 'something' which can be investigated scientifically and causal models developed 
unproblematically. The discourse on trauma shares these fundamental assumptions with 
mainstream psychiatry which understands itself to be, in essence, an applied medical science. As 
such, psychiatry thinks of itself as a progressive enterprise which discovers and accumulates facts 
about the nature of the mind and mental illness. PT SD is understood to be 'something' discovered 
by psychiatry and, like other disorders described by medicine, is held to have an objective reality. 
Furthermore, most PTSD researchers and practitioners assume that it is a disorder which exists, 
in basically the same form, in different cultures. 
These assumptions have not gone unchallenged. I point to the work of the anthropologist Allan 
Young. Young traces the emergence of ideas about psychological trauma from the last century 
into this, and argues that the concept of PTSD has, in reality, been 'created' (not simply 
discovered) by psychiatry. In the course of his analysis of PTSD he raises a crucial, but little 
discussed conceptual difficulty which is built into the concept itself This has to do with the way 
in which PTSD makes the assumption that symptoms flow unidirectionally from the traumatic 
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event. In a thoughtful analysis of the work of the Australian psychiatrist, A. C. McFarlane, Young 
raises the possibility that in at least some individuals, who have been given a diagnosis of PTSD, 
their focus on the event in question is actually the result, and not the cause, of other psychiatric 
symptoms, such as depression and anxiety. This problem is given added weight by the fact that 
recent biological research on PTSD would appear to contradict early assumptions that the 
disorder was simply an exaggeration of the normal response to stress. I use this material to argue 
that the sort of causal models which are currently being used in the field of trauma studies are just 
inadequate to grasp the complex reality of many suffering individuals. 
Of greater concern to myself, however, are the limitations of the PTSD framework in the cross- 
cultural arena. I quote from a number of workers who argue against the easy export of the 
discourse on trauma to non-Western communities. I also present case-material from my own work 
with victims of violence in Uganda to highlight the limitations of an individualist and universalist 
approach to trauma. Instead, I argue in favour of what I call, a context-centred approach. Such 
an approach would be consistent with the hermeneutic understanding of human reality presented 
m part two. 
2. In part two of the thesis I went on to explore some aspects of hermeneutic philosophy. I 
concentrate on the writings of Heidegger as, I believe, his thought is of direct relevance to the 
position I am developing. I suggest that Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world is more 
convincing than the Cartesian understanding of human reality and this is particularly the case when 
it comes to cross-cultural issues. In addition, I use his approach to nature and science to ground 
a critique of positivism. From this I also develop a critique of the sort of 'sophisticated' 
cognltlvlsmf presented by Bolton and Hill (1996). 1 discuss Heidegger's notion of the ontological 
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difference-, his separation between ontic and ontological issues and forms of understanding. The 
former refers to things which exist in the world, the latter to the background which, he says, 
discloses the things of the world to us and renders them intelligible. Heidegger suggests that in 
the mood of anxiety human beings have a terrifying sense of this intelligibility withdrawing. 
Anxiety is thus understood to have an ontological dimension. It is a condition which cannot be 
grasped on ontic level alone. I use this analysis to argue that post-traumatic anxiety is also a 
condition which has an ontological dimension Meaning and loss of meaning are phenomena which 
are inadequately accounted for in an empirical scientific idiom, I argue that cognitive approaches 
to meaning fa to do justice to the complexity of the issue. If one accepts this approach and grants 
that background intelligibility and meaningfullness are qualitatively different to all other'things', 
or elements,, in the world, then it becomes clear that the ontological dimension of post-traumatic 
anxiety demands an understanding which is different to that developed by cognitivism. 
Hermeneutics does not seek to grasp issues of meaning in an analytical and scientific way. 
Instead, meaningful connections are illuminated through interpretations which are never fixed or 
certain, always tentative and partial. 
AR hermeneutics is focused on interpretation but Heideggarian hermeneutics argues that meaning 
is something generated through our practical engagement with the world. We 'know' our world 
primarily through our practical activities in this world. This form of 'knowing-how' cannot be 
described, or analysed in terms of sets of rules (or schemas) but is the ground upon which our 
propositional knowledge (knowing-that) is based. This is an important issue in the context of our 
discussion of trauma and loss of meaningfullness and we shall return to the implications of this 
below. 
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3. In part three of the thesis I distanced myself from the 'universalism' which is inherent in Being 
and Time's project of 'fundamental ontology'. Instead I turn to Heidegger's later works to develop 
my arguments. In chapter nine I position myself against the existentialist presentation of anxiety 
as a universal mood in Being and Time and the associated notion of authenticity as emerging from 
an individual confrontation (and ultimate acceptance) of anxiety. (I present textual evidence from 
other works of Heidegger which, I believe, supports my move in this direction). Instead, I argue 
that the sort of anxiety described by Heidegger (which does not equate with the everyday 
psychiatric concept of anxiety, something more akin to Heidegger's understanding of fear) is not 
universal but something which is particularly associated with the culture of modernity. In other 
words, I am suggesting that a sense of meaninglessness, associated with a feeling of dislocation, 
is something which emerges in a very direct way from the cultural contradictions of modernity. 
Furthermore,, the advent of postmodernity has made these contradictions more acute and robbed 
us of whatever promises of order modernity could make. The suggestion is that the cultural and 
professional preoccupation with trauma and its sequelae (i. e. loss of meaning, shattered 
assumptions etc) stems from a wider cultural difficulty around a belief in an ordered and coherent 
world. I am not suggesting that only people living in the postmodern Western world suffer in the 
wake of traumatic events. However, I am arguing that cultures differ with regard to how much 
'Ontological security' (see Giddens, 199 1) is systematically put into question. In a society whose 
background metaphysics (both articulated and that which is contained in the 'way of life') does 
not function to create a strong sense of life's coherence and continuity severe trauma or loss can 
more easily lead to the sort of post-traumatic anxiety described above. In situations where 
individuals and communities share an orientation towards life (religious, political or cultural) 
which gives them a strong sense of coherence trauma may be experienced differently and result 
in different sequelae. 
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I presented the views of a number of commentators in the introduction with regard to the question 
as to why the concept of PTSD had recently come to the fore. The analysis of trauma developed 
in this thesis leads to an alternative understanding of why this has happened. In the discourse on 
trauma the prevailing view is that the cardinal symptoms of PTSD (as currently defined) are 
directly related to the loss of meaning brought about by trauma. If loss of meaning is a culturally 
variable phenomenon then the cross-cultural validity of the syndrome of PTSD is put into 
question. 
There is thus a move in the thesis from a critique of current (cognitivist) approaches to trauma 
to the elaboration of a context-centred approach grounded in hermeneutic philosophy. However, 
for use in the cross-cultural arena even this hermeneutic approach is inadequate on its own. My 
argument is that it needs to be balenced by certain insights which I broadly label 'deconstructive. 
In chapter ten I discussed Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit and the emergence of a 
'postmodern ethics'. I used the the work of Foucault to emphasise the idea that a withholding of 
knowledge can be a positive move. I noted how Stephen White has used the work of Heidegger, 
Foucault and Derrida to develop the idea of a 'responsibility to otherness'. I then applied this 
concept in the area of cross-cultural work with victims of violence. In this discussion I brought 
together the insights of hermeneutic and deconstructive approaches and outlined some principles 
which could be applied in this clinical area. In the thesis as a whole I have tried to develop what 
can best be described as a 'non-universalist' hermeneutics. In the next section I will elaborate on 
this approach to hermeneutics and point to its direct emergence from my own clinical endeavýours. 
In the last section I shall comment on the wider implications of this work. 
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11.2 TOWARnq A ISTON-UNIVERSALIST HIERMENEUTICS 
In this section I will be making the case that clinical work can be of direct relevance to 
philosophy. The disciplines of medicine and psychiatry involve a practical confrontation with the 
human realities of death and suffering. To the extent that philosophy involves an attempt to 
explore the nature of human experience it simply cannot avoid an encounter with these disciplines. 
Clinical work can underscore the validity of certain philosophical positions or alternatively work 
to undermine them. I will argue that my clinical involvement with victims of violence in Uganda 
and my engagement with their suffering lends support to both hermeneutic and deconstructive 
approaches to understanding human reafity In the fbHowing section I will suggest that there can 
be movement in the other direction as well Philosophy, through its rigorous interrogation of 
accepted 'truths' can work to destabilise dominant theoretical positions and serve to open paths 
in new directions. 
I noted in the introduction that my own interest in the issue of trauma emerged from my work 
with victims of violence and torture in Uganda, in the late 1980s. I became dissatisfied with the 
models of trauma and suffering which were available to me through my training as a psychiatrist. 
In the course of three years listening to people who had experienced terrible suffering I became 
convinced that the knowledge I brought with me had little to offer them. Instead, as time went 
on, I felt that I had more to learn from them about endurance and resilience in the face of extreme 
tragedy. Individual psychological models, such as PTSD, seemed somehow inappropriate and did 
not fit with what I was hearing. Somehow it felt wrong to reduce the suffering I encountered, 
which had historical, cultural,, religious, economic and sociological dimensions to any sort of 
model at all. And yet many people clearly wanted to talk about what had happened to themselves, 
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their families and their communities during the war years. They were very welcoming and often 
extremely grateful for my interest and, at times, it 'felt right' to be there, if only to bear witness 
to what had happened. 
This thesis is the result of my own search for an appropriate way to understand, in a respectful 
way, the suffering of the Ugandan people I met. Since my time in Uganda this search has been 
also stimulated by work with asylum-seekers in this country and occasional work with the 
organisation Save The Children in West Africa. Through this work I have had the opportunity 
to visit both Sierra Leone and Liberia on a number of occasions and speak to people who have 
been affected by war and to people who have gone to help. I have become aware that very many 
'trauma therapy' projects have been set up by Western agencies in countries affected by war and 
civil violence. Most of these projects look to the 'discourse on trauma' analysed in part one for 
their theoretical and practical orientation. I am hopeful that this work will help people think 
differently about the encounter between helping agencies and victims of violence. My aim is not 
to present a new universalist model of trauma but instead to develop a framework in which a 
better understanding can occur between helpers and those they wish to support. I believe that the 
sort of'non-universalist hermeneutics' presented here can offer a way forward. At this point it is 
possible to characterise my position vis a vis hermeneutics more clearly and to define what I mean 
by'non-universalist bermeneutics'. 
As I noted in the introduction, the term hermeneutics, like many words used in philosophy, has 
a number of connotations, and it has different meanings when used in different settings. In his 
book Contemporary Hermeneutics Bleicher (1980) proposes that there are three separate 
'strands' of henneneutic thought within the Continental philosophy tradition. The first of these is 
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hermeneutics as a methodological approach within the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). 
This refers to the sort of hermeneutic enquiry advocated by Dilthey as an alternative to 
approaches adopted fi7om the natural sciences. It is centred on the idea of Verstehen, our intuitive 
capacity to understand and grasp what another person means. This capacity can be developed and 
used to generate 'relatively objective' knowledge and so hermeneutics can involve a scientific 
encounter with the world. This casting of hermeneutics as science was rejected by proponents of 
the second strand of hermeneutic thought. Heidegger and Gadamer denied that hermeneutic 
interpretation was only relevant as a methodology in the human sciences. They opposed any form 
of 'objectivism' and argued instead that aH human understanding was based on interpretation. They 
developed henneneutics as an ontological, or philosopHcal discipline. In his book, Bleicher argues 
that there has also been a tradition of critical hermeneutics. Proponents of this strand criticised 
what they saw as the 'idealism' of hermeneutical theory and philosophy. We have already 
encountered the debate between Habennas and Gadamer in the introduction. Critical hermeneutics 
sought to identify the ways in which material forces and domination restricted thought and action 
and sought a form of 'objective' reason, with which to mount such a critique. I am not sure that 
MY 'use' of hermeneutics can be easily fitted into one of Bleicher's three strands. It is obviously 
Heideggarian in orientation, but I have also used it in a critical fashion to engage with the current 
discourse on trauma. This critical usage stems from my belief that Heidegger's account of human 
reality is superior to that of Descartes. I have attempted to justify this position through case 
material and reference to anthropological writing. In addition I also want this work to have 
methodological relevance and to serve a practical function by helping orient research and support 
projects away fi7om an individualist and positivist programme. As well as developing a critique of 
current writing about trauma I have also developed a more positive agenda. I have argued in 
favour of a context-centred approach and in favour of an ontological dimension to this issue. In 
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doing this I have used the philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger in a 'constructive' way. 
However,, I argued against a universalist understanding of hermeneutics. 
There are obvious tensions here. On reflection, I believe that these stem directly from my own 
c. c experience. In my work with victims of violence two concerns emerged as primary. First, 
there was a need to bear witness; to engage in a positive way with people who had suffered 
terribly. This demanded a capacity for empathy and with this a need for understanding. There was 
no way of avoiding an attempt at interpretation. I was not convinced that PTSD with its 
philosophical and cultural baggage would get me very far and so emerged the framework put 
forward in chapter five. Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world allowed for the philosophical 
grounding of this approach. Alongside a need to bear witness and understand, however, was a 
second priority - the need to avoid a silencing of indigenous interpretations. This, in turn, 
demanded an understanding of the limitations of my own position (even one which was critical 
of PTSD) and a respect for alternative perspectives on illness, heating and the nature of human 
reality. As I argued in chapter ten, this is where Foucault's approach became important. A'non- 
universalist hermeneutics' is my attempt to move beyond the tensions between deconstructive and 
hermeneutic philosophies. In relation to victims of violence (living in non-Western societies or 
refugees to Western countries) I outlined the form such an approach would take in the last 
chapter. 
11.3 WIDER EMPLICATIONS 
If such an approach can be usefully developed with regard to the issue of trauma 
(in cross-cultural 
settings) are there wider implications? Could this analysis 
be applied elsewhere in mental health 
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work? MY aim here is to outline an agenda for future research, so my remarks will be limited and 
tentative. The point has been made by Roland Littlewood, in his review of the 'new-cross-cultural 
psychiatry', that the insights developed in this field could be applied to psychiatry more generally. 
He says that psychiatry has been criticised because it: 
"... lacks any rigorous theory for dealing with the dialectical interplay of biology 
and human society, or for examining the relationship between psychopathologies 
and its own procedures of research and practice. The shift in emphasis from cross- 
cultural comparisons of psychiatric categories to examining psychiatric 
epistemology and clinical practice in all societies has led some to use the term 'the 
new psychiatry' (or even 'metapsychiatry') rather than the 'new cross-cultural 
psychiatry"' (Littlewood, 1990, pgs. 308-309). 
My writing about trauma does not arm the reader with a new model or a new therapeutic 
technique. My aim has been to open a space in which genuine dialogue can begin to unfold, a 
space in which psychiatry has a role, but only alongside other forms of knowledge and 
understanding. Most importantly this is a space characterised by a respect for alternative sets of 
priorities, ways of support which do not involve notions of mental health or mental illness and 
forms of healing not based in the various forms of dualism built into Western understandings. This 
echoes the views of Arthur Kleinman, Professor of Psychiatry and Anthropology at Harvard, who 
argues in his book Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience for 
a substantial rethink of psychiatry's agenda. Kleinman criticises the 'positivist bias' of psychiatry 
and argues the case for a substantial role for other disciplines. In particular, he suggests that'. 
"Cross-cultural comparison, appropriately applied, can challenge the hubris in 
bureaucratically motivated attempts to medicalize the human condition. It can 
make us sensitive to the potential abuses of psychiatric labels. It encourages 
humility in the face of alternative cultural formulations of the same problems 
which are viewed not as evidence of the ignorance of laymen, but as distinctive 
modes of thinking about fife's troubles. And it can create in the psychiatrist a sense 
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of being uncomfortable with mechanical application of all too often taken-for- 
granted professional categories and the tacit "interests" they represent" (Meinman, 
1988, p. 17). 
A 'new psychiatry' would seek to open up such discussions and dialogues in areas other than the 
cross-cultural. Psychiatry has already been challenged to move in this direction. Philosophy has 
a substantial role to play here. My approach has been to use insights from within the continental 
philosophy tradition to open up the assumptions of psychiatry to examination, However, there is 
also an important, and ever expanding critical literature, which draws on the analytic philosophy 
tradition. Fulford (1994) has used the linguistic analytical approach to highlight the prevalence 
of, and significance of, value judgements within psychiatric classifications. He argues that these 
judgements are not simply a 'nuisance' which can be cleared away through the adoption of ever 
more empirical scientific classifications. Instead they are at the heart of the psychiatric enterprise. 
Fulford writes that - 
"Instead of ... 
being a mark of deficiency, the evaluative connotations of mental 
illness are shown to reflect the properties (the logical properties) of its constituent 
symptoms (such as anxiety) and to reflect these properties as faithfully as the more 
descriptive connotations of physical illness reflect the corresponding (logical) 
properties of its constituent symptoms (such as pain)" (Fulford, 1994, p. 219). 
Fulford draws a number of conclusions from this. Perhaps more germane to our discussion here 
is his emphasis on the importance of the patient's experience of illness. This experience is not 
something secondary to the scientific view of the patient's disorder, rather it has a validity and 
an importance of its own. In an approach to mental illness which identifies the centrality Of issues 
of value, then the patient's account of his/her own position also becomes central. In pushing 
psychiatry towards a confrontation with these issues, philosophy has a vital role to play 
in the 
future of the discipline. 
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An increasingly important'user movement' (made up of patients, ex-patients and their supporters) 
has emerged in different parts of the world in recent years'. This movement has begun to 
challenge some of the fundamental assumptions of psychiatry and has argued the case for forms 
of support and assistance in times of crisis which owe little to traditional psychiatric theory or 
practice. For example, the Hearing Voices Network' is a loose organisation of people who hear 
voices. Some have received psychiatric care, others have not. They oppose the psychiatric 
orthodoxy that the experience of hearing voices is always best characterised in terms of auditory 
hallucinations i. e. as being a symptom of mental illness. They argue for the validity of other forms 
of explanation including spiritual and other supernatural accounts. They do not oppose psychiatry 
as such (and many members of the network take psychiatric medication), but they do oppose the 
dominance of psychiatric perspectives and its limited understanding of human reality. Similar 
networks are beginning to emerge in relation to other experiences and behaviours as well, for 
example a national network of people who 'self-harm' has been developing in Britain. Peter 
Campbell argues that the concept of 'crisis' needs substantial rethinking: 
" Sadly, I am convinced that for many mental health workers it remains true that 
they do not think the content of our crises, particularly those they define as 
psychotic, are real, relevant or of anything but negative value. It is ironic that 
while increasing numbers of people in the user/survivor movement are seeking 
new meanings in their most vivid personal experiences, so many mental health 
workers continue to look the other way" (Campbell, 1996, p. 182). 
A narrow positivist approach to research and theory building cannot hope to cope with these 
'There is now a'user literature' on mental health. A good introduction is the collection of 
articles in Read, I and Reynolds, J. (1996) Speaking Our Minds : An Anthology. See also 
Campbell, P. (1993). 
2]For various perspectives on hearing voices see Romme, M. and Escher, S, (1993) 
Accepting Voices. 
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demands and developments. They involve questions of values and ethics and entail debates in 
which the recipients of psychiatry demand a respect for their realities and demand to be heard in 
their own words. They refuse to be silenced by the strong voice of psychiatry. I believe that a non- 
universalist henneneutics can offer a fi7amework in which psychiatry can understand itself in a new 
light and engage in such debates in a productive manner. This framework would not entail an 
abandonment of cognitivism or empirical research in general. However, it would seek to 
demarcate the limitations of these approaches more clearly and also work to establish other ways 
in which researchers and patients encounter one another. 
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